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The Middle East is a semi-arid region where water 
scarcity has forever been a critical issue. Water 
management is a challenge in the area today because of 
increasing population, decreasing water quality, political 
instability and security concerns. Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority share the three major freshwater 
sources in an inequitable and unsustainable manner. This 
study details the hydro-geological, political, cultural and 
legal challenges to equitable and sustainable water 
resource management in the region today. Further, it 
analyzes extant institutional structures and suggested 
proposals for water management in the region and, finally, 
recommends the creation of a jointly operated, supra­
national, water authority for Israel and Palestine.
In support of this research, I traveled to the region 
and conducted first-person interviews with key players in 
Israel and in Palestine and visited water treatment and 
delivery systems. The implications of the study are: the 
water crisis is reaching a defining moment where Israel is 
rapidly developing desalination plants while unilaterally 
withdrawing from Palestinian territory; separate and 
uncoordinated management of surface and groundwater sources 
will inevitably lead to further degradation of the water 
supply; while all freshwater is currently consumed in the 
region, the population and concomitant demand for water 
will double within thirty years; and, currently, there is 
little trust among the political entities.
A jointly created and managed water authority, 
implemented incrementally, could re-engender confidence and 
trust among Israelis and Palestinians and serve as a new 
model for equitable and sustainable water resource 
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The Eastern Mediterranean region of Israel and
Palestine consumes virtually all its available freshwater 
today. The population of these two entities will double in 
thirty years. Major regional droughts are likely to occur 
within that same time period. Most importantly, the region 
is bereft of any effective, regional, institutional 
framework that has the mandate and support for local and 
international communities to formulate and enforce joint 
water resource management policies.
David Brooks stated in his Keynote Address at the 
Second Conference of the Israeli-Palestinian International 
Academic Conference on Water in Antalya, Turkey in 2004, 
"One could place the Israeli-Palestinian situation in a 
good news-bad news framework. The good news is that 
Israeli-Palestinian water issues can be resolved by 
political will. The bad news is that they can only be 
resolved by political will."1
1 David Brooks, "Water Demand Management as Governance: Lessons from 
the Middle East and South Africa." In 2nd Israeli-Palestinian
International Conference on water for Life Held in Antalya, Turkey 10- 
14 October, 2004.
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There are few performance criteria for effective 
groundwater management regimes that are universally- 
accepted, if not adopted, by water managers around the 
world. The design of water resource management 
institutions takes into consideration the sustainability of 
water resources, transferability, efficiency and equity. 
True sustainability is the equilibrium between current and 
future use. It is not enough to measure the inflow and 
outflow of an aquifer but one must take into account the 
quality and distribution as well. Transferability is the 
capacity of the institutional structures to foster 
"relatively free market transactions that can allocate the 
resource according to highest economic uses".2 Efficiency 
is defined as optimization of benefits relative to costs 
and equity is concerned with the fair and defensible 
distribution of the resource.
2 Gregory A. Thomas, "Centralized vs. Decentralized Approaches to 
Groundwater Management and Allocation in the Context of 
Overdevelopment", in Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad ed. Management of 
Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an 
International Perspective: International Development Research Centre 
and Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005, 1/78.
These criteria are manageable when the political 
entity in questions is a singular political body. There 
may be water basins within that political body competing 
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for water allocations but there are clear and well-accepted 
structures of governance, adjudication and concerns for 
conjunctive use.
When water resource management institutional 
structures are in the design stage for transboundary water 
basins and aquifers, other factors that must be taken into 
consideration are the administrative and political 
functionality of the transboundary co-riparian entities, 
the relative institutional, economic, military parity 
between the two (or more) entities, the level of trust and 
confidence between the states and the commonality of 
purpose and vision.
The complexities of the Middle East are notoriously 
labyrinthine in nature and developing institutional 
structures to accommodate all market sectors across 
political and social divides is a monumental task. In 
light of the urgency of water-related issues in the region, 
we do not have the luxury of pontificating about past 
inequities and adamantly maintaining accusatory stances. 




Major Sections of Investigation
The central questions that will be examined in this 
paper are:
1. Does an integrated institutional framework, which 
provides for equitable and sustainable water resource 
management for the Eastern Mediterranean, exist today?
2. If not, what are the strategies and institutional 
structures required to allow for effective water 
resource management in the region?
This paper will be divided into four broad sections:
The Challenges of the Region
The Challenges of the region, vis-a-vis water 
management, interact with all aspects of physical and 
societal life: the geography, geology and hydrology; 
population growth; cultural mores; societal demands; 
political relationships. I shall provide a short, clear 
overview of the water balance in the region and show how 
severe, far-reaching and imbalanced are freshwater supply, 
demand and allocation.
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Institutions Affecting Water Management
The Institutions that have affected water management 
include: the Joint Water Commission; the Israeli Water 
Commission and Water Commissioner; civil and military 
Israeli authorities; Zionism; the Palestinian Authority and 
Palestinian Water Authority; International and Regional 
treaties and agreements; international organizations; Non- 
Governmental Organizations (NGO's). This section will 
include an explication of the international rule and code 
of law developed for water management and weighs its 
applicability for the region.
Propositions for Institutional Management
Suggested propositions for integrated institutional 
water resource management in the Middle East are several: 
Separate, Coordinated, Joint, Independent or Private. This 
section will also look at alternative, local structures and 
the special role of NGO's. Additionally, institutional 
reform required for integrated water resource management in 
Palestine will be described and analyzed.
Recommendations for Institutional Management
Recommendations for integrated institutional water 
resource management in the current political context 
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comprise the final section. Joint water management studies 
and proposals came into their fore in the 1980's and models 
for transboundary water management for the Middle East were 
widely disseminated and debated during the halcyon 
atmosphere of the Oslo Accords in the mid 1990's. There was 
a setback to the confidence-building efforts that had been 
engendered up to that point once the second Intifada in 
2000 took root. The 2006 elections in Palestine and 
Israel, and their aftermath, have manifested an atmosphere 
wherein all the previously taken steps in confidence 
building have vanished. Today, bold concepts of joint water 
management are not under consideration by local, national 
governments. Nonetheless, because of inadequate and 
fragile water supplies, a centralized governance body may 
be required to manage water resources in the region, but, 
such a structure must be flexible enough to incorporate 
alternative, local, subsidiary models for responsive and 
eguitable resource management. The challenge of creating 
those institutional structures to accommodate both sectors 
will be presented in this section.
The challenges that face effective, sustainable and 
equitable water management are myriad and complex. The 
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lack of water and the inequitable allocation of water have 
contributed to conflict at the international and 
intranational levels. "The primary challenge is to get 
ahead of the 'crisis curve'', and to help develop 
institutional capacity and a culture of cooperation in 
advance of costly, time-consuming crises, which in turn 
threaten lives, regional stability and ecosystem health."3
3 Mark W. Rosegrant, "Policies and Institutions for Sustainable Water 
Resource Management: A Research Agenda", Challenge Program on Water and 
Food Background Paper 5. Available at
http://www.iwmi.cgiar■org/challenge-program/pdf/paper5.pdf. Accessed 
February 15, 2006.
The institutions discussed below are also of numerous 
varieties. They range in scope and size from formalized 
institutions such as treaties and government agencies to 
informal subsidiaries such as village councils and 
agreements in principle. The size, formality and efficacy 
of these institutions are often not correlative. 
Integrated Water Management
In integrated water management programs societal 
sectors that must be addressed and satisfied include health 
and sanitation, environment, ecology, hydroelectric power, 
irrigation, recreation, industrial and domestic. All of 
these purposes interact and a management plan that 
adequately sustains each one needs to be able to collect, 
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collate, interpret and act upon scientifically based data 
that are transparently shared among all parties. All 
stakeholders in the region must have access to this 
information and be given the opportunity to become actively 
involved in policy making. A body that governs such an 
integrated management program must be representative of its 
constituents, cognizant of water quality and quantity 
issues, include planning and decision-making bodies, have 
enforcement capabilities, incorporate dispute mechanism 
means and maintain transparent and reliable means of 
income.4
4 R. Laster, J. Gat and D. Livney, "Water Flowing Under the Law", accessed on January 15, 
2006, available on line at http://www.ors.regione.lombardia.it
The Role of NGO's in the Middle East
In support of this thesis I will review the 
institutions of the international and regional water 
resource management community. NGO's have been of 
extraordinary value in the Middle East and it is likely 
that in the current political atmosphere their role will be 
increased as regional governmental cooperation is in flux. 
There are NGO's in the region which are controlled jointly 
by Israelis and Palestinians and serve not only to provide 
technical assistance and links to donor communities, but 
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which have also developed and nurtured meaningful personal 
relationships among their members. New and creative 
thinking in the region has challenged the 'zero-sum' 
equation and provided water management theory based on a 
'win-win' scenario. For Palestinians, in particular, who 
have not enjoyed the benefits of international recognition, 
often these NGO's have provided their voice and face.
Nomenclature .
A word about nomenclature is relevant at this point.
In this paper I use the term "Palestine" liberally. As of 
this writing, there is no state of Palestine. Israel has 
officially withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and that area is 
now under control of the Palestinian Authority. There are 
several towns in the West Bank that are also under the 
authority of the Palestinian Authority. It is conventional 
wisdom that once the final status negotiations between 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority conclude that the 
official state of Palestine will be established. Any major 
change in water policy will not be instituted for some time 
and it is likely that the final agreement on a regional 
water policy, if there is one, will be negotiated between 
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the states of Israel and Palestine. There are also 
different names used by Palestinians and Israelis for many 
of the same locales in the region. For example, Lake 
Kinneret is also called Lake Tiberias and the Sea of 
Galilee. The streams of northern- Israel, southern Syria 
and southeastern Lebanon are, at times, spelled differently 
as well. I will use the commonly used spellings that 
appear in literature published by the Israel-Palestine 
Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), which is the 
only think tank in the region, equally composed of 
Palestinians and Israelis. I will use the term "MCM" to 
describe "Million Cubic Meters" which is the standard used 
to gauge yearly quantities of water and the term "m3" to 
connote "Cubic Meters" which is often used to describe the 
hourly or daily flow of a water source.
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■CHAPTER THREE
GEOGRAPHY AND HYDROLOGY OF THE 
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN
Geography
Israel and Palestine comprise a landmass equivalent in 
size to the state of New Jersey. The population of Israel 
is approximately 6.7 million and the two areas of 
Palestine; the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have populations 
of 2.4 million and 1.4 million, respectively. Israel's 
landmass consists of 22,072 square kilometers (sq. km) 
while the West Bank and Gaza Strip consist of 5,970 and 365 





Israel and Palestine are located in the eastern 
Mediterranean situated in a transition zone between 
Mediterranean subtropical and arid climates. The people of 
the region have always been keenly aware of the limits 
imposed by scarce water resources. Israel and Palestine 
consume all available fresh water in their shared watershed 
annually. The population in Palestine (West Bank and Gaza) 
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is growing at an annual rate of 4.0% (expected to double 
its current 3.5 million population in thirty years) while 
Israel's population growth is a bit more modest at 2.0%.
In spite of Israel having achieved the greatest degree of 
agricultural irrigation efficiency in the world, it is 
likely that increasing water demand will create intolerable 
stress on available resources by 2025.6 The division of 
these resources is a contentious issue and the impending 
water crisis compels new thinking in the realm of water 
resource management policy for the Middle East.
6 Jonathan Lautze, Meredith Reeves, Rosaura Vega, Paul Kirshen, 
International Water Resources Association, Winter International, Volume 
30, p. 197, June 2005.
The Watershed of the Eastern Mediterranean
The map in Figure 1 shows the watershed of the region, 
the major water pipelines including the National Water 








There are three major freshwater sources for the 
region: The Jordan River Basin, the Mountain Aquifer and 
the Coastal Aquifer.
The Jordan River Basin. The Jordan River Basin is 
depicted in Figure 2. It consists of two distinct sections: 
the Upper Jordan (north of Lake Kinneret or Sea of Galilee) 
and Lower Jordan (south of Lake Kinneret to the Dead Sea). 
With the exceptions of the Litani River in southern 
Lebanon, the Dan River, and Lake Kinneret, which are 
situated wholly within the internationally recognized 
borders of Israel, all of the other rivers and streams that 
feed the Jordan River Basin are trans-boundary and co­
riparian. The major tributaries of the Upper Jordan are:
■ The Dan River, which rises in Israel and has an annual 
average flow of 250 MCM;
■ The Hatzbani River, which rises in Lebanon and 
discharges 150 MCM/year;
■ The Banias River, which rises in the Golan Heights and
discharges 150 MCM/year.
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These three rivers all drain into Lake Kinneret. Ten 
kilometers south of the Lake the Jordan River intersects 
with the Yarmuk River. .The Yarmuk has an annual average 
flow of 400 MCM although Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian 
withdrawals have rendered the Yarmuk's contribution to the 
Jordan River nearly insignificant. The Yarmuk serves as 
the border between Syria and Jordan and once it joins the 
Jordan it forms the current border between Israel and the 
West Bank.
There are a number of small tributaries and wadis (ancient 
riverbeds that only flow during winter) that complete the 
basin.
15
Figure 2. Jordan River Basin
Reprinted from "Peace with the Golan: Water
Issues of the Golan Heights"
http://www.golan.org.il/water.html
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The Coastal Aquifer. The Coastal Aquifer, which is 
formed of sand and sandstone, provides Israel's most 
densely populated region (including the largest city, Tel 
Aviv) with 15% of the state's total freshwater supply, or 
280 MCM annually. The Coastal Aquifer is neatly divided 
into two sub-aquifers wherein water to Israel is provided 
from the northern sub-aquifer and Gaza from the southern. 
Gaza draws about 50 MCM annually from its 'sub-aquifer'.
The Coastal Aquifer is 3-5 meters above sea level in 
its natural state but is now thought to be only 1 meter 
above sea level due to over pumping. The chloride level 
has increased from 100 ppm in the 1970's to 155 ppm today.
The Mountain Aquifer. The Mountain Aquifer consists of 
karstic, limestone/dolomite formations with recharge areas 
mostly along the upper mountain slopes and ridges at levels 
above 500 meters above sea level. The Mountain Aquifer, 
located primarily in the West Bank, drains an annual total 
of 650 MCM and is made up of three discrete basins:
The Western Aquifer. The Western Aquifer (termed The 
Yarkon-Taninim aquifer in Israel) provides more than half 
the total yield of the Aquifer (about 350 MCM/year). It 
flows westerly into Israel. Approximately 40 MCM are 
brackish waters. The Western Aquifer is the largest of the 
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three basins, some 6,000 km2. The exposed replenishment 
area covers about 1800 km2 of which 1400 km2 (78%) lie 
within the West Bank. Of the annual recharge: 344 MCM is 
consumed by Israelis, or 91%; about 22 MCM, or 6%, by 
Palestinians. Jewish settlements consume about 10 MCM or 
2% of the total discharge.
flows about 130 MCM/year of which 70 MCM are brackish. The 
primary flow of the North-Eastern Aquifer is north by 
northeast and rises in Israel as the Ma'ayan Harod Springs. 
The North-Eastern Aquifer consists of two overlaying sub­
aquifers: the Eocene limestone aquifer often referred to
as the Nablus-Jenin-Gilboa basin, and the deeper limestone­
dolomite Cenomanian aquifer, which is the more productive. 
The North-Eastern Aquifer covers 1044 km2 and precipitation 
recharges an average volume of 145 MCM. The aquifer lies 
predominantly in the West Bank and the recharge area is 
situated wholly in the West Bank. The natural outflow 
springs are located within Israel in the Beit She'an 
(Beisan) and Yezre'el (Marj Bani Amr) valleys.
The Eastern Aquifer. The Eastern Aquifer is the only 
basin the Mountain Aquifer system that lies and rises 
entirely in the West Bank. It discharges about 150
The North-Eastern Aquifer. The North-Eastern Aquifer 
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MCM/year and provides all the consumptive water for 
Palestinians and Jewish settlers living in the West Bank. 
The Eastern Aquifer covers an area of 3,080 km2. This 
aquifer is the most dramatic and asymmetrical basin. It 
stretches from the mountaintop at 600-800 meters above sea 
level to the Jordan (Syrian-African) Rift at 350-400 meters 
below sea level. An average precipitation volume of 172 
MCM recharges groundwater, although evapotranspiration 
rates are among the highest in the world reaching 3000mm 
annually. (Refer to Table 2). The springs that are 
discharged from this aquifer proliferate in the area of the 
Dead Sea and carry high levels of salinity. Palestinians 
consume about 69 MCM or 43% of abstracted water from the 
Eastern Aquifer, Jewish settlers consume about 50 MCM or 
31% and another 40 MCM or 25% are consumed by Israelis 
within the 'green line' (area delineated as international 
boundary pre-June, 1967). Table 1 provides a summary of 
freshwater availability and use by Israelis, Palestinians 
and Jewish Settlers in the West Bank in 1995.
Evaporation and Recharge
The only sources of recharge for the Mountain Aquifer 
are precipitation and run-off. The annual infiltration 
volume is 600 MCM/year. However, precipitation in the
19
region is inconsistent and widely varies from an average of
600 mm in the mountains to 100 mm in the arid Jordan 
Valley. Evapotranspiration rates far exceed annual 
rainfall.
Figure 3. Mountain and Coastal Aquifers
20
Table 1. Summary of Fresh Water Availability and Use in 
1995
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1311 685 20 0 705
' TOTAL f. 2295 1434 85 232
7 "Settlers" refers to Jewish settlers living in the area of the West 
Bank. Jewish settlers were evacuated from Gaza in mid August 2005.
8 Marwan Haddad, "The Dilemma Over Palestinian Water Rights," in Eran 
Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, Eds. Joint Management of Shared Aquifers; 
The Fourth Workshop, Jerusalem: The Harry S. Truman Research Institute 
for the Advancement of Peace, 1998, p. 96.
Source: Marwan Haddad, "The Dilemma Over Palestinian Water
Rights,"8 in Joint Management of Shared Aquifers-The Fourth 
Workshop, ed. Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, The Harry 
S. Truman Institute for the Advancement of Peace and the 
Palestine Consultancy Group. Jerusalem, 1995.
The Hydrologic Cycle
Because the overwhelming source of recharge water for 
the aquifers is precipitation it is salient to place 
precipitation in its place in the hydrologic cycle. The 
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hydrologic cycle is actually a complex web of continual 
flows, or fluxes of water among the major 'reservoirs' or 
stocks of water. The sun provides the energy that causes 
evaporation and mixes water vapor in the atmosphere and 
thereby drives the cycle against the pull of gravity.9 The 
water balance equation (Harte, 1985) for the land (as 
opposed to the sea) is expressed by Pl=ELs + ELL + R: whereas 
PL= rate of precipitation on land; ELS= rate of 
evapotranspiration from land of water that fall as 
precipitation on the sea; ELL=rate .of evapotranspiration 
from land of water that falls as precipitation on the land: 
R=rate of runoff from land to sea. Runoff to the sea is 
minimal, in particular in the area of the Mountain Aquifer. 
Evapotranspiration is a factor that manifestly affects the 
total water balance in the region. Table 2 illustrates the 
average annual precipitation, evapotranspiration rates and 
temperature ranges for the region. The area is among the 
most water scarce in the world and evapotranspiration rates 
among the world's highest.
9 S. Lawrence Dingman, Physical Hydrology, Macmillan Publishing Company, 
New York, 1993
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Table 2. Summary of Average Precipitation, 
Evapotranspiration and Temperatures













400-600 1700 19 13-26
Mountains 500-700 1850 17 8.5-22
.Jordan 
Valley
50-150 2300 23 11-40
Source: Yoav Harpaz, Marwan Haddad and Shaul Arlosoroff, 
"Overview of the Mountain Aquifer": A Shared Israeli- 
Palestinian Resource", in Management of Shared Groundwater 
Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an
International Perspective, ed. Eran Feitelson and Marwan 
Haddad. Ottawa, Canada: International Development 
Research Centre and Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
Mekorot and Israel's National Water Carrier
Mekorot, in Hebrew, means "sources" and, true to its 
moniker, Mekorot has been the source of water Israelis have 
turned to for piped water since 1937.
Mekorot supplies 90% of Israel's drinking water and 80% 
of water overall. Mekorot supplies about 1004 MCM/annually 
to Israel and consumes about 6% of Israel's electrical 
power. Mekorot's water supply system consists of:




■ 10,500 km. of large-diameter pipes
■ 570 concrete and steel reservoirs
■ 95 earthen reservoirs
■ 6 laboratories
Mekorot's crown achievement is the National Water Carrier.
This system's pumping capacity is 72,000 cubic meters/hour 
and the total lift of 400 meters at the Sapir Pumping 
Station on the southern coast of Lake Kinneret requires 
three 20,000 k/W horizontal pumps driven by three 30,000 hp 
motors. The primary purpose of the system is to pump water 
from Lake Kinneret to the populated areas of Israel. The 
Lake covers about 170 sq. km containing 4,000 MCM of water. 
The National Water Carrier is illustrated in Figure 4.
24
Water Sources
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs 
(PASSIA)
Figure 4. Water Sources of the Middle East
The original plan for the National Water Carrier, in
1953, when Jordan formed the border between Israel and
Syria, called for drawing the water of the Jordan River
above Lake Kinneret at approximately, sea level but Syrian
and UN opposition enjoined Israel from diverting Jordan
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River water. The economic affect of this decision was 
significant as it forced Israel to pump all its water out 
of Lake Kinneret at an elevation of -100 to -120 meters 
below sea level. Figure 5 illustrates the relative 
location of Lake Kinneret and its elevation.
Figure 5. Lake Kinneret
Desalinated Water
Desalinated water in the region falls into one of two 
categories: Seawater desalination and brackish 
desalination. Brackish water can be treated and delivered 
for irrigation purposes to farms in Israel and Palestine 
for about $0.20-$0.50/m3 or, roughly the cost of currently 
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pumped, piped and delivered freshwater to Israeli farms. 
(The cost of delivered water to Palestine will be addressed 
later in this paper).
Desalinated seawater in Israel is already the major 
drinking water supply for the southernmost area (Eilat is 
the largest southern city with a population of about 40,000 
people).
The Ashkelon Desalination Plant
Israel inaugurated the final stage of the plant in 
Ashkelon, (on the southern Mediterranean coast of Israel) 
on February 9, 2006. This is now the single largest 
seawater desalination plant for drinking water in the 
world, producing 110 MCM/annually. Its total capacity is 
equivalent to 5-6% of Israel's potable demand. The 
Ashkelon plant reduces salinity from 40,750 TDS to <40 TDS 
(a 99.9% salinity reduction).10 The cost of desalinated 
seawater is more economical today than in year's past due 
to increased energy efficiency and a growing use of reverse 
osmosis technology. The plant in Ashkelon cost $250 
million to construct. The overall revenue over the period 
of the contract will be in the region of $825 million. The 
contract for the Ashkelon facility - the first in the 
10 http: //www. water-technology.net/projects/israel/specs .'html accessed 
February 12, 2006
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series of large-scale seawater desalination units - was 
awarded in September 2001, after an extensive tendering 
process beginning in July of the previous year. The 
concession was granted on a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
basis and at the end of the 25-year period, the plant 
transfers to the Government of Israel. Originally intended 
to produce only 50 million m3/yr, after the formal 
signatures were completed in November 2001, further 
negotiations were entered into between February and April 
2002 to double the output. This second agreement was signed 
in April 2002 and work on the three-phase construction 
program began a year later. The Ashkelon facility operating 
at full capacity will itself contribute 25% of the initial 
target set out in the Israeli government's master plan. 11 
Proposals for Desalinated Water in Israel
Today, Israel's National Water Company, Mekorot, 
operates 29 desalination plants within Israel, producing 
22.5 MCM/year of treated brackish water for irrigation 
purposes, and 114 MCM/year of treated seawater for drinking 
purposes since the inauguration of the Ashkelon plant. 
There are many proposals under consideration to increase
ii Ibid
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Israel's desalinated seawater and brackish capacity to 20% 
of total demand by the year 2010.12
12 Michael Zaide, Planning Division-Water Commission, Israel, 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/csd/csdl2/statements/israel_1904.pdf
13 Water-technology.net http://www.water­
technology . net /pro j ects/israel/index.html#israel6.
Plans for Desalinated Seawater in Gaza
There are two small plants, financed by the French 
Government and Austrian Government to provide Gaza with 0.5 
MCM/year and 0.2 MCM/year, respectively. These two plants 
will ultimately be ready to accommodate a capacity of 2.0 
MCM/year and 1.0 MCM/year. USAID has agreed to finance a 
larger desalination plant (as full donation) with a 
capacity of 22MCM/year with a final phase capacity in the 
year 2020 of 55 MCM/year.
The Cost of Desalinated Seawater
The cost of desalinated seawater is quite elastic as 
advanced technologies move forward. The Eilat-Ashkelon 
Pipeline Corporation (EAPC), which lies around 700m north 
of an existing Israel Electrical Company power station uses 
advanced SWRO (Reverse Osmosis) technology and state-of- 
the-art energy recovery systems to reduce operating costs 
and help achieve one of the lowest water prices ($0.527/m3) 
ever offered for this kind of operation.13 In comparison, 
the cost of seawater for the region of one delivered cubic 
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meter of seawater from smaller plants carries a price of 
$0.80/m3.14
14 Arlosoroff, Shaul, "Water Resource Management in Israel", In 
Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian 
Case with an International Perspective, ed. Eran Feitelson and Marwan 
Haddad ed. International Development Research Centre and Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2005, p. 73.
Desalination is a major component of any integrated 
water management plan for the region and will be addressed 
as such in the third section of this paper. Figure 6 
illustrates the pilot projects undertaken by Israel as of 
today.
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Figure 6. Desalination Pilot Projects
Projections for Desalinated Seawater in Israel'
The State of Israel's Master Plan calls for a constant 
freshwater availability of 1,467 MCM in each year and a 
steady increase in desalinated seawater, brackish water and 
reclaimed water.
31
Table 3. Projections for Desalinated Growth within Israel
2002-20).0
YEAR • Fresh Reclaimed .’Desalinated Brackish .Required
Supplement
1,467 298 0 166 35
1,467 403 355 166 26
1,467 509 500 140 -75
Source: State o:E Israel Ministry of In:Erastructures, Water
Commission, Planning Division; Transitional Master Plan for





Population in the region will double within thirty 
years. Figures 7 and 815 show the growing population curves 
among Israelis and Palestinians.
15 United Nations 2002 as shown in Jonathan Lautze, Meredith Reeves, 
Rosaura Vega and Paul Kirshen, "Water Allocation, Climate Change, and 
Sustainable Peace", Water International, IWRA, Volume 30, June 2005
Population Trends In Israel 
(1950-2050)
Figure 7. Population Trends
In Israel 1950-2050
Figure 8. Population Trends 
in Palestine 1950-2050
These figures include both natural population increase and 
medium variant immigration.
The population projections below in Tables 4 and 5 are 
based on a relatively static ratio of water per capita for 
all water sectors. The only significant increase, per 
capita is in the industrial sector in the Palestinian
33
population, which provides for a 9% growth from 2010 to 
2020. Of significance is projected static per capita use 
of agricultural water in the Israeli population.
Population and Water Demand
The total projected water demand for Palestine and
Israel is 3051 MCM by 2010 and 3943 in 2020. Water demand 
management is also a major component of any integrated 
water resource management program for the region and will 
be addressed later. Tables 4 and 5 depict population 
projections and water consumption projections in Palestine 
and Israel from 2000-2020.
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2000 3,160,000 1,140,000 2,020,000 263 217 18 498
. 2010.; 4,930,000 1,870,000 3,060,000 484 305 37 826
2020 6,580,000 2,620,000 3,960,000 787 415 61 1263
Source: Eckstein, Z., and Fishelson, G. "The Water System 
in Israel" Submitted to the Harvard Middle East Water 
Project, 1994
35
Table 5. Israeli Population Projections and Water
Consumption Patterns











2000 6,498,000 690 1,010 129 26 1855
2010 7,300,000 886 1,122 167 50 2225
2020 8,600,000 1000 1,350 230 100 2680
Source: State of Israel; Transitional Master Plan for
Water Sector Development 2000-2010 Ministry of National 
Infrastructures; Water Commission, Planning Division. 






Current water resources in Palestine provide a per 
capita average of one-half of the World Health 
Organization's daily requirement. Palestinians average 
about 70 liters/day of fresh water although 66% of the 
population averages less than 50 liters/day16.
16 http://www.passia.org/index_pfacts.htm
17 Ibid. Rashed Al-Sa'ed, "Obstacles and Chances to Cut Pollution Load 
Discharges from Urban Palestine", Water Studies Institute, Bir Zeit 
University, West Bank, Palestinian Authority, IWRA, Water Authority, 
December, 2005
Israeli Consumption
The Israeli average, by contrast, is about 300 
liters/day. If one takes industrial water consumption into 
account then the average annual Israeli water consumption 
reaches five times the average Palestinian's.17
Sewage Connections
The percentage of the population that is connected to 
sewer networks in Palestine is 45.8% overall: 66.3% in Gaza 
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and 34.6% in the West Bank.18 In Israel 95% of all produced 
sewage is collected in central sewage systems.19
18 http:www.moh.gov.ps/index.asp





Overdrawn Water and Unaccounted-for Water
The water that is extracted by Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, particularly the latter, exceeds 
the natural replenishment rate leading to aquifer 
degradation, seawater intrusion, and overall decline of the 
Gaza Coastal Aquifer of 1.6 meters/year, and a concomitant 
paucity of water for health, agriculture and industry. 
Because of the scarcity of new infrastructure in Palestine 
the amount of 'unaccounted for water' in the West Bank is 
40% and in Gaza, 50%. For the most part this is water that 
is lost due to leaking pipes.20
Water Withdrawals in Palestine
In the West Bank total water demand is about 120 MCM 
and in Gaza about 125 MCM. Since Israel captured the West 
Bank and Gaza in 1967, Palestinians, from that point 
onward, have been prohibited from further developing their 
water resources. Although Palestinian withdrawal has 
increased modestly from approximately 200 MCM/year in 1967 
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to 240 MCM/year in 2000, the population nearly tripled in 
the same time interval. In other words, while Palestinian 
water withdrawal in 2000 stood at 107 to 120 percent of its 
1967 level, the Palestinian population in 2000 was nearly 
300% its 1967 level; hence a substantial decrease in gross 
per capita withdrawal.21 Table 6 illustrates an overall 
picture of water demand in the West Bank and Gaza.
Table 6. Water Demand in the West Bank and Gaza
. ’ WEST BANK : 'GAZA
.Number of wells, : 305 3, 855
Total well discharge 58 MCM 122 MCM




.Mekorot .water • ; , ■ 32 MCM 5 MCM
T.otal. Available, ■ 116 MCM 127 MCM
Source: Ihab Barghothi; House Committee on International 
Relations U.S. House of Representatives
Water Suppliers to the West Bank and Populations Served
Mekorot, Jerusalem and Palestinian Councils. There 
are three main domestic water suppliers in the West Bank: 
Mekorot, the Municipality of Jerusalem, and the Palestinian 
municipal village councils and water utilities of the West
21 Lautze 2.
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Bank.22 Mekorot supplies about 11% of the water to the West 
Bank from sources within Israel; Mekorot supplies about 15% 
of the water to the West Bank from sources within the West 
Bank; the Municipality of Jerusalem supplies about 1% of 
West Bank water from sources within the West Bank; and the 
Municipalities and Village Councils of the West Bank 
provide about 16% of the water to the West Bank from e
22 Nassereddin, Taher, "Legal and Administrative Responsibility of 
Domestic Water Supply to the Palestinians", in Eran Feitelson and 
Marwan Haddad Ed. Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The 
Israeli-Palestinian Case with an' International Perspective: 
International Development Research Centre and Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2005, p.110.
23 Ibid. p. 112
24 Ibid
sources within the West Bank.23 24
Table 7 illustrates the districts of the West Bank, 
the population served/not served by one of the three 
providers and the number of villages served/not served. 
The 179 villages in the West Bank that are not served by 
piped water receive their water either by tanks or from 
cisterns, which are filled with rainwater.
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Table 7. Distribution of Water Supply in the West Bank by 
Population and Number of Localities Served25
District Population .Served Number of Villages Served-
Served* ' Unserved 'Total’" Served"; [Unserved • Total
Jenin ; 112,923 65,247 178,170 34 41 75
.Tulkarem! 86,452 23,858 110,310 15 23 38
Qalqilia ‘ 50,497 14,891 65,388 16 17 33
Salfit 33,100 11,174 44,274 14 7 21
Tubas 22,578 8,931 31,509 7 2 9
■Nablus 178,137 139,798 217,935 32 24 56
•Ramallah' 225,873 8,517 234,390 85 8 93
Jerusalem 254,387 0 254,387 23 0 23
Jericho 27,599 484 28,083 12 1 13
Bethlehem! 110,430 2,583 113,013 40 10 50
Hebron ’ 276,085 18,031 294,116 51 46 97
TOTAL 1,378,061 293,514 1,571,575 329 179 508
Source: Taher Nassereddin, "Legal and Administrative
Responsibility of Domestic Water Supply to the 
Palestinians", in Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad Ed. 
Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli- 
Palestinian Case with an International Perspective. Ottawa, 
Canada: International Development Research Centre and 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005, p.114.
Water Tankers. During the heated and irrigation­
intensive summer months, some villages on the West Bank 
normally served by Israeli sources are cut off for periods 
of 2-3 weeks at a time.25 6 When these sources are not 
available, private tank vendors in the West Bank conduct a 
25 Nassereddin, p. 114
26 Interview with Saul Arlosoroff, December 28, 2005
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brisk Black Market business in water sales. A more 
complete discussion of water pricing and the economics of 
water appear later but Table 8 provides an illuminating 
affect of the unavailability of piped water in times of 
stress. The average cost of piped water to consumers in 
all of the districts below average between $1.00-$l.50/m3.
Table 8. The Price of Water Sold by Tank Vendors in 
Different Districts of the West Bank 2003











Source: Yasser Nasser, "Palestinian Water Rights and
Needs", Water in Palestine: Problems, Politics and. 
Prospects, Ed. Fadia Daibes, Jerusalem: Palestinian 
Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 
2003 p. 108
A detailed depiction of domestic water allocations in 
Palestine is presented below in Table 9. A more detailed 
analysis of water tariffs in Palestine is found below in 
the discussion of the PWA.
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Table 9. Domestic Water Allocations in Palestine 2005











West Bank 73.02 2,055,227 97.3
Jenin . : 4.93 246,685 54.7
Tubas • „ 0.69 45,168 41.8
Tulkarem 6.67 162,936 112.1
Nablus 9.84 317,331 84.9
Qalqilia 3.96 90,960 119.2




.Jericho 3.09 40,909 206.8
Jerusalem 6.79 144,597 128.6
/Bethlehem--- . 1 12.39 169,190 200.5
Hebron • : .. 9.80 506,641 53
Gaza Strip ’ 69.83 1,337,236 143
Source: Palestinian Center Bureau of Statistics 2005.




BRIEF SURVEY OF GAZA, WEST
BANK AND ISRAEL
Gaza
All of Gaza's water emanates from the Gaza Coastal 
Aquifer. Karen Assaf, Ph.D., is currently director of the 
Department of Water Planning at the Ministry of Planning 
and International Cooperation working in the Palestinian 
Water Authority, Palestinian Interim Self-Government 
Authority. In correspondence with her about the water 
situation in Gaza she wrote, "There are many, many wells in 
Gaza (Table 6).... maybe reaching 3,000 - but most of them 
are shallow and are used for agriculture or household use. 
The water situation is so bad in Gaza that many have just 
dug in their yards, or living rooms to get to the shallow 
water table. Of course the water is very brackish. Only 
about 12% of the water in Gaza is really fit to drink, 
according to WHO standards..."27 Figure 9 depicts the well 
distribution in Gaza.
Karen Assaf,, email correspondence with author, September 28 2005. 
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Figure 9. Gaza wells
Source: Reprinted from Applied Resource Institute,
Jerusalem: 2004
Population. Approximately 1.4 million people live in
Gaza today and it is already the most densely populated 
region in the Northern Hemisphere with 3,500 people per sq. 
km. It is presumed that the population will increase to 
2.3 million in ten years and the density will increase to 
5,800 people per sq.km.
Size, Poverty and Unemployment. Gaza is an arid area 
some 360 sq. km in size. Unemployment in Gaza is 50%; the 
per capita income is about $600/year: 81% of the population 





Size, Geography and Ethnicity. The West Bank is quite 
a bit larger than Gaza. It is about the size of the state 
of Delaware, 5,860 sq. km. The West Bank is landlocked and 
topographically diverse. Its low spot is the lowest place 
on Earth, the Dead Sea at -408 meters, and its highest 
point is well above 1,000 meters above sea level. The 
population today is about 2.4 million and there are about 
187,000 Jewish settlers in the area. While Gaza is 99.7% 
Moslem, the West Bank, though still predominantly Moslem, 
is also home to an 8% Christian Arab population and, as 
mentioned, 7% Jewish..
Unemployment and Poverty. Unemployment is about 27%. 
The per capita income is $800/year and approximately 59% of 
the population lives below the poverty line.29 Figure 10 
provides a political overview of the West Bank.
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Figure 10. West Bank Political Map of Palestine
Source .-http: //www. inf oplease. com/atlas/country/ 
westbank.html
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Jewish Settlers in the West Bank
Of the total 679 MCM of West Bank groundwater 
approximately 56.6% is used by Israel for use within 
Israel; 23.8% is used by the approximate 187,000 Jewish 
settlers in the West Bank (excluding those residing in East 
Jerusalem); and, the approximate 1.8 million Palestinians 
living in the West Bank use 19.6%30 Figure 11 is an overview 
of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
30 Fayez Freijat, "Impact of Jewish Settlements on Palestinian Water 
Resources", Water in Palestine: Problems, Politics and Prospects, 
Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 
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Israel's territory is approximately 1,017 sq. km. with 
a population of about 6.2 million. Within Israel, 76% are 
Jewish; 15% are Muslim and about 8% Arab Christian. Israel 
achieved independence and declared statehood in 1948. 18%
of the population lives below the poverty line and 11% are 
unemployed. Israel's GDP is $128 billion and per capita 
income is about $20,000/year.31 Figure 12 provides a 
political overview of Israel today.
31 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/is.html





Quality of Water in Gaza
The only source of water supply for domestic, 
agricultural and industrial uses in Gaza is local 
groundwater. The Gaza Aquifer is composed of sand and 
sandstone and varies in thickness from 10 meters in the 
eastern boundary to 150 meters along the coast but the 
fresh water interface ranges from 10 meters above mean sea 
level in the southeastern area to less than 2 meters above 
sea level along the coast. As aforementioned, the 
available yield of the Aquifer is about 91 MCM/year while 
total abstraction is greater than 150 MCM/year.
Chemical Threats to the Gaza Aquifer
The most serious chemical threats to the groundwater 
are elevated levels of chloride and nitrate 
concentrations.32 Acceptable levels of nitrate in drinking 
water, according to the U.S. Environmental Protection
32 Fayeq El-Madhoun, "Drinking Water Quality: Evaluation of Chloride and 
Nitrate Concentrations of Wells Supplies Gaza Governorates (1990-2002) 
Palestine" Palestinian National Authority, Gaza Governorate, 
Environmental and Informational Center, presented at Water for Life in 
the Middle East Conference, Antalya, Turkey, 2004, available at 
http://www.ipcri.org/watconfZelmadhoun.pdf, accessed January 2, 2005.
Agency (EPA), are 10 mg/L33 and 250 mg/L for chlorides.34 
Testing of drinking wells in Gaza, illustrated in Table 10, 
indicate levels of nitrate in drinking water greater than 
ten times the maximum acceptable EPA levels. Chlorides 
resident in drinking wells in Gaza show mean levels greater 
than 1.5 times the maximum acceptable levels of the EPA 
with readings as high as nine times the maximum acceptable 
level.
33 US EPA, "List of Drinking Water Contaminants and MCLs" available at: 
http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/mcl.htmlftmcls, accessed on March 18, 2006
34 Ibid.
Table 10. Chloride and Nitrate Concentrations in Drinking
Wells among Gaza Governorates 1999-2002_____________
Chloride .Nitrate
Governorate # Samples Mean Maximum’ Mean , Maximum
North 198 126.9 489.5 114.4 360
Gaza 242 402.4 2180.5 121.3 291
Middle 40 488.9 782 65 104
Khan Younis 109 777.8 1580 190 383
Rafah 60 514.7 1236 110.1 240
TOTAL 649 397.1 2180.5 126.2 383
Source: Fayeq El-Madhoun, "Drinking Water Quality:
Evaluation of Chloride and Nitrate Concentrations of Wells 
Supplies Gaza Governorates (1990-2002) Palestine"
Palestinian National Authority, Gaza Governorate, 
Environmental and Informational Center
Additionally, the Aquifer is extremely vulnerable to
pollution due to years of overpumping resulting in seawater
intrusion and upconing of saline groundwater. These 
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phenomena are due primarily to anthropogenic causes: 
agricultural practices and waste management, in particular. 
In 2001, there were 137 dumping sites in Palestine (133 in 
the West Bank and 4 in Gaza) of which 118 had no health 
monitoring and 108 had no environmental supervision. Some 
32% of the localities in Palestine have no solid waste 
collecting services.35 The refugee camps in Gaza, with one 
exception (Jalabia) have no sewage facilities. The three 
extant water treatment plants do not function effectively 
and approximately 70-80% of the domestic wastewater 
produced in Gaza is discharged into the environment either 
directly, after collection in cesspits, or through leakage 
into the Mediterranean.36 
Water-Related Disease in Gaza
35 PCBS, Environmental Statistics, 2003.
36 Amani Alfarra and Sami Lubad; "Health Effects Due to Poor Wastewater 
Treatments in Gaza Strip", IPCRI Conference, Antalya, Turkey, 2004.
Statistics from the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention reveal that there were more than 17,000 cases of 
water-related illnesses during 2002-03 in Gaza. However, 
since many symptoms are often confused with other 
sicknesses, some researchers feel as many as 25 outbreaks 
go unreported for every one reported, since many people are 
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exposed to potentially harmful microbes and pesticides, 
through drinking tap water and taking showers.37
37 Ibid.
38 Harpaz, Yoav, Haddad, Marwan and Arlosoroff, Shaul, "Overview of the 
Mountain Aquifer: A Shared Israeli-Palestinian Resource" in Eran 
Feitelson and Marwan Haddad Ed. Management of Shared Groundwater 
Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an International 
Perspective: International Development Research Centre and Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2005, p. 52.
39 Ibid
Quality of Water in the Mountain Aquifer
The major water source for the West Bank is also the 
most important groundwater resource shared by Israelis and 
Palestinians: the Mountain Aquifer. "Most of the waters in 
the upper levels of the three basins-within the West Bank 
and Jerusalem area, where rain recharge is intense-are 
rated as of potable quality with only slight salt content: 
50-150 mg chlorides per liter."38 Chloride levels in the 
Western basin are generally of similar quality except in 
several regions (Ayalon, Hartiv and Amatzia in particular) 
where chloride levels reach 300-400 mg/L. Brackish waters 
in the Beersheba region reach 200-300 mg/L.39 
Imbalances in the Mountain Aquifer
The greatest threat to continued abstraction of the 
Mountain Aquifer is the lowering of the water table and 
concomitant rise of saline seawater in the Western basin. 
Rainwater is the only source of recharge and precipitation 
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rates in the region vary widely from year to year. Table 2 
provides rainfall and evapotranspiration rates for the 
Aquifer which illustrate that ET far exceeds annual 
precipitation. Nonetheless, there is some infiltration 
into the Aquifer and it does serve as the largest storage 
reservoir for Israel and Palestine.
Widespread pumping of the Mountain Aquifer commenced 
in the 1950's alongside many other developing countries as 
the centrifugal pump came into prominence. Until that 
time, the northern and southern springs of the Western 
basin (Taninim and Yarkon areas, respectively) discharged 
annual rates of 300 MCM40. Before massive pumping was 
instituted, the British, during the Mandate period of 1917- 
1947, exploited these springs for water usage in Jerusalem. 
Once the Israeli authorities realized that saline water 
bodies were in close proximity to the fresh-water levels 
close to production wells, they instituted a water 
management policy aimed at preventing a considerable drop 
in fresh-water levels in the vicinity of the Taninim 
(northern) springs which, by the 1960's, were producing 
40 Kahane, Yona, "The Turonian-Cenomanian Aquifer: The Need for a Joint 
Monitoring and Management Programme",' in Eran Feitelson and Marwan 
Haddad Ed. Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli- 
Palestinian Case with an International Perspective: International 
Development Research Centre and Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005, p. 
92.
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about 40 MCM/year. A determination was made to ensure that 
water levels would not drop below +9.00 m.41 Water levels in 
the areas of pumpage rise an average of 3.5 m/year. The 
sensitivity of the Western basin vis-a-vis seawater 
intrusion is such that operation of the Yarkon-Taninim 
Aquifer for the National Water System today is managed 
conjunctively with the operating regime of Lake Kinneret if 




Pollution Threats to the Mountain Aquifer
Within the Mountain Aquifer potential sources of 
groundwater pollution include: infiltration from septic 
tanks, cesspools, pit latrines and other sanitation 
facilities; breakage and subsequent leakage from sewage 
systems; infiltration from wastewater ponds/storage and 
from irrigation with treated and/or untreated wastewater; 
seepage from treatment plants; leachates from solid 
concentrations and disposal sites; leachates from 
pesticides and fertilizers; leakages or spills from oil and 
fuel installations, gasoline stations, fuel tankers, 





cubic meter of heavy oil or fuel will render 200 xl06 MCM 
of potable water unfit for consumption.44
44 Ibid. p. 102 (according to EPA and WHO standards)
45 Ibid, p. 101
The sensitivity of the Aquifer to pollution lies in 
its limestone, karstic, fractured unsaturated zone. The 
lack of overlying soil cover, together with its geological 
character, make the Mountain Aquifer susceptible to high 
infiltration rates and short detention times. Of the 870 
wells pumping from the Aquifer today, some 550 supply 
potable water. 170, or 31%, of those wells are protected 
against pollution but the remaining 69% are either 
classified as having direct contact between the soil and 
the aquifer or indirectly hydraulically linked and subject 
to pollution.45
Figure 13 shows a three-dimensional schematic sketch 
of the Mountain Aquifer and its major layers. The Eastern 
and Western (Yarkon-Taninim) basins are clearly defined, as 
are the major pumping wells in the confined area of the 
Western basin.
Salinization of the Mountain Aquifer
The danger of over-pumping can be gleaned from Figure 
14: as the interface between the freshwater body and saline 
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water body rises, the risk of salt water intrusion 
increases.
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Figure 13. Three-Dimensional Sketch of Mountain Aquifer
Source: Amir Paster and Gideon Dagan. "Salinization 
Processes in the Western Mountain Aquifer in Israel: A 
conceptual and Quantitative Model of the Deep Saltwater 
Body." M.S. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 2004.
The interface is apparently rising at a rate of 1-10 
meters/year. In years 1988-2002 it rose by at least 50 
meters, related to an estimated inflow of at least 300 MCM 
of seawater.46
46 Paster, Amir and Dagan, Gideon, "Salinization Processes in the
Western Mountain Aquifer in Israel: A Conceptual and Quantitative Model 
of the Deep Saltwater Body", Tel Aviv University, 2004
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Schematic cross-section of the aquifer
Flow zones: 1 - phreatic zone. 2- confined zone. 3- interface zone. 4- saltwater 
zone (where no flow occurs).
Figure 14. Schematic Cross-Section of Mountain Aquifer 
Source: Amir Paster and Gideon Dagan. "Salinization
Processes in the Western Mountain Aquifer in Israel: A 
conceptual and Quantitative Model of the Deep Saltwater 
Body." M.S. thesis, Tel Aviv University, 2004.
The increase in salinity and overall degradation of 
water quality in the Mountain Aquifer coincides with the 
development of anoxic conditions and the appearance of 
H2S.47 Anoxic conditions refer to the depletion of 
dissolved oxygen. Salinization of the Upper sub-aquifer in 
47 Avihu Burg, Ittai Gavrieli and Joseph Guttman, "Changes in Water 
Quality Along the Water Flow From the Recharge Area to the Confined 
Area-The Western Mountain Aquifer, Kefar-Uriyya Case Study", Israeli- 
Palestinian International Conference on Water for Life, Antalya, 
Turkey, October 10-14, 2004.
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the Kefar Urriya pumping fields (located at the western 
foothills of the Judea Mountains which pumps water from the 
Mountain Aquifer), has been investigated in several studies 
(Guttman, 1980; Guttman and Kronfield, 1982; Kroituro, 1987; 
Ecker, 1995; Guttman and Ettinger, 1997; Rosenthal, et al, 
1999; Avisar et al, 2000, 2003; Katz, 2001; Frumkin and 
Gvirtzman, 2003) . The mechanisms proposed for salinization 
in all of the aforementioned studies included inflow of 
water derived from an evaporitic body, residual brines from 
a marine intrusion and flushing of salts and organic matter 
from the overlaying local mountain group. The coincidence 
of salinization and the development of reducing conditions 
were not cited. In the most recent study (Burg, 2004), the 
analysis shows water quality degradation is occurring due 
to seepage of saline, organic-rich water from the 
bituminous rocks to the underlying Mountain Aquifer. This 
organic matter is the 'fuel' that consumes the dissolved 
oxygen, changes the redox state of the water and serves as 
substrate for bacterial sulfate reduction to produce H2S. 
The assumption is that these conditions exist throughout 
the Mountain Aquifer and that similar degradation may occur 
elsewhere. In the area of study the Kefar-Uriyya pumping 
fields exhibited a dramatic salinity gradient over a
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distance of only a few kilometers from <180-ppm CL in the 
east to >400 ppm CL in the west.48
48 Ibid
49 Zecharya Tagar, Tamar Keinan and Gidon Bromberg, "A Sleeping Time 
Bomb: Pollution of the Mountain Aquifer by Sewage", Friends of the 
Earth Middle East. Available at:




Untreated Sewage in the Mountain Aquifer
The sewage of over two million people flows untreated 
in the recharge area of the Mountain Aquifer, percolating 
into the largest and most significant groundwater reservoir 
in the region.49 Sewage from Palestinian sources on the 
Mountain Aquifer's recharge area is estimated at 46 million 
cubic meters per year.50 In rural Palestinian West Bank 
settlements more than 60% of sewage is disposed of in 
unlined cesspits and whereas 70% of urban Palestinian 
dwellings in the West Bank are connected to a sewage 
network, these networks, in a majority of cases, discharge 
the sewage without treatment into streams in the open 
environment.51 As of this writing, . there is only one 
operating sewage treatment plant in the West Bank, in El- 
Bireh.
The obstacles confounding the establishment of a sound 
infrastructure for wastewater treatment and urban storm 
water discharge are several: insensitive Israeli
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environmental policy now and during the past period of 
.occupation; lack of financial and technical human 
resources; insufficient maintenance of sewage facilities; 
poor environmental awareness and commitment.52
52 Rashed Al-Sa'ed, "Obstacles and Chances to Cut Pollution Load 
Discharges from Urban Palestine", Water Studies Institute, Bir Zeit 
University, West Bank, Palestinian Authority, IWRA, Water Authority, 
December, 2005
53 Ibid
54 Rashed Al-Sa'ed, p. 538
Sewage Treatment in Jewish Settlements in the West Bank
Data regarding sewage treatment of Jewish settlements 
in the West Bank is not readily available. The Israeli 
Water Commission reports that 70% of the settlements' 
sewage is treated satisfactorily. Conflicting reports 
(Tagar) indicate that as much as 48% of sewage produced by 
settlements on the West Bank is treated inadequately or 
beneath the standards set by Israel proper.53 The
'contribution' of Israeli settlements in the West Bank to 
the total organic and inorganic pollution loads is 
estimated to be at 400,000 population equivalents.54
Quality of Water in Israel
Just as the fires in the Cuyahoga River in Ohio in 
* June of 1969 helped spur an avalanche of pollution control 
activities resulting in the Clean Water Act, Great Lakes 
Water Quality Agreement and the creation of the federal and 
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state Environmental Protection Agencies55 so did the tragic 
collapse of the bridge spanning Tel Aviv's Yarkon River 
during the Maccabi Athletic Games in 1997, when four 
Australians lost their lives due, at least in part, to the 
state of the water itself into which they fell which was so 
heavily polluted with sewage56, spur the substantive 
environmental evaluation of Israel's natural resources. 
Environmental Indicators
55 http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/aoc/cuyahoga.html
56 ABC News On-Line Service, available at http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/earth/stories/slll8244.htm, March
10 2005.
57 The Environment in Israel 2002, available at http://www.environment.gov.il, accessed January 5 2005
Israel's history and development of its institutional 
water structures are presented later in this paper in 
greater detail. Israel has only recently begun to develop 
environmental and sustainable development indicators.
These indicators are meant to increase public awareness of 
the state of the environment in Israel, on the one hand, 
and to communicate information to decision makers on 
environmental and sustainable development trends, on the 
other hand. The environmental indicators in several key 
areas have been compiled by the Ministry of the Environment 
in the publication The Environment in Israel 2002.57 The 
indicators include Air Quality, Environmental Planning, 
Hazardous Substances, Landscape and Biodiversity, Marine
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Waters, Noise, Population Growth, Soil and Fuel Pollution, 
Solid Waste, Water and Rivers and Wastewater Treatment. 
Sewage Treatment in Israel
More than 500 facilities for the treatment of sewage 
exist in Israel today, of which 26 are major wastewater 
treatment plants. Out of a total of 440 million cubic 
meters of sewage produced in Israel in 2001, 95% was 
collected in central sewage systems, 80% was treated, and 
65% (285 MCM) was reclaimed for reuse. By 2001 70% of the 
effluents produced by the country's treatment plants 
complied with the standards set in regulations; 20 mg/L BOD 
and 30 mg/L suspended solids.58
Chemical Monitoring of Effluent Water In Israel
With the growth in efflhent water for irrigation 
purposes, high levels of chloride, sodium and boron become 
the critical concentrations that require monitoring. 
Figure 15 illustrates the levels of chloride and sodium in 
Haifa and Figure 16 depicts the chloride levels in the Dan 
region, which includes the city of Tel Aviv. Tel Aviv and 
Haifa produce about 40% of effluents generated by Israel. 
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Figure 15. Chloride and Sodium Concentrations in the Haifa 
Wastewater Treatment Plant
Source: Israel Ministry of Environment, 2003.
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Average Chloride 
Concentration in the Dan Region 
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Figure 16. Average Chloride Concentration in the Dan Region 
Wastewater Treatment Plant
Source: Israel Ministry of Environment, 2003
According to the Hydrological Service, average 
chloride concentrations in the Coastal Aquifer have 
increased at a rate of 2.4 mg/L per year since 1970 and 
reached 198 mg/L in 2000. Average nitrate concentrations 
have increased from 30 mg/L in 1950 to 59 mg/L in 2000, an 
annual rate of increase of about 0.6 mg/L.59 Figure 17 shows 
the growing levels of nitrate and chloride concentrations 
in the Northern Coastal sub-Aquifer. (Refer to Table 10 for 
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Figure 17. Average Chloride and Nitrate Concentrations in
Coastal Aquifer




Transboundary water resource management problems are 
common throughout the world. International transboundary 
groundwater problems represent a distinct and important 
category, but not all transboundary groundwaters are 
international.60
60 William Blomquist and Helen Ingram, "Boundaries Seen and Unseen: 
Resolving Transboundary Groundwater Problems", Water International, 
International Water Resources Association, June 2003
61 Ibid
Resolution of water conflicts within one nation can be 
challenging but the commonality of language, shared 
government, common tradition of law and familiarity and 
acceptance of water use can facilitate the adjudication of 
disputes. There are notable cases, however, where the 
presence of all of these common factors has not been 
sufficient to resolve water conflicts between, for example, 
contiguous states of the United States.
The differences in economic, political, and military 
resources (across boundaries)61 between Israelis and 
Palestinians are substantive and meaningful. A major 
portion of this paper contrasts those institutional 
disparities. The gaps in those areas have indeed compounded 
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the resolution of the Middle East conflict and have 
precluded a voluntary establishment of joint management of 
regional water resources.
The optimism among water resource researchers who live 
and work in the Middle East is based on the assumption that 
the above-mentioned factors are solvable. The end of 
Israeli occupation, restoration of confidence and faith in 
institutional reform, coupled with a significant increase 
in Palestinian quality of life and political stability 
represent the foundation for progress.
Islam and Judaism
Ethnic, cultural and religious differences between 
Israelis and Palestinians, between Jews and Muslims, are 
not compounding factors standing in the way of this 
conflict's resolution. While a thorough discussion of the 
religions and ethnicity of the region is beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is important to point out that Islam and 
Judaism do share common ancestry and both have historic and 
fundamental precepts regarding the equitable allocation of 
water. Islam has many references and injunctions that 
regulate human-environment interactions. Specifically, 
Islam requires its adherents to conserve water, consider the 
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water needs of non-human species and refrain from 
irreparably degrading water and other natural resources.62
62 Hussein A. Amery, "Islamic Water Management", Water International, 
Volume 26, International Water Resources Association December 2001.
63 ibid
64 Ibid
It is argued that a broadly sustainable system of 
water resources management in Islamic countries is more 
likely to be realized if management instruments incorporate 
a range of additional inputs from the religious, spiritual 
and the resource-based spheres. Culturally sensitive demand 
management strategies require a deliberate effort to 
educate people on the positive link between Islam and water 
conservation.63 Notwithstanding the doctrinal nature of 
Islam, there also exists a tenet of ijtihad or 'independent 
reasoning' by learned Muslims, which allows them to deal 
with new developments and challenges that they experience 
in their daily lives. This explains the fatwa or 
'religious decree or opinion' that was issued in Saudi 
Arabia permitting the use of recycled wastewater for 
irrigation purposes. This confluence of Islamic teachings 
and modern-day independent thinking made possible the re­
use of millions of cubic meters of treated effluent.64
The application of the Islamic approach to aquifer 
management begins with faith in Allah and His unlimited 
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capabilities, including knowledge, power, management, 
wisdom, justice and mercy. Individuals and groups, 
therefore, must seek Allah's approval for their actions and 
follow Allah's decrees such as: securing and distributing 
sufficient drinking water for all creatures; forbidding the 
use of water as a monopoly; not using water as a commodity 
to be bought and sold but to ensure its distribution among 
all creatures to fulfill their basic needs.65
65 Marwan Haddad, "The Islamic Approach to the Environment and 
Sustainable Groundwater Management", in Eran Feitelson and Marwan 
Haddad Ed. Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli- 
Palestinian Case with an International Perspective: International 
Development Research Centre and Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005
Because the Bible was written in a part of the world 
where water is scarce it is not surprising that water 
features significantly in the lives of the people. The 
scarceness of water was taken very seriously and parables 
of drought are linked to the wrath of God. The Jewish 
prophets Elijah, Jeremiah and Haggai all predicted droughts 
as punishment from God. Conversely, rainfall is a sign of 
God's favor and goodness.
Pollution and undrinkable water were also very serious 
matters in the Old Testament. One of the ten plagues 
turned the waters of the Nile to blood and interpretations 
have often divined that this is a metaphor for pollution. 
Pure water (the word for pure, "tahor" is the same in
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Hebrew and Arabic), was needed for cleansing in the Temple 
and is also used frequently as symbols for God's 
blessings.66
66 http://www.thewaterpaqe.com/religion bible.htm. Accessed on March 2, 
2006.
67 Isaiah 41:17-18, available at
http://www.thewaterpage.com/religion bible.htm, accessed on March 2, 
2006.
"When the poor and needy seek water, and there is none 
and their tongue faileth for thirst, I the Lord will hear 
them, I the God of Israel will not forsake them. I will 
open rivers in high places and fountains in the midst of 
the valleys: I will make the wilderness a pool of water and 
the dry land springs of water".67 The perceived conflict 
between Jews and Muslims is often based on false 
assumptions. The two religions originated from the same 
ancestor and the common precept of both faiths is that 
Islam and Judaism are, first and fundamentally, ways of 
life. The essence of each faith does not preclude the 
proliferation of the other. Finally, it should be 
remembered that when Ishmael and Isaac went their separate 
ways to institutionalize and promulgate Islam and Judaism, 
respectively, they both returned to Hebron when their 
father, Abraham, lay on his death bed and, together, they 




The major NGO's in the region actively pursuing 
conflict resolution are joint Israeli/Palestinian 
organizations. The major research proposals (many of which 
are cited herein) are joint proposals by Israelis and 
Palestinians. In particular, Professor Eran Feitelson, 
Ph.D. who is the Head of the School of Public Policy and 
the Chair of the Department of Geography at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem and the Harry S. Truman Research 
Institute for the Advancement of Peace, Mount Scopus, 
Jerusalem and Marwan Haddad, Professor at the College of 
Environmental Engineering at An-Najah University, Nablus, 
Palestinian Territory and researcher at the Palestine 
Consultancy Group (PCG) in East Jerusalem manifest the 
preeminent model for cooperation and common understanding 
of the need for joint resolution of water resource issues 
in the Middle East .
As is exemplified in the third section of this paper, 
local Israeli and Palestinian municipalities have 
successfully resolved complex water delivery and treatment 
problems when permitted to negotiate directly with one 
another. There are other examples of cooperation between 
Israeli and Palestinian individuals and institutions.
75
Universities within Israel and in Palestine have cordial 
exchanges of information and share international stages at 
conferences, the board of Directors of the Middle East 
Desalination Resource Center include Arabs and Israelis. 
The founders of the State of Israel were largely European 
in origin and had less in common with Palestinians two and 
three generations ago but the head of the Labor Party today 
was born and raised in Morocco. The vast majority of 
Israelis are Middle Eastern by birth today.
A community of local professional water resource 
researchers and members of NGO's who have developed models 
for integrated, sustainable and equitable water resource 
management institutions for the Middle East regularly meet 
and share experiences and the results of their work. They 
have drawn upon international law precedents, treaties, 
hydrogeological data, demographic studies, economic 
theories, political science and social science. The models 
they have generated, in turn, are inclusive and reflective 
of all these sectors of society.
From the mid-1980 to 1995 there was a 'slew' 
(Feitelson, 1995) of conferences, studies, exchanges of 
information, creation of NGOs, pilot projects, funding of 
projects and the early development of institutional
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structures such as the Palestine Water Authority, Joint
Water Commission, etc. The loss of confidence that 
resulted from the first Intifada dampened the progress of 
joint management and reached a nadir in 2000 when the 
second Intifada erupted. Virtually all management 
proposals from 2000-2005 were incremental in design based 
on small ('sequential/flexible') steps to, initially, re­
gain and re-engender confidence, on both sides. The notion 
of basin management was proposed during this phase. At 
this point, establishing a sense of confidence has taken a 
back seat to officially recognizing the existence of each 
party. The proposed structures for institutional reform in 
the water sector are now shrouded in fog.
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CHAPTER NINE
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES FOR WATER MANAGEMENT
Legal Institutional Background
While groundwater makes up about 98% of the world's 
fresh water apart from the glaciers and polar ice-caps68 and 
is recognized as a source of diminishing quality and 
quantity as well as a touchstone for conflict (particularly 
in arid zones) international legal disputation and 
adjudication of transboundary groundwater aquifers is 
largely absent. Moreover, "...there are no internationally 
accepted criteria for allocating shared water resources."69
68 Environment Canada. http://www.ec.gc.ca/envhome.html
69 Aaron T. Wolf, "From Rights to Needs: Water Allocations in
International Treaties", Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: 
The Israeli Palestinian Case with an International Perspective, Eran 
Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, editors, International Development 
Resource Center, Toronto, 2000.
Literature is replete with historical treaties related 
to water but they are primarily pre-disposed to remedy 
disputes over surface water access and quantity. 
International treaties that have a direct bearing on 
groundwater are largely theoretical and have yet to be used 
for purposes of adjudication. Negotiated settlements 
between two parties, such as the Oslo Accords of 1993 and 
1995 do have a direct bearing over water allocations in the 
78
region and those Interim Accords will be examined in detail 
below.
Prior to the Oslo agreements, the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization filed more than 3,600 treaties 
relating to international water resources between 1805 and 
1984, the majority of which dealt with matters of 
navigation.70 The "Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database" is a collection of 145 treaties, which deal with 
water exclusive of boundaries or fishing rights disputes in 
the 20th century.71 Of those treaties, 49 deal with issues 




72 The Harmon Doctrine was named after US Attorney General Judson Harmon 
when, in 1895, he opined that international law did not impose any 
obligation on the United States regarding how it used waters within its 
sovereign borders.
73 Ibid
From Rights to Needs
In general, the parties to these treaties initiated 
their negotiating positions on the basis of 'water, rights' 
wherein, for example, upstream riparians, such as the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and the Indians in the Indus 
region, invoked "some variation of the Harmon Doctrine72, 
claiming that water rights originate where the water 
falls".73 Downstream riparians regularly made claims of 
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prior appropriation. However, at the end of the day, in 
virtually every case, the disputes were eventually resolved 
on the basis of 'needs'; not 'rights' . Demands for water 
based on the needs for irrigation and increasing 
populations were often cited as preemptory.
Negotiating water allocations based on 'needs' rather 
than 'rights' is more likely to bear fruit. Wolf (1993) 
and Rothman (1995) 74 cite two basic reasons why this is so:
1. The process of negotiation and bargaining that leads 
to success involves a sense of empathy and, when 
agonizing over water allocation problems, it is much 
easier to empathize with the opposition's need for 
water than with his or her overriding right to the 
same water.
2. Water rights are much more difficult to quantify than 
are water needs. The issues of water rights between 
Israelis and Palestinians in the Interim Agreement of 
1995 involve a poorly defined and non-quantifiable 
Israeli recognition of Palestinian water rights but 
the Agreement clearly states that Palestinian water 
needs are 70-80 MCM/year and that Israel, toward that 
74 Ibid
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end, will provide 28.6 MCM.75 Parenthetically, this 
Interim agreement represents the only treaty in the 
study wherein existing (partial) use (Israeli use of 
the Mountain Aquifer) was relinquished.
75 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel-Palestinian Interim 
Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Jerusalem: State of 
Israel, 1995, p. 179
76 Ibid
All of the treaties in the database prioritize water use 
and each cites domestic use as the highest priority. 
Subsequent use priorities vary but generally include 
agriculture, sanitation, hydroelectric power, industry and 
irrigation. "Notably absent in all of these lists are any 
instream or other environmental requirements".76 As will be 
discussed later, thg requirements for environmental water 
needs are growing more rapidly than any other sector in the 
Middle East.
Palestinians have seen fit to base many of their 
arguments about disparate water allocations as a function 
of water rights and as an extension of human rights. "...The 
Palestinian people must be allowed to enjoy their right to 
both self-determination and the freedom to develop their 
society, and like any other free people, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies in a manner 
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consistent with the common good of all people in the 
region. Eventually Palestinians must have greater access 
to, control over, and use of their natural resources in 
general and water resources in particular."77 78
77 Yasser Nasser, "Palestinian Water Rights and Needs", Water in 
Palestine: Problems, Politics and Prospects, Palestinian Academic 
Society for the Study of International Affairs, Fadia Daibes, Editor, 
Jerusalem, 2003.
78 WHO. Domestic Water Quantity, Service Level and Health, accessed on 
March 12, 2006, available at
http://www/who.int/water_sanitation_health/diseases/wsh0302/en/
The World Health Organization has set a benchmark of 
100 liters per day per capita as the minimum amount of 
clean water required for human sustenance. Average 
consumption in the West Bank is less than this mark in many 
locations. Table 7 shows the discrepancy of water 
consumption in different areas in the West Bank.
While clearly defined guiding principles and 
precedents regarding groundwater in the international arena 
are rare, if defined at all, the principle of 'prior use' 
is protected in every treaty within the "Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database" when upstream/downstream river 




In terms of groundwater resources and international 
law in the Middle East, Israelis claim a prior use before 
the state of Israel (pre-1948) of the Mountain Aquifer for 
irrigation purposes and a more extensive and intensive use 
once statehood was declared. Moreover, Israelis bolster 
their claims by citing the "...significant damage that would 
result from the loss of the Israel's current level of use, 
necessary to meet the country's vital economic needs".79 80
Palestinian development of the Mountain Aquifer prior to 
1948 was limited due to lack of Palestinian resources and 
did not increase to any significant degree between 1948 and 
1967 when the Jordanians administered the area of the West 
Bank. "Between 1948 and 1967, the Jordanian regime 
directed all its resources to the development of the East 
Bank, which at the time was less developed than the West
79 Yoram Eckstein and Gabriel E. Eckstein, "Groundwater Resources and 
International Law in the Middle East Process", International Water 
Resources Association, June 2003.
80 Nasser, p. 91
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Prior Use and the Geneva Convention
Among Palestinians, the argument of prior use does 
resonate81 and is augmented by the claim that Israel is in 
violation of the Geneva Convention which delineates the 
limits and obligations of the 'belligerent occupier". The 
Geneva Convention holds that the occupier may not use the 
natural resources of the occupied land for the furtherance 
of civilian activities, only necessary military functions. 
The Israelis dismiss the argument on prima facie grounds 
maintaining that the Geneva Convention Accords are designed 
to remedy only disputes between two sovereign nations 
effectively eliminating the "Palestinian Authority" as an 
internationally recognized sovereign entity.
81 In an interview on December 29, 2005 with Dr. Fadia Daibes in 
Jerusalem, she adamantly maintained that the Palestinian nation is a 
sovereign state entitled to the equitable treatment in the eyes of the 
law as any sovereign state in the world and that any water re­
allocation for the West Bank would only be accepted by Palestinians as 
'just compensation' for water taken from the Palestinian sovereignty in 
the West Bank.
Helsinki
The International Law Association (ILA) adopted the 
Helsinki Rules of 1966 for the purpose of addressing the 
status of groundwater within the context of international 
law. The Helsinki rules list eleven hydrographic and 
socio-political factors, which ought to be taken into 
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account as a whole in water allocations. The rules 
include, but are not limited to82:
82 Jad Isaac and Maher Owewi, "The Potential of GIS in Water Management 
and Conflict Resolution", in Management of Shared Groundwater
Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an International
Perspective, Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, editors, p. 335.
■ Geography of the basin
■ Hydrology of the basin
■ History of past use
■ Climate affecting the basin
■ Economic and social needs
■ Population dependent on basin's water
■ Availability of other resources
■ Comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying 
the economic and social needs
■ Avoiding the unnecessary exploitation of basin's water
■ Practicability of compensating one or more co-basin 
states when disputes arise
■ Degree to which needs of a basin state can be 
satisfied without damaging co-basin state
These rules have been used in conjunction with domestic 
criteria is settling water disputes but the Helsinki rules 
are not binding. The body of work represented in the Rules 
is important and has served as a foundation for further 
codification of international groundwater rules. The basic 
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rule adopted in 1966 was that equitable and reasonable 
utilization (often called the 'doctrine of hydrological 
unity'83) was the overriding principle for managing 
transboundary use and water management. Steady decline of 
water quality, exponential population growth and the threat 
of climate change gave pause to ILA's earlier thinking and 
set in motion a series of meetings, conventions and a 
proliferation of new rules to deal with a new reality. The 
Water Resources Committee of the ILA met ten times between 
1997 and 2004 finally codifying the complete set of rules 
at the Berlin Conference in 2004.
The Bellagio Draft Treaty, developed in 1989, attempts 
to provide a legal framework for groundwater negotiations. 
The Bellagio Draft Treaty was developed by a group of 
experienced legal practitioners and scientists from many 
parts of the world who came together to identify basic 
requirements for protection and use of international 
groundwater supplies. Treaty provisions and international 
agencies with jurisdiction over groundwater are limited in 
scope and often unable to address the issues. The goal of 
the draft treaty is to provide mechanisms for dealing with 
uncontrolled drawdown, depletion, drought reserves, water
Bellagio
83 Eckstein, p. 159
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quality, protection of recharge areas, and public health 
emergencies, along with procedures for settling disputes. 
The Bellagio Draft Treaty does not take environmental or 
ecological considerations into account.
The work began upon the joint initiative of Professor 
Al Utton and Mexican Ambassador Cesar Sepulveda in 1977 
that convened a group to study the issues. Many proposals 
and drafts were circulated over the years and in 1987, a 
conference was convened in Bellagio, Italy. The notes and 
tapes from the 1987 meeting became a principal basis for 
the preparation of the Bellagio Draft Treaty, authored by 
Professors R.D. Hayton, G. E. Radosevich and Albert E. 
Utton84.
84 http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/bellagio_treaty.html
85 Jesse H. Hamner and Aaron T. Wolf, "Patterns in International Water
Resource Treaties: The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database",
87
The Draft requires joint management of shared aquifers 
and describes principles based on mutual respect, good 
neighborliness, and reciprocity. While the Draft 
recognizes that obtaining groundwater data can prove 
difficult and expensive, and mutually acceptable 
information relies on cooperative and reciprocal 
negotiations, it does provide a useful framework for future 
groundwater diplomacy.85 *87
"Increasing populations and industrial and 
agricultural development. worldwide are placing much greater 
demands on groundwater supplies. Many of these groundwater 
basins or aquifers underlie two or more countries and are, 
thus, international or transboundary. Withdrawals from one 
country can drain life-giving water from a neighboring 
country and, as a consequence, be the source of severe and 
protracted conflict. Unfortunately, international law and 
treaty practice are only at a beginning stage. With the 
goal of advancing international law and institutions on the 
matter, a multi-disciplinary group of specialists over an 
eight-year period have developed a draft international 
groundwater treaty. The draft provides mechanisms by 
mutual agreement rather than continuing to be subjected to 
unilateral taking. The treaty addresses contamination, 
depletion, drought and transboundary transfers as well as 
withdrawal and recharge issues. The fundamental goal is to 
achieve joint, optimum utilization and avoidance or 
resolution of disputes over shared groundwaters in a time 
of ever-increasing pressures upon this priceless 
resource. "86 *868
Colorado Journal of International
Environmental Law and Policy. 1997 Yearbook, 1998.
86Robert D. Hayton and Albert E. Utton, , The Ixtapa Draft Agreement
Relating to the Use of Transboundary Groundwaters, The Bellagio Draft
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The Asymmetrical Relationship between 
Israel and Palestine
All of the above treaties (and others promulgated 
within the context of the United Nations) "institutionalize 
the inherent conflict between 'reasonable and equitable 
use' and 'the obligation not to cause harm' and by not 
prioritizing principles of sharing, the work does not make 
great strides in delineating the allocation of 
transboundary waters-an issue that is at the heart of most 
international water conflicts"87
Treaty 25 Nat. Res. J. 715 (1985).
http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Bellagio_Draft_Treaty_E.pdf
87 Wolf p. 149
The outstanding difference between the Interim 
Agreement of Israel and Palestine in 1995 and all the other 
treaties delineated above is the asymmetrical relationship 
between the two parties. The relationship between Israel 
and Palestine is one of Occupier and Occupied Territory, 
respectively. There have been no prior agreements between 
two such entities. Within the Interim agreement the only 
references to 'rights' are in the context of the yet-to-be 
negotiated Final Status Agreement *87
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Changing of the Guard in Palestine
The West Bank and Gaza do not form a singular 
geographical unit and, throughout time, these two entities 
have fallen under the sovereignty of different rulers. "A 
new ruler did usually not impose immediately a new legal 
system but enacted overtime, a new set of norms as 
supplementary to the existing one. Only when necessary the 
new ruler repealed the old laws and enacted new one to
op replace the old, pre-existing, laws” 
Ottoman Rule and the British Mandate
Both areas fell under Ottoman Rule until 1918 and, 
subsequent to World War I, by order of the League of 
Nations, became part of the British Mandate until the War 
of 1948. *
88 Hiba Husseini,, "The Palestinian Water Authority: Developments and 
Challenges Involving the Legal Framework and Capacity of the PWA", 
Israeli-Palestinian International Conference on Water for Life, 
Antalya, Turkey, October 10-14, 2004.
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The Impact of Israeli Statehood on Palestine
When Israel became an independent state the area of 
the West Bank was incorporated into the Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan and the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian Military 
rule. Egypt refrained from incorporating Gaza and 
therefore did not apply any pre-existing legal norms.
Israeli Military Rule Over the West Bank and Gaza. 
Following the 1967 War both Gaza and the West Bank came 
under Israel Military Rule. Military Order 92 (August 15, 
1967) provided for the transfer of all administrative, 
executive, judicial and monitoring authorities from the 
various governors, municipalities and village councils to 
one person, an Israeli official appointed by the Military 
Commander. Saul Arlosoroff, as the deputy water 
commissioner of Israel was appointed by General Tzur, 
assistant Minister of Defense to Mr. Moshe Dayan, to act as 
the responsible authority on water affairs management and 
development in the Occupied Territories, for the local 
populations (non Jewish settlements), in the Golan Heights, 
the West Bank and Gaza. (This appointment), of course, it 
(sic) was agreed with the relevant governors in each of the 
territories.89 This official was responsible for granting, 
stopping or adjusting permits, setting and collecting fees 
89 Email correspondence with Saul Arlosoroff, March 23, 2006
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and taxes, monitoring water use and setting quotas, 
stopping the activities of any or all water entities or 
committees and forming alternative entities, the members of 
which he himself was responsible for appointing.90 Mr. 
Arlosoroff implemented a policy designed to foster a 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians akin to 
that of a lion and a lamb. Israel sought to provide a 
minimum amount of water ("no one died of thirst") to the 
Palestinians; enough for sustenance and certainly 
inadequate supply for growth and development. Mr.
90 Fadia Daibes, "Water-Related Politics and Legal Aspects", Water in
Palestine; Water, Problems Prospects, Jerusalem, 2003
91 Interview with Saul Arlosoroff, Tel Aviv, December 28, 2005
Arlosoroff held this position from 1967-1978 when the rival 
Likud party came to power and replaced the Labor Party (of 
which Mr. Arlosoroff was a member) positions of power. The 
water policy for the Occupied Territories of the more 
conservative Likud Party was not substantively different 
from Labor's. The major difference was, whereas Labor 
sought to maintain a level of pacific stability in the 
Occupied Territories, Likud went out of its way to make the 
Palestinians' lives as miserable as possible.91
Military Orders Affecting Water. Military Order 158 
(November 19, 1967) prohibited new construction of water 
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installations without a new official permit. It precludes 
construction of previously planned Jordanian installations.
Military Order 291 (December 19, 1968) stipulated that 
all prior settlements of dispute over land and water were 
now invalid.
Oslo and the Development of the Joint Water Committee
The operative agreement between Israel and Palestine
is the seminal 'Declaration on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangement of 1993 between Israelis and Palestinians' or, 
"Oslo I Accord". This agreement contains provisions that 
are of relevance to water management. In Annex III of the 
Accord the parties agree to establish an Israel-Palestinian 
Committee on Economic Cooperation focusing, among other
matters on environmental issues, water, energy and
industry.
OSLO II
The Oslo II Accords of 1995 states that, "Israel
recognizes the Palestinian water rights in the West Bank
These will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations and settled in the Permanent Status Agreement 
relating to various water sources...the Israeli side shall 
transfer to the Palestinian side, and the Palestinian side 
shall assume powers and responsibilities in the sphere of 
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water and sewage in the West Bank related solely to 
Palestinians, that are currently held by the military 
government and its Civil Administration, except for the 
issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article. "92
92 "Desk Study on the Environment in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories:, United Nations Environment Programme, 2004.
Joint Israeli-Palestinian Committees
The Joint Israeli-Palestinian committees that were 
appointed by virtue of Oslo II are described in Figure 18.
Figure 18. Joint Israeli-Palestinian Committees Appointed 
by Oslo II
Source: Reproduced from an information sheet of the FES
Jerusalem Office, September 1996
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The First "Intifada", or Palestinian uprising, from 
1987-1991, gave rise and urgency to a conference in Madrid, 
which eventually led to the Oslo Accords. The Intifada 
shifted the center of gravity of Palestinian political 
leadership from the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) in Tunis to the Occupied Territories resulting in the 
creation of the Palestinian National Authority in 1994. 
The second Intifada began in 2000, and, in its wake all of 
the above joint committee meetings between Israelis and 
Palestinians were halted and the committees disbanded, with 
the notable exception of the Joint Water Committee. The 
Joint Water Committee (JWC) has continued to meet on a 
continual basis.
The Joint Water Committee
The Oslo II Agreement of 1995 established the Joint 
Water Committee (JWC) assigning it the responsibility for 
overseeing the management of all the West Bank's water and 
sewage resources and systems.93 The JWC is comprised of an 
equal number of Palestinians and Israelis (generally 4), 
decisions must be reached by consensus and each side 
maintains a veto over any proposal. All water-related 
issues that the JWC discusses are solely concerned with
93 Israel and the PLO, Interim Agreement, Annex III, Appendix I, Article
40
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Occupied Palestine. Water-related issues relevant to Israel 
are not within the purview of the Committee.
Projects considered by the JWC are typically not 
implemented with due haste. "While the Palestinians 
attribute many problems and delays in decisions regarding 
Palestinian projects to Israeli unwillingness, the Israelis 
maintain that they have hydrological reasons for turning 
down Palestinian proposals. However, well-informed sources 
admit that Israel's refusal to agree on project proposals 
with the Palestinians are sometimes due to political rather 
than technical reasons"94
94 Anders Jagerskog, "Why the States/Entities in the Jordan River Basin 
are Co-operating over their Scarce Water Resource", The Hague 
Conference on Environment, Security and Sustainable Development May 9- 
12, 2004
95 Challenges by private legal firms and by the Israeli Ministry of 
Agriculture's Freedom of Information Division.
An additional reason which delays implementation of 
proposals is the fact that all four members of the JWC must 
physically sign all protocols and minutes. Travel 
restrictions for Palestinians within the Occupied 
Territories affects the two Palestinian members of the 
Committee and transmission of these protocols is difficult 
because they do not fall within the public domain. There 
are challenges to the 'secrecy' of these protocols to the 
Israeli Supreme Court.95 It is not unusual for committee 
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members to withhold signatures as part of the bargaining 
process as well.
The major impact of the Joint Water Committee is 
symbolic and political but, as such, should not be under­
estimated. It recognizes and enunciates the hydrological 
interdependence between Israel and Palestine. The original 
heads of the Palestinian and Israeli delegations, Ihab 
Barghouti and Meir Ben-Meir, respectively, acknowledged 
that joint mechanisms for dealing with transboundary waters 
are necessary and that position has been re-enforced by the 
respective heads of the JWC today (up until the 2006 
elections in Palestine); Shimon Tai, the Water Commissioner 
for Israel and Fadel Kawash, the head of the Palestinian 
Water Authority96 have continued to publicly appreciate the 
necessity of such cooperation. For example, the fanfare 
accompanying the recent opening of the Ashkelon 
Desalination Plant in .Israel was subdued by the ominous 
threat of Palestinians' plans to lay a sewage pipe that 
drains into the sea in the northern Gaza Strip, (which 
would) "paralyze the largest desalination plant in Ashkelon 
96 However, since the formation of the Hamas led government in 
Palestine, Mr. Kawash has been removed from office
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and pollute the nearby beaches". 97 Palestinian water 
commissioner Fadel Kawash, aware of Israel's concerns 
remarked, "In principle, I accept that there cannot be 
unsupervised discharge of sewage, to the sea or anywhere 
else. Both sides will suffer if the situation gets out of 
hand. Today we have one sewage pipeline from the Gaza Strip 
to the sea, in the vicinity of Gaza City [Sheikh Ajlin]. 
Waste flows in the direction of Israel in the Wadi Hanun 
area. I agree that spilling sewage into the sea should not 
be allowed. But bear in mind that there is a huge pool of 
sewage near Beit Lakiya, covering some 400 dunams of land.' 
Kawash says that the cleanup in the northern Gaza Strip 
could take at least two years."98
97 Ze'ev Schiff, "From Wastewater to War", Palestine Media Center, 
available at: http://www.palestine-pmc.com/details.asp?cat=4& id-2382, 
accessed on March 2, 2006.
98 Ibid
99 Anders Jagerskog, op cit.
Earlier, in 2002, Fadel Kawash also stated in an 
interview in the Jerusalem Post that Palestinians were 
working together with their Israeli counterparts to prevent 
pollution of water through the JWC in spite of the 
Intifada.99
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the JWC is 
constrained by its structural context. Israel presumes the 
hegemonic role and enjoys the more powerful position vis-a­
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vis economic size, military strength and international 
standing. By contrast, Israel also entered into a similar 
agreement with Jordan as part of the Peace Agreement of 
1994 and the water agreement has served to enhance and 
formalize "regime cooperation between the two states."100 
The major difference between the two agreements is that 
while the treaty between Israel and Jordan was signed by 
two sovereign states empowered to negotiate rights and 
obligations, the Interim Agreement between Israel and 
Palestine concerns only the behavior of the latter.
Israel has a clearly defined and developed water 
institution history. The State was founded in 1948 and for 
the first ten years riparian and appropriative rights were 
extensively used to claim water rights. The most 
significant change to Israel's water structure and history 
was the adoption of the Water Law in 1959. This Law 
essentially vested the ownership of all water resources in 
the state. Section 1 of the Water Law lays down the 
underlying philosophy of Israel's approach to its water 





State are public property; they are subject to the control 
of the State and are destined for the requirements of its 
inhabitants and for the development of the country".101 The 
Law goes on to say that there is no private or governmental 
ownership of water. All water resources belong to the 
public and are controlled by the State of Israel as the 
custodian for its residents"102 Israeli law requires of each 
and every water user a license and stipulates that land 
ownership in Israel does not include the right to the water 
flowing through the land, beneath it or drawn from wells 
situated thereon. In short, there are no riparian laws 
whatsoever. A fundamental provision in the law is the 
obligation to provide water solely by measurement, and to 
each consumer separately. In other words, each point of 
connection must be metered. The Water Commissioner has 
ultimate authority to authorize or cease production of any 
wells in the country.
101 "Israel's Water Economy", Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 
2002 http://www.mfa.gov.il
102 Ibid.
Water Rates in Israel
Domestic consumption rates are progressive and rise 
with an increase in the amount of water consumed. One 
price is given for the initial 8 cubic meters per month for 
each housing unit and a second price is charged for the 
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next 7 cubic meters. Thereafter, for each additional cubic 
meter the price increases. Each family member (over 4 
family members) is entitled to an additional 3 cubic meters 
a month charged at the lowest rate. There are separate 
rates for 'gardening' and an overall restriction on the 
total amount of landscape water per month, per residence.
While it costs Mekorot, Israel's national water 
company, on average, $0.34/m3 to convey water to the Israeli 
farmer, farmers only pay approximately $0.16/ m3 due to the 
subsidization. Palestinian water rates average between 
$1.00- $1.20/ m3.103 
The Water Commission
103 Nawal Atwan,, "Allocations of Water and Responsibilities in an 
Israeli-Palestinian Water Accord", Princeton University Press, January 
5 2000. http://www.princeton.edu/wws401c/nawal.pdf .
Israel's Parliament, the "Knesset", assigned 
management and responsibility for Israel's water to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, where it remained until 1996. 
Currently, the aegis for water management is found within 
the Ministry of Infrastructure. The Prime Minister 
appointed a Water Commission (currently operating within 
the Ministry of Infrastructure) to enforce water policy.
The farming community ("kibbutzim" or collective 
farms) of Israel in the 1960's through the 1980's was 
extremely strong, particularly when the Labor Party (which 
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favored socialist policies) was in power. While the Water 
Commissioner wielded great power: determining which water 
projects would be built; determining water appropriations; 
enforcing flood and pollution prevention measures, the 
Water Court, which was established with the aim of settling 
water disputes between the Water Commissioner and 
'citizens', was dominated by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
The Water Council, also established to serve as a 
'consultant' to the Commissioner, was largely comprised of 
members of the agrarian community. 104
104Itay Fischhendler. Forthcoming. The politics of water allocation in 
Israel. In: Feitelson, E., and Shamir, U (Ed.).. Water for Dry Land. 
Resources for the Future Press.
105 Ibid.
At the time of this organizational structure, the 
farming community consumed about 75% of all available 
water. That number has been reduced today to 67%.105
Academicians and scientists in Israel began to advise 
the government in the mid 1990's that a drought of serious 
proportion was nearing its inevitable arrival. In 1997 and 
1998 the Water Commission planned a 40% reduction in 
agricultural allocations. Minimum record rainfalls did 
occur in 1998-99 and emergency decrees were promulgated 
affecting all water sectors of Israel but rather than 
enforcing the emergency decree as it was written, the 
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agricultural sector's quota was only cut by 27%. The 
difference was provided by overexploitation from the 
Mountain Aquifer.106 The recharge rate during that year was 
only 47% such that the water deficit in the country, in 
1999, was 847 MCM.107 In 2000, the ultimate Water 
Commission recommendation was a 60% reduction in 
agricultural water but that was slashed to 33% and, in that 
year, the water deficit was 385 MCM or a replenishment rate 
of 68%. In 2000 a new Water Commissioner was appointed, 
Shimon Tai (who maintains the post today) and he suggested 
a 56% cut in water allocations to agriculture but was only 
able to implement a 50% cut "...knowing that the difference 
would be provided by overexploiting the Coastal Aquifer".108 
The following year a 73% suggestion waned to 44% and, 
again, "the result of this limited cutback in another dry 
year was the further exploitation of the Coastal Aquifer. 






Fragmentation of Water Governance in Israel
As Israel's water sector became more complex with the 





in the aftermath of the Six Day War in June of 1967, the 
responsibilities for water management became more 
fragmented. The Ministry of the Environment became 
responsible for water pollution issues, the Ministry of 
Health assumed responsibility for water quality affecting 
public health and the Ministry of the Interior began to 
supervise the operation of local authorities in issue
V
related to water supply to urban users and wastewater 
treatment. Financing of all water projects fell under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. During the 1960's 
and subsequently, water tariffs, under the purview of the 
Ministry of Finance, were established to reflect a 
subsidized rate for agriculture.
According to Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs110 
"The rates for industrial and agriculture are lower than 
those for domestic consumption and services for two major 
reasons: 1) Water for agriculture and industry is 
designated for production, and 2) Water for agriculture is 
supplied on a less reliable basis and is of poorer 
quality".
110 "Israel's Water Economy", Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, August 
2002 http://www.mfa.gov.il
During this period of fragmentation and increasing 
water demand due to the expansion of agriculture and
104
increased territory, there were no overarching coordination 
efforts between these ministries.
Zionism. It would be remiss to not briefly mention the 
"Zionist Imperative" at work. Israel's raison d'etre was 
the establishment of a Jewish homeland where Jews could 
're-claim the soil' and 'make the desert bloom'. The 
allocation of water and subsidized price for water has as 
much to do with furthering and cementing the Zionist dream 
as any economic reasons. During the first ten years after 
Israel's declared statehood (1948-1958) mass immigration 
from North Africa, Arab countries to the east and 
southeast, and Eastern Europe doubled Israel's population 
from 800,000 to over 1.5 million. In a period of thirty 
years, the population was quadrupled to 3.5 million.111 
Development of territory, particularly in the urban center 
of Tel Aviv and in the southern desert was not only a 
pragmatic move to absorb all the new settlers but was also 
part of the new, Jewish national expression and ideology. 
Settling the land, tilling the soil and making it 
productive became the new national imperative. The water 
infrastructure had to be national in character and in scope 111
111 Hillel Shuval, "Sustainable Water Development Under Conditions of 
Scarcity: Israel as a Case Study", presented at Water for Life in the 
Middle East Conference, Antalya, Turkey, 2004, available at 
http://www.ipcri.org/watconf/elmadhoun.pdf, accessed January 2, 2005 
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so a system to ensure equal pricing for water was 
instituted regardless of location. The mandate given to 
Mekorot and to its, then, construction and planning 
partner, Tahal, was to develop an extensive and complex 
central water distribution system to facilitate the 
establishment of hundreds of new settlements.
As the years went on and the major initial thrusts for 
rapid development were successful and well advanced, the 
dominant agricultural establishment which controlled water 
development and management evolved slowly and became more 
and more a normal economically and socially oriented vested 
interest group. Progressively, this group became more 
concerned with the standard of living of the collective 
settlements and farmers in general. These settlements were 
primarily collective farms called kibbutzim and part of the 
larger Labor party. While never achieving a total 
population greater than 5% of the country, these 
settlements disproportionately contributed to the political 
and military leadership of Israel. The early heads of 
state (David Ben-Gurion, Golda Meir, Yigal Allon, et al) 
and the current Water Commissioner were members of 
kibbutzim. National economic growth from the 1950's 
through the 1970's was largely due to the agricultural and 
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industrial successes of this movement. During this period 




In 2005 the government of Israel112, announced its view 
that market forces are the most suitable tools for the 
efficient use of water in the urban and agricultural 
sectors. Accordingly, water prices that are largely 
determined by the Government, based on the existing block 
rate and non-tradable allocations, are to be converted into 
a market negotiating system. This change would eventually 
lead to a greater involvement of the private sector in the 
production and supply of water to the various consumers. 
Further, it is anticipated that rational water use will be 
achieved by the creation of new water suppliers, carved out 
of Mekorot. The role of Mekorot will be limited to the 
operation of the National Water Carrier, while the regional 
water supply schemes will be privatized and defined as 
public service under the supervision of the Water 
Commissioner.
112 "The Water Sector" Ministry of National Infrastructures, available 
at; http://eng.mni.gov.il, accessed on November 2 2005.
Shares allocation attracting dividends and voting 
rights will replace existing water rights. To balance 
between supply and demand, a shadow price reflecting the 
water value at the source will be added, thus rendering the 
historic allocations ineffective. Regulation orders will 
108
still be maintained in case of emergency, such as during a 
series of drought years. Subsidized prices, if available, 
will be fully indicated and calculated reflecting their 
portion of the full costs and budgeted for each specific 
system.
The initialization of privatization was established 
under the Water and Sewage Corporation Law of 2001 of the 
Public Authority on Water Corporations. This was the first 
substantive law challenging the sanctity of the Basic Water 
Law of 1959. The aim is to encourage business investment 
in essential infrastructure and to relieve local 
authorities of the financial and tactical burdens of water 
supply and distribution. According to the law a public 
representative is supposed to be appointed to the board of 
the Public Authority and on May 17, 2005 the High Court of 
Justice (Israel's Supreme Court), responding to a petition 
by the Israel Union for Environmental Defense, ordered the 
State of Israel to freeze its deliberations related to 
water tariffs currently underway within the privatization 
framework, and to explain to the court within thirty days 
why it has ignored its obligation to include
109
representatives of the public on the board of the Public 
Authority.113
113 Israel Union for Environmental Defense, available at 
http://www.iued.org.il, Accessed February 1, 2006
114http://www.environment.gov.il/bin/en.jsp?enPage=e BlankPage&enPisplay= 
view&enDispWhat=Object&enPispWho=NewsA12928&enZone=e news
Israel Ministry of the Environment
The Ministry of the Environment has called for 
proposals to local authorities, municipal and regional 
environmental units, private entrepreneurs and industrial 
plants to submit requests for financial assistance in 
eleven different subjects. The projects include114:
1. Support to local authorities for establishing
construction and demolition waste infrastructure
2. Support to local environmental units
3. Support to local authorities for recycling mixed waste 
in sorting and recycling plants
4. Support to private entrepreneurs for treating olive 
press wastes
5. Support to local authorities for purchasing equipment 
for noise and radiation measurements
6. Support to private entrepreneurs and industrial plants 
for conducting feasibility studies on reducing 
pollutant emissions at source
7. Support to private entrepreneurs and industrial plants 
for reducing hazardous waste at source
8. Support to local authorities for purchasing and 
maintaining equipment for treating hazardous waste 
accidents
9. Support to local authorities for conducting training 
courses on environmental subjects
10. Support to local authorities for the Green School 
certification process
11. Support to local authorities for implementing 
cleanup campaigns and educational activities.
Israel's Legal Framework for
Water Protection
The Water Law of 1959 serves to provide the framework for 
the control and protection of Israel's water sources. The 
law states that all water sources in Israel are public 
property and that every person is entitled to use water, as 
long as that use does not cause the salination or depletion 
of the water resource. In 1971, the law was amended to 
include prohibitions against direct or indirect water 
pollution, regardless of the state of the water beforehand. 
The Minister of the Environment is authorized to protect 
water quality, to prevent water pollution, and to 
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promulgate regulations on these issues. Regulations 
supportive of the Water Law include:115
■ Prohibitions on the rinsing of containers, used for 
spraying of chemical and biological substances into 
water sources
■ Prohibitions on aerial spraying of chemicals and 
biological agents for agricultural purposes near 
surface water sources
■ Restrictions on the use of cesspools and septic tanks; 
conditions for the establishment and operation of gas 
stations to prevent fuel leaks
■ Requirements for evaporation ponds and reservoirs
■ Regulations on the reduction of salt use in industrial 
water softening processes and on the discharge of 
brines
■ Regulations on protecting water sources from heavy 
metals and other pollutants by limiting the volume of 
wastewater discharged from pollution sources and 
reducing pollutant concentrations
■ Regulations on sewage disposal from vessels, which are 
largely aimed at preventing pollution in Lake Kinneret
115 Ibid
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■ Regulations on the pH values of industrial sewage, 
which are aimed to prevent the pollution of water 
sources from the impacts of corrosion
■ Regulations on the use of sludge aimed at preventing 
pollution as a result of improper treatment of sludge
The Ministry of Health
The Ministry of Health is responsible for the quality 
of drinking water within the framework of Regulations 
Concerning the Sanitary Quality of Drinking Water under the 
Public Health Ordinance. A 1995 regulation established 
conditions for drilling water wells including quality 
assessment based on microbial and chemical tests and 
establishment of three protection zones around drinking 
water wells in which different types of activities are 
prohibited. Israel's amended regulations (2000) on 
drinking water, within the framework of the Public Health 
Ordinance, set limits on concentrations of various 
chemicals and microbes in drinking water and specify 
requirements for sampling and testing. Rules promulgated 
under the Public Health Ordinance in 1981 specify the 
treatment required for wastewater and list the crops 
suitable for effluent irrigation in accordance with the 
treatment level.
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The Local Authorities Sewage Law of 1962 prescribes 
the rights and duties of local authorities in the design, 
construction and maintenance of sewage systems. This law 
requires each local authority to maintain its sewage system 
in proper condition. This sector of water treatment is the 
least centralized within Israel and individual water basins 
have the greatest amount of latitude in designing and 
managing these systems.
Business licenses applications in Israel require 
affidavits for industrial effluent treatment, salt 
concentrations in sewage and threshold values for 
chlorides, sodium, fluorides and boron.
Enforcement of Environmental Regulations
Several enforcement mechanisms have been set up in the 
Ministry of the Environment to increase efficiency and 





■ Finable Offense System: Responsible for all aspects 
of the 'finable offense' procedure, from collection. 
Computerization and validation of reports on 
environmental offenses to dispatch of fine notices to 
suspected offenders;
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■ Collection System: Responsible for collecting unpaid 
fines, both "finable offenses" and fines imposed by 
the courts;
■ Cleanliness Trustee System: Responsible for recruiting 
and training Cleanliness Inspectors (from among civil 
servants and inspectors of government agencies and 
local authorities) and Cleanliness Trustees (from the 
general public).
■ Environmental Problem Solving Project: Designed to 
"fix" critical problems, with the participation of 
stakeholders.
■ Negotiated Rulemaking: Designed to foster stakeholder 
participation in the establishment of standards and 
regulations to promote compliance.
In order to maximize the efficiency of the Environment
Ministry's enforcement efforts, training sessions for 
ministerial personnel have been held, enforcement 
coordinators have been appointed to all of the ministry's 
regional offices, enforcement teams (including relevant 
staff members, the Green Police, enforcement coordinators 
and directors of regional offices) have been set up, and 
standardized enforcement procedures are being formulated 
for different areas—whether landfills, land-based sources
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of marine pollution or pest control. At the same time, 
coordination among all enforcement bodies—from the Green 
Police, to all divisions of the ministry, to the regional 
offices—is being increased. The ultimate goal is to improve 
environmental enforcement through more effective oversight 
over implementation of environmental legislation. The 
ultimate aim of environmental legislation is to prevent 
pollution and promote environmental quality. In this 
context, enforcement is an essential means of assuring 
compliance with the country's environmental laws and 
regulations. Israel's environmental legislation is enforced 
through administrative, civil and criminal measures. 
Although major emphasis is placed on administrative 
enforcement, criminal prosecution is often an effective 
deterrent tool, especially because of the personal 
responsibility imposed on directors of economic and public 
corporations. The criminal enforcement system uses 
sanctions, including imprisonment, to promote deterrence 
and help ensure compliance with environmental 
legislation.117 Figure 197 depicts the indictments for 
water offenses from 2001-2003.
117 Ibid
116
Indictments for Water Offenses -2001-2003 (163 cases)




Figure 19. Indictments for Water Offenses 2001-2003
Source: Israel Ministry of Environment
Palestine's Water Institutions
The PWA; Palestine Water Authority. The mandate of the 
Palestine Water Authority (PWA) is to serve as the main 
regulatory body for water resources management and 
development in Palestine and its objectives, as enunciated 
by Ihab Barghothi, Ph.D., advisor to the PWA118 are to:
■ Execute the National Water Policy as approved by the 
National Water Council;




■ Seek to achieve and develop water security through 
optimal planning and management of water resources and 
explore further resources to ensure balanced 
management between supply and demand;
■ Set standards and establish technical specifications 
to assure quality control of water works;
■ License the exploitation of water resources including 
the construction of water projects;
■ Seek to achieve strong cooperation between PWA and 
other relevant parties.
The core functions of the PWA are to:119
■ Support negotiations on expansion of Palestinian Water 
rights toward gaining control over its equitable share 
of the region's water resources;
■ Be in charge of management and allocation of water 
resources including issuing and supervision of water 
abstraction licenses;
■ Provide water resources and water sector information 
services;
■ Undertake water "master planning" functions:




■ Be a regulator of water and wastewater utility 
operations;
■ Promote public awareness, stakeholder participation 
and mutual trust among interest groups.
The PWA was established in 1995 under (Palestinian)
Presidential Order No. 90, acting under the direct 
responsibility of the President of the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA). In the same decree, the
National Water Council (NWC) was also established and its 
purpose is to approve projects and capital expenditures 
related to water. The Head of the Water Committee is the 
President of the Palestinian National Authority. All of 
the members of the NWC are:
■ PNA President, Head of Committee
■ Minister of Agriculture, Member
■ Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, 
Member
■ Minister of Justice, Member
■ Ministry of Industry, Member
■ Ministry of Local Government, Member
■ Representative of Palestinian Universities, Member
The PWA recognizes, as available, 650 MCM of the
Mountain Aquifer and an additional 70 MCM of wadi (ancient 
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river beds only active in the winter months) surface runoff 
to support the water needs of the West Bank. The PWA 
recognizes that the Gaza Coastal Aquifer is the sole source 
of water for the Gaza Strip and estimates a renewable 
recharge rate of 45 MCM. Total use of the Mountain Aquifer 
is about 120 MCM of which 86 MCM is used to irrigate 90,000 
dunam (22,000 acres or 9,000 hectares). The remaining 34 
MCM are used for domestic and industrial consumption with 
more than 40% unaccounted for water, as mentioned above.
In Gaza, the PWA estimates demand of 125 MCM irrigating 
120,000 dunam (30,000 acres or 12,000 hectares).
The PWA asserts that Israel is controlling 85% of the 
water from the Palestinian groundwater. (Refer to earlier 
discussion of water supply and the Mountain Aquifer). 
The PWA has established four regional utilities throughout 
the West Bank and Gaza and divided them geographically:
1. Northern Utility; Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilia, 
Salfit and Tubas Governorates
2. Central Utility; Jerusalem, Ramallah, Al-Bireh and 
Jericho Governorates
3. Southern Utility; Hebron and Bethlehem Governorates
4. Coastal Utility; Gaza Strip Governorates
The PWA recognizes "Oslo II" as the basis for water
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sector planning and project implementation during the
'interim period' and until a final status agreement is 
reached. The PWA has prepared its final status negotiating 
position, which was articulated at the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on International Relations 
meeting on May 5, 2004 by Ihab Barghothi, advisor to the 
Palestinian Water Authority.120
Barghothi summarized the Palestinian demands as:
■ Total and permanent Palestinian sovereignty coupled 
with actual control over all resources of the 
(Eastern) aquifer, whether ground or surface.
■ Redistribution of the water resources of these
(Western and Northeastern aquifers), on the basis of 
equitable and reasonable distribution principle, 
without any precedent conditions, and to dismiss the 
statement, which says it is necessary to honor the 
Israelis' current utilization.
■ Total and permanent Palestinian sovereignty and actual 
control over watercourses inside the Gaza Strip.
■ Complete participation in the aquifer management, and 




■ To get a commitment from the Israeli side to pump the
Palestinians' share of water from the aquifer through 
Lake Tiberias, by a pipeline or canal connecting 
between Lake Tiberias and the (Jordan) Valley area at 
the starting point of the northern borders of the West 
Bank along the Jordan River.
Palestinian Water Tariffs. All joint water proposals 
include provisions for water markets, degrees of financial 
privatization, water transfers, or, quite frequently, all 
three. A discussion of the benefits and disadvantages of 
water transfers is necessary to fully explicate the notion 
of joint management. However, in order for that discussion 
to be appropriate for Palestinians as well it will be 
necessary to review the current state of their 
institutional water price policies and programs.
At this point in time it is challenging for a 
Palestinian to know how much a cubic meter of water costs. 
The answer is determined by where he/she lives, what manner 
and method is used for calculating the cost, whence the 
water is derived, in what form it is delivered and, 
finally, where it is measured. Within Israel, the 
discussion revolves around subsidized costs for agriculture 
and industry, 'shadow' costs and marginal costs. Water is 
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uniformly and centrally provided for domestic use. That is 
simply not the case in Palestine.
Water Law No. 3 of 2002 of the Palestinian Authority 
re-affirmed the formation of the Palestine Water Authority 
(PWA) and the High Water Council. Article 9 of this law 
specified that the PWA is entrusted with a number of powers 
including:
■ Setting the general water policy.
■ Setting the policy for development and utilization of 
water resources and their different usages.
■ Authorizing plans and programs aimed at regulating 
water usage, preventing wastage, and conserving 
consumption.
■ Confirming the allocation of funds for investment in 
the water sector.
Further, Article 20 of the law stipulates that, a unified 
tariff system for water shall be set. Article 26 
prescribes that the regional utilities and water user 
associations shall set the prices of water for different 
usage, in accordance with the tariff system. Article 35 of 
the same Law stipulates the penalties to be imposed for 
violating the law's provisions.
The reality of water tariffs in West Bank Governorates 
123
in 2002 is represented below in Table 11 and the water 
tariffs in Gaza Strip Governorates in 2002 are shown in 
Table 12.121
http://www.piccr.org/publications/special27e.pdf
Several points of discrepancy are shown in the tables.
The highest price for 100 cubic meters of water is 198 NIS 
in the Gaza Strip Governorate of Absan Al-Kabireh whereas 
the highest price in the West Bank for an equivalent amount 
of water is 900 NIS. Within the West Bank approximately 
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The disparities in the billing cycles are significant
as well. Some Governorates bill customers monthly and
other every two months. The minimum tariff is not pro
rated so customers pay 26 NIS for the first 5m^ of water in
Nablus and those in the city of Tubas, for example, pay 14
NIS. There is also no differentiation in prices for
different market sectors. All market sectors: agriculture,
industry, sanitation, drinking, public landscape, etc., pay
126
the same rates.
The reasons for these discrepancies are primarily- 
found in the source of the water purchased. Water purchased 
from Mekorot, Israel's water company, generated from 
artesian wells, generated from shallow wells and water 
generated from springs carry different costs. Water 
purchased from Mekorot represents the vast majority of 
water consumed in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. An average 
cost of one cubic meter of water the West Bank Water 
Department sold to its customers (that had been purchased 
from Mekorot) was 2.38 NIS. The cost of generating water 
from artesian wells in Ramallah averages about 3.5 NIS/m3. 
Pumping water from shallow wells is less expensive than the 
first two options arid averages about 1-1.5 NIS per cubic 
meter although the quality of shallow well water is 
generally less than that of water generated from deeper 
wells or purchased from Israel. The least amount of energy 
for water production is expended on springs or surface 
water. The Governorate of Jericho spends about 0.70 NIS 
per cubic meter for spring water.122
Most municipalities still use diesel motors and aging 
generators in water production which makes the true cost of 
122 Ibid
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water production1 even higher and the delivery of water less 
efficient than in Israel.
The true cost of water is not calculated by the 
accounting system in the PWA. Scientific, modern methods 
of accounting are not practiced and some facilities do not 
take into account depreciation of the value of water 
systems, maintenance costs, employee wages, or interest on 
loans. They likewise do not take into account the costs of 
immovable assets' such as wells, storage tanks, waterlines, 
water networks, and equipment used in water production and 
distribution.123 Many institutions in the Palestinian 
Authority have water exemptions. Schools, camps, places of 
worship have been regularly exempted from paying water 
bills. Other consumers have received Presidential decrees 
excusing them from paying their water bills and many public 
entities such as ministries and local authorities are not 
forced to pay for their water either. The financial 
deficit for the West Bank Water Department in 2002 was 300 
million NIS.124 Five of the largest eight West Bank 







NGO's can and do provide means of communication for 
Israelis and Palestinians and enable them to meet on more 
equal terms than governmental channels permit125. They are 
not beholden to the winds of politics nor are they 
restricted to work with whomever they choose. However, the 
most effective on-the-ground NGO's are made up of local 
Israelis and Palestinians but travel arrangements for those 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza are severely 
restricted by the Israeli Military and Civil Authorities.
125 R. Twite, "The Role of NGOs in Promoting Regional Cooperation Over 
Environmental and Water Issues in Israel and Palestine-Successes and 
Limitations", presented at Water for Life in the Middle East 
Conference, Antalya, Turkey, 2004, available at 
http://www.ipcri.org/watconf/elmadhoun.pdf, accessed January 2, 2005.
The most active and prolific NGO's addressing Israel 
Palestine Water Management issues are:
The Israel Palestine Center for Research and Information
The Israel Palestine Center for research and 
Information (IPCRI), founded in Jerusalem in 1988, is the 
only joint Israeli-Palestinian public policy think-tank in 
the world. It is devoted to developing practical solutions 
for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. IPCRI is an 
organization of 26 people with a governing board directed 
by two chairmen and two co-directors. It consists of 
Israeli and Palestinian civil servants, academicians and 
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professionals. The goal of.IPCRI, is "to bring about 
change, social change in awareness and patterns of thought 
that bring about change in the behavior patterns of all 
those involved in the education process"126. The seminal 
conference held on Middle Eastern water issues was the 
First Israeli-Palestinian Conference in Zurich in 1992. The 
'breakthrough' conference held on Middle Eastern water 
issues, since Oslo II, was the IPCRI Second Israeli- 
Palestinian Conference held in Turkey, October 10-14, 
2 0 0 4127 1 40 speakers addressed this conference on a wide 
range of water related topics salient to the Middle East. 
The conference sponsors included USAID, UNESCO, the 
Heinrich Boll Foundation and the IWRA. IPCRI is 
participating in the OPTIMA (Optimization for Sustainable 
Water Management) that bring together 14 partners from 12 
different Mediterranean countries. IPCRI's part in the 
project in OPTIMA is concerned with socio-economic 
management of the Mountain Aquifer. The three major units 
of IPCRI are:
126 http://www.ipcri.org, Accessed November 2, 2002
127 Http://www.ipcri-waterdconference.org, Accessed November 18, 2004
■ The Strategic Analysis Unit (SAU) which is an 
interdisciplinary unit of twelve groups headed by 
both an Israeli and Palestinian leader and consists 
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of: The Political Group, Border Regime, Economic 
Development and Cooperation, Economics and Security, 
Culture of Peace, Jerusalem, Water, Security 
Coordination, Agriculture, Environment, Media and 
Human Rights.
■ The Environment and Water Department (E&W) which was 
established in 1994 and deals with issues such as 
environmental standards in agriculture, environment 
and public health, water pollution, the allocation 
of water, the development of new innovative models 
for joint management of natural resources
■ Peace Education, which focuses on incorporating the 
peace process in elementary and high school 
textbooks and conducting focus group and teacher 
training in Israel and in Palestine.
Friends of the Earth; Middle East
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"Good Water Neighbors" is the project name of the 
regional Friends of the Earth; Middle East. The project is 
aimed at fostering people-to-people information exchange, 
dialog and cooperation on the protection, equitable and 
sustainable use of water and environment resources in 
Jordan, Palestine and Israel. The Project staff 
coordination team consist of twelve field researchers
living in the community where water projects are underway, 
six expert advisors (two from each political entity) to 
accompany, advise and evaluate the projects, three 
councilors whose task it is to consult and maintain contact 
with the government representatives. The projects that 
FoEME have initiated include: Transportation Policy and the 
Environmental Repercussions of By-Pass Roads; Sustainable 
Tourism for the Gulf of Aqaba, Jordan; Regional Development 
Plan for the Dead Sea Basin; Replacement of Water Tanks for 
Palestinians whose tanks were destroyed by the fighting 
during the Intifada in the Bethlehem area.
In 2005, FoEME dedicated its forces to mitigation 
efforts in the Mountain Aquifer. Officials from Israel, 
the Palestinian Authority and donor countries, as well as 
the US representative to the Quartet, met on January 31, 
2006 to discuss groundwater pollution and ways to alleviate 
it at a symposium organized by Friends of the Earth. Middle 
East (FoEME). A new report published by FoEME found that 
over 1 million tons of waste per year is dumped in 
unsanitary conditions, polluting scarce water resources 
shared by Israelis and Palestinians. The report, titled "A 
Seeping Time Bomb: Pollution of the Mountain Aquifer by 
Solid Waste", found that as the rampant pollution continues
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all sides share the blame. "The restrictions on movement 
imposed by Israel; denial by Israel of the Palestinian use 
of preferred sites in area C; lack of vigorous attempts by 
the PA to implement the Palestinian environment policy, and 
lack of international funding and recognition of the 
severity of the issue are all responsible", said Nader 
Khateeb, Palestinian Director of FoEME. Bringing together 
officials and decision makers from Israel and the PA, as 
well as the international community, the symposium . 
represents a unique opportunity to resume cooperative 
efforts to prevent groundwater pollution for the first time 
since the Intifada. "Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
failed to maintain the needed environmental cooperation" 
said Zach Tagar, from FoEME Tel-Aviv office. "By refusing 
to cooperate over issues of shared interest, both 
governments are failing their people who suffer from water 
and air pollution. Due to the strategic importance of 
water, it is crucial that both sides resume cooperation 
immediately", he added. The symposium was held at the Notre 
Dame Hotel in Jerusalem. FoEME is organizing a site tour 
of the Dir Dibwan (planned) dumpsite near Ramallah 
highlighting the pollution issue at hand.128
128 http: //www. FoEME. org/press .php?ind=26
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On September 25, 2005 Friends of the Earth Middle East 
presented the experience of community based water 
cooperation at the UN during a seminar organized by the US 
mission to the UN entitled; "The Role of NGOs in Promoting 
Peace in the Middle East".
FoEME presented lessons learned from four years of 
experience of the "Good Water Makes Good Neighbor" project, 
a community based activity focusing on pairs of 
Palestinian, Israeli and Jordanian communities that share a 
common water source (river, stream or groundwater). The 
project was one of few that not only survived but also 
expanded in spite of the ongoing Intifada because of the 
interdependence associated with water resources and the 
understanding that water is a basic necessity to life. "All 
our water resources are shared and how one side manages 
water issues directly impacts the lives of the other side", 
said Mr. Gidon Bromberg, the Israeli director of Friends of 
the Earth Middle East. "The interdependence naturally 
associated over water means that communities must be 
working together to solve common water problems". The Good 
Water Neighbors (GWN) project has worked in 11 communities, 
supported by the European Union and the U.S. Government. In 
light of its tremendous success, it is now being expanded
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to include 6 additional communities. "Water can be a
bridge for peace" said the Palestinian Director of FoEME, 
Mr. Nader Khatib, who also spoke at the UN event. "The 
water resources are so scarce in the Middle East that we 
have to work together with our Israeli neighbors in order 
to help guarantee that we as Palestinians get our fair 
share of water and all together stop the pollution of the 
water resource." Over 200 representatives of delegations to 
the United Nations and other NGOs, which have 
representatives in the United States, were present, in 
addition to coverage by the UN and local press corps. 
Ambassador John R. Bolton hosted a reception later in the 
evening, which allowed the NGO representatives to meet and 
engage with members of the UN community.
The Center for Environmental Diplomacy
The Center for Environmental Diplomacy (CED) is a 
regional cooperative venture among Israelis, Palestinians 
and Jordanians working to provide expertise to protect the 
environment in the West Bank and Jordan Valley. CED works 
in alliance with others to shape a future of peace and 
security through management of natural resources. CED 
founded TEPP (Tri-Lateral Environmental Peace Plan), an 
applied environmental diplomacy project, to act as a 
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public/private partnership with the three governments, 
other NGOs and hydrologic and environmental experts for the 
purpose of establishing two watershed conservation 
districts: WED, which is the West Bank Environmental 
District and JVED, the Jordan Valley Environmental 
District. CED gained the support for JVED from the newly 
democratically elected Mayor of Jericho, Mr. Hassan Selah, 
the city Health and Environmental managers and Dr. Saeb 
Erakat, Palestinian Minister for Internal Affairs. On 
March 1, 2005 TEPP established a third Environmental 
District in Jericho (JED). TEPP is lead by its Council of 
Ministers (COM). The TEPP, in seeking to remove the 
environment from the political stalemates that regularly 
frustrate the immediate parties from time to time, supports 
the implementation of the UNEP Desk Study on the 
Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.129 The 
UNEP is the tome written at the behest and approval of the 
State of Israel, Palestinian Authority and 120 other 
countries and 90 ministers who attended the conference in 
Cartegna, Columbia in February 2002 with the purpose of 
outlining the state of the environment in the Occupied
129 For the complete UN Study refer to Topfer, Klaus Desk Study on the 
Environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, United Nations 
Environmental Programme, New York: UNEP, 2005.
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Territories and identify major areas of environmental 
damage requiring immediate attention.
The International Development Research Center
The International Development Research Center (IDRC) 
is a Canadian public corporation created by the Parliament 
of Canada in 1970 to help developing countries use science 
and technology to find practical, long-term solutions to 
the social, economic, and environmental problems they face. 
IDRC has worked in close collaboration with the Middle East 
and North Africa since 1971. Three years later the Centre 
established a permanent presence in the area with the 
opening of a regional office in Beirut, Lebanon. Relocated 
to Cairo, Egypt in 1976, this office is the focus of 
activities in 10 countries and territories extending from 
Turkey to Morocco. In the past 30 years IDRC has supported 
more than 550 research projects directed and managed by 
researchers and institutions in the region. A series of 
Country Profiles provides an overview of IDRC's work' in the 
region by country and includes project highlights. Based on 
IDRC's Corporate Strategy and Program Framework (CSPF 2005- 
2010), three broad Program Areas are supported in the 
region, namely: Environment and Natural Resource Management 
(ENRM), Information and Communications Technologies for
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Development (ICT4D), and.Social and Economic Policy
i




1 i: ' ■
<1. Scientific,.Working Groups ■ -
' I:
Executive Action/ Team'
Multilateral.working groups to advance the. Middle East 
Peace Process were established in 1992. The Water Data 
Banks Project,, established in-1994, is-a product of that 
process. Dr. Karen .Assaf and;Mustafa F., Nuseibeh of the 
Palestinian Water Authority were instrumental in this
i I'project as was Hazim El-Naser of the Jordanian Ministry of 
Water and Irrigation,.-Shmuel Kessler and Meir Ben-Zvi of 
the Israeli Hydrological Service. The goal of.this project 
is to standardize and adopt data collection and storage 
techniques in the region and improve communication among
I'
the scientific, community in the region. An executive’team,
J:
or EXACT, manages the project, comprised of scientific
j j'
water experts from Palestine, Jordan and Israel. EXACT has 
set a new standard for scientific data base management in
I, l'
the Middle East Ij The project has successfully trained 
water managers.and field technicians in the fields of:1 i
i j
database development, interpretation of water quality
; iI I'
network data, installation and operation of hydro-
meteorological and stream gauging stations. Classroom
training has been conducted in the fields of: statistical
water analysis for water resources, laboratory review
procedures, preparation of laboratory quality assurance
plans, water-quality field measurements, fundamentals of
relational database design, rainfall intensity data
analysis, use of digitalizing rainfall intensity strip
chart software and use of RAINPLOT software. EXACT has
successfully exacted substantial funding from donor
countries for equipment and training. According to Dr.
Assaf, perhaps the greatest single success is the effective
and continuing communication channels that have been
established among colleagues from the Core Party
participating agencies.
Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System .
The Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System is an
information and knowledge exchange tool that was developed
in 1999 to share information and to promote common outputs
and cooperation programs exclusively on water related
issues in the Mediterranean region. Both the Palestine
Authority and Israel are among the 15 European and 12
Mediterranean partners. This is an information gathering
and dissemination organization that is structured around
National Focal Points and Technical Units assigned to 
particular geographic areas in the region. The categories 
of information management that EMWIS has organized include: 
institutions, documentation, training, research and 
development and data management.
Geohydrological Information Center
The Geohydrological Information Center (GIC) is the 
brainchild of an Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian research 
team. This team collaborated on this project representing 
the Department of Geophysics and Planetary Sciences, Tel 
Aviv University; EWRE, Environmental and Water Resource 
Engineering, Haifa, Israel; An Najah University, Nablus, 
The West Bank, Palestinian Authority; and PHG, Palestine 
Hydrological Group, Ramallah, The West Bank, The 
Palestinian Authority. The purpose of the GIC was to 
provide an information management system to integrate all 
available data with respect to the Dead Sea and Jordan 
Valley area. It was determined that the political 
situation, heretofore, prevented the efficient management 
of the water policy of the area around the Dead Sea and 
Lower Jordan basin. However, "...now a day when peace has 
been achieved, to a certain extent, between Israel, the 
Palestinians and Jordan, it is in great need to provide a 
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better management of the water policy on both side of the 
river" (Annat Yellin, Department of Geophysics and 
Planetary Science, Tel Aviv University)
Middle East Desalination Resource Center
Based in Oman, the Middle East Desalination Resource 
Center (MEDRC) has been the force behind the construction 
of the largest and most efficient systems throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula. MEDRC is committed to reducing the cost 
of desalination through research, capacity and education. 
The Executive Board has been broadened to include 
Ambassador Sayyid Badr bin hamad al bu Said, the Executive 
Council Chairman who is also the Sultanate of Oman's Under 
Secretary for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Charles 
Lawson, the Executive Council Vice Chairman, who is the 
Senior Advisor for Science and Technology in the Bureau of 
Near Eastern Affairs of the U.S. Department of State; Mr. 
Jacob Keidar who is the Director of the Multilateral Peace 
Talks Coordination and Water Issues Department at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel; Mr. Fadle Said 
Kawash who was the Deputy head of the Palestinian Water 
Authority and the Coordinator of the Water Negotiation 
Committee; Mr. Fayez Bataineh who is the Assistant 
Secretary General for Technical Affairs in the Ministry of 
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Water and Irrigation, Jordan. There are also 
representatives from Japan and South Korea on the Executive 
Council.
Palestine Hydrology Group
The Palestine Hydrology Group (PHG) is striving, in 
cooperation with the local communities, to protect and 
develop water and environmental resources and to ensure 
just and equal provision of water and sanitation services 
to the rural and marginal communities in the West Bank and 
Gaza. PHG is also striving to promote research capacity and 
infrastructure for the sector in Palestine and seek 
international networking and partnerships to participate 
actively in promoting the sustainability and just 
allocation of water resources at local, regional and global 
levels. "The Palestinian Hydrology Group is a non-profit, 
non-government organization that protects and develops the 
water resources of Palestine. We strive, through community 
participation, to achieve justice in the service, 
allocation, and protection of the water resources of 
Palestine, since the sustainability of this resource is 
vital for the protection of the Palestinian nation, the 
protection of future generation, and the protection of the 
planet. We shall nurture the development of our employees 
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and will assist them in fulfilling their personnel 
objectives."131'
131 http://www.phg.org/background/background.html#top
PHG was a two-person operation that worked out of the 
office of the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee 
(PARC). PARC hosted the group for two years, providing 
logistical support, and introducing PHG to outside funding 
and professional organizations. The first activity of PHG 
was to conduct a field study on the natural springs in the 
West Bank. At the end of a year and half of fieldwork the 
study was published, and an action program was developed in 
order to utilize the potential of the neglected springs. 
The action program began with a pilot project at Arura 
village in Ramallah area, and was funded by Oxfam, UK. At 
the completion of the pilot project an economic evaluation 
of the project was conducted. The results of evaluation 
illustrated the feasibility of the project and so Oxfam 
agreed to support similar projects. This signaled the 
beginning of PHG as an official NGO. Since this first 
project, 10 years ago, PHG has continued its involvement in 
spring rehabilitation. Since the cooperation of the local 
community is a crucial factor in the success of any 
project, PHG had to work hard in its early years to earn 
the trust and respect of these communities. Many 
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communities were initially reluctant to deal with yet 
another new agency because of their previous, disappointing 
experiences with other program implementing agencies.
However, the determination of PHG to earn the confidence of 
the communities was strong and so within the next two years 
they traveled into the northern rural area to spread news 
of their mission. The success of their visits was evidenced 
by the requests for PHG assistance, which soon followed. 
The confidence of the communities had been won over, and 
has been strengthened with each passing year of PHG 
operation. This is evidenced by the fact that in 1997, PHG 
received over 2000 requests from individuals and 
communities to help construct cisterns. PHG is now a well- 
known name in relation to the development, and protection 
of water supplies throughout the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.132
Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem
Founded in 1990, the Applied Research Institute of 
Jerusalem (ARIJ) is a non-profit organization dedicated to 
promoting sustainable development in the occupied 
Palestinian territories and the self-reliance of the 




The Institute works specifically to augment the local 
stock of scientific and technical knowledge and to 
introduce and devise more efficient methods of resource 
utilization and conservation, improved practices, and 
appropriate technology.
ARIJ plays an active role in the local community as an 
advocate for greater co-operation among local institutions, 
international and non-governmental organizations. In its 
capacity as a national research institute, it frequently 
provides current data and research necessary to the 
formulation of position papers and policy strategies on 
such issues as land and water resources. Moreover, through 
its work with donor institutions and regional and 
international experts, ARIJ promotes an environment 
conducive to the introduction of new initiatives and ideas 
and thus serves as a facilitator in the co-ordination of 
multilateral activities.
Although initially conceived to confront issues facing 
the agricultural community, ARIJ has since broadened its 
agenda to include a wide spectrum of environmental 
concerns. Early research priorities focused on cultivation 
in marginal lands, livestock production, agro-industries 
and marketing, and water management and utilization. As 
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water issues gained precedence, the Water Research Unit and 
the Rainfed Farming Unit were created to better identify 
research goals and implement project objectives.
In 1994 the Environmental Research Unit was 
established to conduct an overview of environmental 
conditions in the West Bank and Gaza and subsequently to 
assist in the formulation of strategy options, policy 
guidelines, and national standards and legislation. A 
precursor to these objectives is the development of a 
comprehensive Environmental Information System, which will 
serve the region as a foundation for in depth research.
In 1994 also, the GIS and Landuse Unit was created 
with the aim of using up-to-date data and mapping 
technology for analysis planning and modeling of 
sustainable development in Palestine.
In the shadow of the ongoing massive wave of 
development and investment activities in Palestine in the 
mid 1990's, it was feared that the basic terms of 
sustainable development and conservation of the environment 
and its resources would be disregarded. To address this 
concern, ARIJ created the Environmental Resource Planning 
and Assessment (ERPA) Unit on 1 January 1996.
Additionally, ARIJ instituted a Resource Centre, which 
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makes scientific data, literature, and periodicals on a 
wide range of' subjects available to the local community. 
The Institute also maintains a data analysis center, 
laboratory, weather station, and a hydroponics unit. A 
garden allows the Institute to cultivate and compare new 
varieties before introducing them to the ideal community.
ARIJ receives technical and financial support from a 
variety of international governmental and non-governmental 
organizations that grant funding on a project basis.
Moreover, ARIJ has signed an affiliation agreement 
with Al-Quds University in 1996. The President of Al-Quds 
University, Dr. Sari Nusseibeh and the President of the 
board of trustees of the Applied Research Institute- 
Jerusalem (ARIJ), Mr. Daoud Istanbuli signed an agreement 
that creates a role model for institutional cooperation 
aimed at promoting the research capabilities in Palestine 
to meet the growing needs of the Palestinian society for 
research and technology as essential ingredients in 
comprehensive development.133
http://www.poica.org/arij/arij.php
Any institutional structure for water resource 
management in the Middle East must include the 
participation of NGO's. While cooperation among the 
governments of Palestine and Israel are at a nadir, 
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cooperation between Palestinians and Israelis who are 
members of NGO's is extraordinarily high and seemingly 
impervious to political machinations and party politics. 
Moreover, these NGO's attract funding from outside sources 
for technical projects, research projects, conferences and 
publishing. The men and women working for and contributing 
to these NGO's are among the world's most prolific and 
learned water resource theoreticians. These aforementioned 
NGO's coupled with the noted academicians of the region 
form a trans-boundary community, which, if allowed to 
flourish, mobilize and help govern, can serve as a vanguard 
for further cooperation among the political entities.
Even as political entities are reticent about entering 
into any discussions of joint interest, there is a 
conference planned to be held in Amman, Jordan entitled, 
"Scientific Forum: Environment and Water Resources of the 
Dead Sea and Jordan Rift Valley" on September 11-16, 2006 
which is co-organized by Jordan University, Amman; Jordan 
Valley Authority, Amman; Al-Quds University, East 
Jerusalem; Environmental Research Center, Leipzig-Halle, 
Germany; Palestinian Hydrology Group, Ramallah; Tel Aviv 
University, Tel Aviv. The Conference is supported by the 
Federal Ministry for Research and Education, Germany and
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International Association of Hydrogeologists (IAH), Karst
Commission.134 Israeli universities and Palestinian 
universities and regional NGO's continue to cooperate and 
their successes and consistency has attracted sponsors and 





PROPOSITIONS FOR INTEGRATED INSTITUTIONAL 
WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS
Propositions and suggestions for successful joint 
management of shared water resources in the Middle East 
share common assumptions: water resources in the region 
are trans-boundary; water resources in the region are 
scarce and at risk; population growth in the Eastern 
Mediterranean is rapidly increasing; there can be no final 
settlement or rapprochement between Israel and Palestine 
without a satisfactory, equitable water management program; 
scientific data and research must continue to flourish in a 
cooperative and transparent fashion; trust and confidence­
building measures between parties must serve as the 
foundation for joint management. There is also agreement 
among theoreticians of joint water management in the Middle 
East that institutions and regulations must be governed 
transparently, however, there is no consensus as to whether 
or not institutional development in the water sector should 
be used as a governance tool. The motivating factor for 
nations to consider joint management of trans-boundary 
water resources is the water shortages that are upon us. 
Water resource development is not the quid pro quo solution
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to the scarcity that faces the Middle East. Desalination 
will be necessary to partially meet the growing 
populations' demands but any fundamental institutional 
program must address resource allocation, demand management 
and water quality. Turkey and Israel had signed an 
agreement that called for the importation of 50 
MCM/annually from Turkey's Mangavat River. That 
arrangement has been suspended due, primarily, to the 
recent increase in the price of oil making the 
transportation of barges impractical. Shaul Arlosoroff 
maintained all along that one could not bring water from 
Turkey at an affordable price.135
135 Ha'Aretz, May 4, 2006 accessible at
http://www.haaretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/702903.html
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Because water institutions are multi-disciplinary and 
intersect with economics, law and public policy and are 
strongly influenced by myriad externalities such as 
resource endowment, demography, science and technology, and 
security needs, only an integrated approach to 
institutional changes that aims to modernize and strengthen 
regulations and administrative arrangements can have the 
maximum, synergistic effect on the region.
Institutional arrangements for developing and managing 
water resources have been termed the; 'transmission gears'
between policy objectives and field-level performance. 
Whereas policies raise questions about what is to be done, 
institutional analysis asks who is expected to do it, and 
with what resources and how are the institutional building 
blocks expected to interact.136
136 E. Chioccioli, A. Hamdy and C. Lacirignola, "Institutional Capacity 
Building and Integrated Water Resources Management in the 
Mediterranean", The International Conference on Water and Sustainable 
Development, Paris, 19-21 March 1998. Available at
http://www.oieau.fr/ciedd/contributions/at2/resume/rciheam.htm. 
Accessed on January 22, 2006.
137 Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, "Identification of joint Management 
Structures for Shared Aquifers: A Cooperative Palestinian-Israeli 
Effort", World Bank Technical paper No. 415
138 Saleth and Dinar, 2
There is scant practical experience in joint 
management of shared aquifers while there is extensive 
experience in the management of cross-boundary surface 
water.137 The treaties aforementioned do not provide 
operative models for the Middle East nor are they 
enforceable to the parties in the Middle East. Country­
specific studies (Saleth and Dinar, 1999 et al) are common 
but studies evaluating institutional underpinnings of water 
sector performance with a cross-country perspective are 
rather rare.138 There are lessons to be learned from other 
countries' experience with water scarcity but, by and 
large, the eventual joint management program in the Middle 
East will most likely serve to enlighten other areas of 
conflict around the world rather than be the beneficiary of 
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programs and policies adopted elsewhere. There is no 
equivalent conflict in the world where water resource 
management is so inextricably linked to the overall peace 
process and one nation is militarily occupied by the other. 
"There are many, many, groups of people that feel occupied 
(in the rest of the world), but few whose land is 
recognized as legally being under military occupation"139 
The Johnston Plan
139 Aaron T. Wolfe, Ph.D., Department of Geosciences, Oregon State 
University, email correspondence in reply to question, "It appears to' 
me that transboundary water management generally crosses borders of 
sovereign states or nations. The area of my prime interest is the 
Middle East, in general, and between Israel and Palestine, in 
particular. Their relationship is one of 'occupier' and 'occupied'. 
Do you know of any other similar scenarios in the world (either today 
or in the past?), January 2, 2006
Several international proposals for political 
solutions to the water conflict in the Middle East have 
been proffered over the course of the past ninety years. 
While the Johnston Plan did not relate specifically to 
groundwater and was never ratified by the parties in the 
Middle East, it is worth noting for two reasons. First, 
its precepts still provide, de facto, manners of behavior 
in water management within Israel and Jordan. Second, the 
plan is in the throes of being re-visited although the 
prerequisites for its adoption today are many and, within 
the current political atmosphere, seemingly insurmountable.
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Special Ambassador of the United States, Eric
Johnston, presented the Johnston Plan in 1955 for the 
purpose of satisfying all the Jordan River basin riparians' 
needs. The provisions in the Plan called for:140
140 Sharif L. Emusa, "Toward a Unified Management Regime: The Johnston 
Plan Revisited"-, Yale F and ES Bulletin, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/environment/publications/bulletin/103pdfs/103elmusa 
.pdf. Accessed on March 1, 2006.
■ Riparian water quotas, including quantities, basis of 
estimation, priorities of extraction, points of 
extraction, and spatial utilization (in and out of 
basin boundaries)
■ Regulatory works, including diversion canals and dams 
and their location (See Figure 20)
■ A joint management body, including international 
representation
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Figure 20. The Johnston Plan
Source: Sharif L. Emusa, "Toward a Unified
Management Regime: The Johnston Plan
Revisited", Yale F and ES Bulletin,
The quotas were to be allocated according to the 
geographical locations of the riparians. Lebanon was to 
get water from the Hatzbani, Syria from the Banias, the 
Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk river, Jordan from the Yarmuk, 
the Lower Jordan and local wadis. While Johnston returned 
the United States under the assumption that all the parties 
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were to approve, forthwith, the plan, there was never any 
indication that any of the parties had any intention of 
doing so. The Arab states had not, to this point, 
recognized the State of Israel and this plan required such 
a statement.
The Johnston Plan did not take into account any 
environmental protection provisions and, of course, the 
political reality and state of management resources in the 
region are substantively different today than in the 
1950's. The attraction of the Plan and the reasons for its 
revival today is that its major provisions for joint 
management resonate with current proposals today and, if 
there is an eventual accommodation between Israel and 
Syria, in particular, the engineering schemes detailed in 
the Johnston Plan could be a viable starting point. Syria 
is a water-rich country but is in the throes of a water 
dispute with Turkey concerning the allocation of Euphrates 
River water. One possible scenario suggests that should 
Syria be the beneficiary of its demands for Euphrates River 
water it may be possible to discuss the easement or 
elimination of the diversion dams it has erected on the 
Yarmuk River permitting the regeneration of flow of that 
river on Jordan's behalf.
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Management Methods of Shared Aquifers
There are several options for managing shared aquifers 
and the four most commonly weighed are: separately, in a 
coordinated manner, jointly or by delegating responsibility 
to an outside body.141 
Separate Management
141 Marwan Haddad, Eran Feitelson and Saul Arlosoroff, "The Management of 
Shared Aquifers", Management of Shared Aquifers: The Israeli- 
Palestinian Case with an International Perspective, Ed. Eran Feitelson 
and Marwan Haddad, 2005
142 Elections in Palestine, February 2006 wherein Hamas won a majority 
vote
143 Email correspondence from Saul Arlosoroff, March 24, 2006.
When nations decide to manage their aquifer(s) 
separately they develop their own policies, determine the 
extraction rates, set their own standards and establish 
their own water rights. This option may be optimum when 
hydrogeological interdependence is not present between 
neighboring states. This method of management may seem the 
least expensive and is usually the default position that 
sovereign states decide to take.
Since the recent elections in Palestine142 "the JWC 
(has) not met for sometime and Fadel Kawash is out, and as 
far as I know there is no one in his stead."143 There is an 
aura of fog surrounding the future of the possibility for 
joint water management in the region and there have been 
several developments recently of a foreboding nature. The 
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Israeli elections (March 2006) displayed a plurality in 
support of continued unilateral withdrawal from the West 
Bank. Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in September 
2005 and the newly formed government of the Palestinian 
Authority does not recognize the existence of the State of 
Israel. Furthermore, the Israel Water Commission is 
weighing the possibility of completely abandoning the 
Eastern Aquifer.144
144 Email correspondence from Aaron T. Wolfe, January 18, 2006.
145 Feitelson, 2.
The option of "Separate Management" of the Mountain 
Aquifer must be viewed as a distinct possibility even 
though its adoption will "result to a race to the bottom, 
as the aquifer will increasingly be over-pumped."145 Under 
this regimen each side will determine its own pumping rates 
and, undoubtedly, the Palestinians will increase their 
extractions to provide more domestic water and foster 
agricultural growth and reduce their dependence on Israeli 
sources. Israel can respond by either reducing its pumpage 
in order to maintain sustainability of the Mountain Aquifer 
or continuing its present rate of extraction. Should over­
pumping occur in an exacerbated, unabated, unregulated and 
unrestricted manner, the concerns of saline intrusions into 
the aquifer, increase of pollution due to landfills, other 
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point and non-point sources, wastewater collection, 
treatment and re-use would be realized in short order.
From any long-term perspective it is obvious that 
separation is an inferior option. This will remain true 
also after the introduction of large-scale desalination in 
Israel, as long as desalination will remain more costly 
than pumping from the aquifer. The implication of a higher 
cost for desalinated water over pumped water, regardless of 
the size of the difference in cost, will encourage pumpage. 
Groundwater issues are generally less perceptible than 
surface water issues and the ability to rectify the damage 
to groundwater is costly and limited. Thus it is likely 
that by the time the damage is apparent enough to generate 
action, and assuming that Palestinian authorities have the 
technical, economic and managerial wherewithal, it may be 
very late and much of the damage could be irreparable.
• 14 6Figure 20 illustrates the implications of separation.
146 Ibid
159




Coordinated management in circumstances of a 
transboundary aquifer provides for each party the right to 
manage the portion of the aquifer within its boundaries. 
However, both parties agree to coordinate specific elements 
seen as useful by them. Those elements may have to do with 
extraction rates in a commonly shared area that must be 
coordinated to assure reasonable pumpage rates by both 
parties. In cases where there is an imbalance between 
extraction and recharge rates and the health of the aquifer 
is at risk, it is likely that this mode of management will 
be insufficient.
Coordinated management does not provide for 
collaborative measures nor does it include any sharing of 
institutional structures between the entities.
Joint Management
Joint management is predicated on the establishment of 
a single institution agreed to by both or all transboundary 
parties whose task it is to manage the aquifer. This 
method of aquifer management is clearly defined in purpose 
but lends itself to many variations in structure.
Generally speaking, this option includes relinquishment, to 
one degree or another, of the parties' sovereignty. Not 
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surprisingly, up until now, this method of aquifer 
management lies largely in the realm of the theoretical.
Joint Water Management. The initial attempt to pursue 
joint water management (JWM) as a governance mechanism for 
pragmatically resolving the water resource issues between 
Israel and Palestine was championed by two researchers: one 
Palestinian and one Israeli in 1993. Several NGO's and 
academic institutions provided funding and non-monetary 
support. The researchers were Professor Eran Feitelson and 
Professor Marwan Haddad. These researchers were joined by 
the leading experts in water issues in Israel and the 
Occupied Territories: Mr. Saul Arlosoroff, former deputy 
Water Commissioner of Israel, Mr. Ali Wahiadi, director of 
the Gaza Water Department and Mr. Taher Nasseredin, 
director of the West Bank Water Department. Funding was 
provided by two Canadian NGO's: International Development 
Research Center (IDRC) and CRB. The research institutions 
affiliated with the study were the Palestine Consultancy 
Group (an umbrella group of Palestinian research 
institutions) and the Truman Institute for the Advancement 
of Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The 
impetus for the study was the success of the first IPCRI 
(Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information) 
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water conference of 1992.147 The research began with a 
sense of promise if not euphoria during the first two years 
when Oslo I was signed in 1993, followed by the Gaza- 
Jericho accords of 1994 and finally Oslo II in 1995.
147 Feitelson and Haddad, 2
148 In gathering data for this paper I traveled to Israel in December, 
2005 in hopes of meeting with Dr. Karen Assaf of the Arab Research 
Institute of Jerusalem and a key researcher at EXACT. When I emailed 
Dr. Assaf to arrange for a meeting in Jerusalem her reply was," If I am 
in Ramallah - of course, I would have time. BUT, if I am in
Arrabeh/Jenin - then it would be too far. PLUS, I do not have a 
'permit' to go to Jerusalem. I have been asking for one for a long 
time. If I do have my 'permit', then I can meet you in Jerusalem. If 
not, then we have to see where it would be possible. Email 
correspondence, November 23, 2005.
Still, the reality of the asymmetrical relationship between 
Israel and Palestine was always felt and manifested itself 
by the difficulties Palestinian researchers had (and 
continue to have) in traveling to Jerusalem where all joint 
meetings were held. 148
The first phase of the study included two closed 
international workshops consisting of thirty water experts: 
one-third Israeli, one-third Palestinian, and one-third 
international. The first workshop tackled issue of 
international experience with regard to cross-border water 
resources and the issues that need to be addressed when 
managing an aquifer in general and the Mountain Aquifer in 
particular. The second workshop concentrated on specific 
issues such as the requisites of the Mountain Aquifer, the 
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potential of water trading and the legal and institutional 
facets of joint management.149 Discussions were not recorded 
to ensure freedom of expression and freedom from 
retribution.
149 Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, 2
150 ibid
Institutional Structures and Goals. First structures 
that emanated from the workshops had several elements in 
common: all emphasized the need to begin with confidence
building measures, in particular joint monitoring and data 
sharing and the establishment of conflict resolution 
mechanisms. Overall, the institutional structures that 
this team suggested were aligned according to their 
ultimate goals. In the end, four main goals, or "Type of 
JWM Structure"150 were identified and the individual 
activities were collated according to their contribution 
toward achieving these goals and by the priority each 
activity represented for each structure. The 'Sequencing 
of Activities' incorporation by type of JWM structure is 
detailed in Table 12. These four goals are thus seen as the 
optional directions that an institution building initiative 
may take:
1. Resource or Aquifer protection; long-term protection 
of water quality
164
2. Crisis management; spills, containment, floods, 
droughts
3. Economic Efficiency; promotion of efficient water use, 
reduce transaction costs
4. Comprehensive Integrative-comprehensive structures;
all facets of aquifer management
This table was compiled as a minimalist one limited to 
those activities that need be incorporated in each state to 
make the process rational and operational. The numbers in 
each column represent the priority of each activity for the 
structure, as analyzed by the project team and the stage in 
which it needs to be incorporated into the structure. In 
other words, a number one designation in a certain column 
means that this activity should be included in the first 
stage of the structure of that particular column.
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1 1 4 1
Monitor water 
extraction
1 1 1 2
Crisis management 2 1 2
Preparation for 
drought







Landfill siting 3 5
Hazardous waste 
disposal
3 2 2 4
Enforcement 3 2 2 4
Funding of joint 
proj ects
4 3 4 3
Impose and collect 
taxes
3 5





2 2 2 2
Structure 
modification
4 4 3 3
Pass by laws 5
Coordinate standards 
and regulations





Price setting 2 5
Data-base 
compilation




Source: Eran Feitelson and Marwan Hade ad, Identification ofJoint Management Structures for
Shared Aquifers: A Cooperative Palestinian-Israeli Effort. Washington, D.C.: World Bank 1998
Exclusion of National Institutions. While the JWM 
identified twenty-one structure type activities and 
prioritized them according to the four aforementioned 
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goals, two caveats to the overall institutional structure 
for the JWM point to the inherent difficulty of 
implementing such a plan:
■ Water rights and allocation agreements are to be 
determined separately.
■ The JWM will not supplant the existing water 
institutions of the different parties (The Israeli 
Water Commissioner and the Palestinian Water 
Authority)
The basis for inducement for joint management among the 
parties is that they all have a joint and vested interest 
in maintaining the water quality of the aquifer and its
• 151storage capacity.
Objectives of JWM. The long-term objectives for the 
JWM are identified as stages. Stage one includes 
monitoring of the quality and quantity of water in the 
aquifer and the compilation of resulting data in a joint 
database. Stage two addresses threats to the aquifer, 
wastewater issues and preparation of plans for containing 
pollution incidents and resolving disagreements. Stage 
three involves setting standards, control of solid and 
hazardous waste and implementation of long-term solutions. 
Subsequent stages include steps to protect the aquifer as 
151 Ibid
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well as drought planning and the assumption of drilling 
licensing power.
Structural Levels. The JWM proposes an institutional 
structure of four levels:
1. Decision makers and mediators
2. Aquifer Protection Commission (APC) to be composed of 
high-ranking representatives of the main interests 
(water, health, environment, agriculture and industry 
from different parties)
3. Research coordination and standard setting
4. Local and regional authorities
The economic structure of the JWM calls for two groups: the 
first group contains structures intended to facilitate 
trading of water allocations to allow greater flexibility 
in accommodating changes in circumstances and coping with 
situations of rapid shifts in demand. This group would 
encourage market mechanisms to facilitate such adjustments. 
The second structural group would engage in utilities.
This would open the way for the private sector to become 
involved in the management of the aquifer and attract 
funding.
The institutional structure of an economically based
JWM would include three basic elements: Board of Directors; 
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Aquifer Utility or Water Trading Authority; and Local 
Authorities that supply the water to end users.
Obstacles and Constraints. Obstacles or constraints 
that may preclude or delay the establishment of a JWM 
structure in the Middle East have been revealed in the 
accumulated experience of the Joint Water Commission (JWC) 
and its field operatives; Joint Supervision and Enforcement 
Teams (JSETS). As earlier mentioned, the JWC was an 
outgrowth of the Oslo II Agreement and is often cited as 
the one continuous strand of communication on water matters 
between Israel and Palestine. However, "Palestinians feel 
that the JWC's purpose has been to further Israeli control, 
and that it has not addressed Palestinian needs 
(Nasseredin, 1998). Several Israeli projects proceeded 
without the JWC's authorization. Information and data on 
water resources and use requested by the Palestinians have 
not been provided to them. At the same time the water 
supply to Palestinian cities and towns continues to be 
precarious. In most cities and towns running water is not 
available to all households throughout the year. As a 
result there has been a loss of confidence in the 
coordination of structures that were established."152 This 
mechanism established in the Oslo II Agreement in 1995
152 Ibid
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"did not establish a structure that would actively manage 
the shared groundwater resource, or at least certain facets 
of it necessary to achieve a coherent goal. It also did 
not include measures for developing the institutional 
structure or resolving disagreements, since it was for an 
interim period. Moreover, despite the call for data 
sharing in the accords no data sharing occurred."153
153 Marwan Haddad, Eran Feitelson, Saul Arlosoroff and Taher Nassereddin, 
"A Proposed Agenda for joint Israeli-Palestinian Management of Shared 
Groundwater", Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli- 
Palestinian Case with an International Perspective, Eran Feitelson and 
Marwan Haddad, editors.
154 ibid
In the fourth workshop participants reached several 
important conclusions with regard to water rights and water 
allocations:154
Rights and Allocation Priorities. Water rights need to 
account for variances in quality and over time. The 
allocation of water, when defined as a function of quality 
and time has to take into account the use of water, as the 
priority should be given to the domestic sector.
The domestic sector should have priority rights 
regardless of nationality and all people should have an 
equal right to water on a per-capita basis for domestic use 
Enhancing Palestinian water supply, prior to 
establishing a comprehensive JWM structure, should be 
instituted as a confidence-building step.
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This study suggested a step-by-step or 
'flexible/sequential' approach for the identification and 
structuring of joint management systems for shared aquifers 
with special reference to the Mountain Aquifer and its role 
in the Israeli Palestinian case. The study is significant 
as it represents a truly joint, academic effort conducted 
on parallel tracks among Israeli and Palestinian 
researchers. The study was supported by international 
agencies and NGO's whose support came with ’no strings 
attached'155
156 Marwan Haddad, "Institutional Framework for Regional Cooperation in 
the Development of Water Supply and Demand in the Middle East", Journal 
of the American Water Resources Association, August, 1999.
Regional Institutional Proposal
A regional institutional framework proposed for the 
implementation of an integrated regional approach 
consisting of a regional water board operating through 
three units for technical, implementation, and management 
aspects of projects and activities was introduced in 
1999.156 This proposal is far-reaching as it attempts to 
engage all the parties in the Middle East that currently 
share the wider water basins of the region: Turkey, Syria, 
Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt and Sudan. It pre­
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supposes that local water differences and conflicts among 
regional parties can be resolved.
"Due to political complexity of the disputes, the 
higher costs involved, and the recent development in the 
peace process, the Middle East countries are convinced more 
than ever before that the most promising and least costly 
solution to their present and future water shortages 
probably is an integrated regional approach which 
incorporates and accounts for the needs of all neighboring 
countries."157 Succinctly, Haddad recommends that, "In 
order for such a regional solution to be reached we need on 
one hand that local water differences and conflicts among 
the regional parties be fairly and equitably resolved and 
on the other had that regional water projects to be 
properly planned, designed, executed and managed to meet 
the qualitative and quantitative water demands of each of 
the countries in the region with time, space, and at an 
affordable cost. Accordingly, a regional water institution 
is needed with an infrastructure, a mandate and an 






Regional Water Board Structure. This proposition for 
'an institutional arrangement for the Middle East sets up a 
regional water board (RWB) consisting of all the national 
stakeholders in the region: Turkey, Israel, Iraq, 
Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Sudan. The 
proposition calls for the establishment of a Regional Water 
Company (RWC) responsible for conducting all works related 
to the project tender including construction, installation, 
operation and maintenance of water projects. In order to 
secure international support it is suggested that the 
Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources (MWGWR) be 
used as the nucleus for this regional institution. 
Multilateral working groups to advance the Middle East 
Peace Process were formed in January 1992. One of these 
groups, the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources, 
endorsed the Water Data Banks Project in November 1994. The 
Water Data Banks Project consists of a series of specific 
actions to be taken by the Israelis, Jordanians, and
k>
Palestinians that are designed to foster the adoption of 
common, standardized data collection and storage techniques 
among the Parties, improve the quality of the water 
resources data collected in the region, and to improve 
communication among the scientific community in the region.
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The project is managed by an Executive Action Team (EXACT), 
an important NGO in the region, comprised of water experts 
from Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian water-management 
agencies. Technical and financial support to EXACT is 
contributed by the EuropeanUnion, France, The Netherlands, 
and the United States. Former donors include Australia and 
Canada.159
EXACT. Available at http://exact-me.org/, accessed December 3, 2005 
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An operative mechanism to facilitate progress is the 
notion of accepted "terms of reference" (TOR) so that 
everyone agrees on the roles and levels of involvement of 
the regional parties.
This proposal recommends that the RWB consist of a 
steering board representing all the parties involved. Each 
member would be appointed by its representative state and 
would coordinate his/her national priorities and positions 
with the regional proposals and planned activities. Each 
member country would represent his/her "National Strategic 
Water Planning Body" and from that body be directed. 
Incremental activities are recommended such that success 
and confidence building can take place.
Regional Water Board Responsibilities. Ultimately, 
responsibilities of the RWB are to:
159
■ Recommend and advise the parties in the region on the 
water demand and supply management in their countries 
and the region in such a way to ensure the 
availability of sufficient water supply in a 
sustainable and integrated manner with time and space 
and in quality and quantity with minimum or reasonable 
cost.
■ Steer and administer through a pre-accepted TOR and 
developed scale, appropriateness, capability, and 
financial stability, the tendering process related to 
the development of regional water projects and 
activities.
■ Decide on implementation methodology for each regional 
water project and activities being direct through a 
turnkey, subcontract or any other implementation 
system.
■ Oversee and supervise through a pre-accepted TOR the 
efficiency, compliance and works of the RWC.
■ Coordinate through a pre-accepted TOR between the RWC 
and the regional parties.160
Regional Water Board Teams. The RWB is to be supported 
by three professional teams: a technical advisory unit
160 Haddad, page 732
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(TAU); a project implementation unit (PIU); and a 
management unit (MU)
The TAU has two assigned units: supply and demand; and 
data management. These two units are responsible for 
studying, evaluating, assessing and reporting to the RWB on 
all matters related to national and/or regional water 
supply and demand issues, projects, plans and supervising 
works and, compliance of RWC with signed agreements and 
contracts.
Managing all financial and administrative matters of 
RWB falls under the purview of the MU.
The PIU is responsible for project contracting and 
construction
Acceptance of any item subject to voting within the 
RWB requires a two-thirds majority and the MWGWR, it bears 
noting, would not have any voting rights but would serve in 




3. Proposal Assessment and Evaluation
4. Final Decision
5. Project Implementation and Management
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Regional Water Board Goals. The goals of the RWB are to 
prevent or at least minimize freshwater gaps in the Middle 
East, improve crisis (drought) management, increase water 
and food availability and, overall, enhance economic growth 
and socio-economic conditions; quality of life.
Water markets and technology would be areas of focus 
for the RWB. RWB would discuss the exchange, transfer or 
sale of water as well as introduce high technological and 
performance levels and market functions in order to 
allocate and encourage local investment. Since the 
predominant water user in all nations of the Middle East is 
agriculture, it is hoped that the RWB can serve as a place 
for promoting agricultural trade between partners and for 
the exchange of 'virtual water'.
Financing the RWB is to be provided by either shares 
from the RWB members and/or contributions in the form of 
grants or loans.
Implementation Obstacles and Constraints. The 
obstacles and constraints to the proposal are serious and 
not overlooked by its author. Haddad cites two major 
groups of obstacles: political and economic; and physical 
and legal.
There will be no place for sustainable cooperation in 
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the Middle East if the fear of the peace process failure 
prevails and current practices in water management 
continue. To give the proposal the best chance of success, 
Haddad emphasizes that national sovereignty and territorial 
integrity will not be jeopardized. The issues of who owns, 
controls and benefits from infrastructure changes and the 
extent of the authority of RWB and RWC are obstacles. 
Delegation of Responsibility
Delegation of responsibility is the fourth option for 
aquifer management. This method of management assigns some 
aspects of aquifer management to an external body, which, 
could be an international agency or privately held 
corporation.
Alternative Means for Cooperative
Management
The four options for aquifer management are not mutually 
exclusive. None of the above-mentioned methods has yet to 
be employed in the Middle East and the uniqueness of the 
asymmetrical and diminishing relationship between Israelis 
and Palestinians warrants analysis of alternate proposals 
for cooperative or collective management of some of the 
transboundary water issues in the region. For states to 
engage in normative structures of joint management water 
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institutions they need to have sophisticated and stable 
national legal and economic traditions. National legal and 
institutional arrangements for the internal uses of the 
resource shape each state's ability to commit itself to 
international obligations.161 The Palestinian Authority is 
not in a position to discuss any relinquishment of 
sovereignty before the international community recognizes 
its sovereignty. Proposals to form joint management 
regimens between institutionally unequal partners are 
unlikely to be embraced by the parties. Nonetheless, the 
benefits for both parties, now and in the future, for joint 
management of shared resources are myriad while failure to 
adopt these means and measures will be catastrophic.
161 Eyal Benvenisti, "The Legal Framework of Joint Management 
Institutions for Transboundary Water Resources", Management of Shared 
Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an 
International Perspective, Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, editors.
Perhaps a potentially powerful way to overcome the 
tension between the supranational institution and national 
governments is by creating links between the institution 
and sub-state entities, such as provinces or towns.
Indeed, a crucial element in setting up shared institutions 
is the design of its levels of operation to tailor the 
specific geographic, political and social constraints of 
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the region.162 One particular case in point is the 1996 
agreement between two local entities in the Middle East; 
one in Israel and one in neighboring Palestine.
The Case of Emek Hefer and Tulkarem
Emek Hefer is a Regional Council in the northern 
coastal plain of Israel where Israel is at its narrowest. 
Tulkarem is a Palestinian municipality in the West Bank and 
they both share a severely polluted basin in which runoff 
from Palestinian neighboring towns and villages and nearby 
Jewish settlements flows, ironically, under the separation 
barrier built recently by Israel, through a small stream 
into Israel. The situation could not be ameliorated by 
national governments although both Israel's Ministry of 
Environment and Palestinian Authority President Arafat 
agreed that the situation was untenable and did not object 
when the two localities suggested•direct contact with each 
other to try and solve the problem. Residents of the two 
communities organized a regular regimen of contacts, signed 
petitions in support of stream restoration and agitated for 
international support for construction of wastewater 
treatment plants for both municipalities. Germany, in 2001 
began construction of plants in Emek Hefer and in Tulkarem. 
Today most of the irrigation water used by Tulkarem farmers 
162 Ibid
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is treated wastewater and the Alexander River, which bore 
the brunt of wastewater pollution, and its flora and 
animals are in the process of restoration. The Mayors of 
both communities signed an agreement outlining their 
commitment to cooperation.163 The letter was originally 
written in Arabic and Hebrew and reads:
1S3 Translated by Eyal Benvenisti
164 Benvenisti
Letter of Intent
"The District of Tulkarem, the municipality of 
Tulkarem and Emek Hefer Regional Council recognize the 
acute necessity to promote and protect the 
environment, for the protection of the water we drink 
and the soil we cultivate. For the benefit of the 
inhabitants of Tulkarem and environs, the Hefer Valley 
and environs.
It was therefore decided to establish a steering and 
planning committee, which will be entrusted with supplying 
mutual expert solutions to resolve the problems in the 
short and immediate term and in the long term.
Those who stand at the helm will jointly work for obtaining 
funding and consent from international bodies, in an effort 
to realize the plans and to implement them"164
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River Basin Management and Drainage Boards and the 
Case of the Kidron Valley. Israeli water law has created 
drainage authorities throughout the entire country. There 
are eleven drainage boards within Israel whose borders are 
drawn along catchment basin lines. This law gives drainage 
authorities power of flood protection and prevention of 
runoff but does not currently provide a mandate for water 
resource management on a grand scale. Nonetheless, the 
Ministry of Environment has recently (2003) bestowed 
additional environmental protection powers upon two 
drainage boards and one authority is seeking additional 
powers to become a land conservation authority. These 
drainage boards can serve as a platform for joint 
management of a transboundary river. What is needed is a 
mirror authority on the Palestinian side.165
165 R. Laster, J. Gat and D. Livney, "Water Flowing Under the Law", 
available at www.ors.regione.lombardia.it, accessed on January 3, 2006.
Israel's extensive compendia of water laws emphasize 
state control of water and its infrastructure reflects that 
foundation. It is, however, left to local or regional 
components of the system to manage sewage treatment making 
this function the weakest link in the system. Similarly, 
there is no 'national' system for ecological management 
within the Palestinian Authority. There are myriad
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examples and precedents for trans-boundary river and 
wastewater treatment joint management schemes in other 
parts of the world. For example, the Rhine Commission, 
created over one hundred years ago is a model of 
cooperative action among sovereign states.166 Because 
multiple purposes and agencies vie for river water it is 
necessary, not unlike aquifer management regimens, to 
ensure that any institutional management proposal be based 
on an Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
foundation. This approach is necessary in order to 
optimize and fully recognize all the legitimate, beneficial 
uses for clean water, including nature's and humans'. In 
order for any institutional structure to be effective for 
these purposes, it must have:167
166 Ibid
167 Ibid
■ Diverse and comprehensive sources of information that 
are up to date;
■ Logical data for determining water needs, including 
quantity and quality of water entering, remaining and 
leaving an aquifer, stream and other water bodies 
within the catchment basin;
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■ Scientific criteria for determining water quality and 
quantity, and economic criteria for determining cost 
and income;
■ An efficient forum for exchange of that information;
■ Public access and involvement;
■ Transparency by creating appropriate mechanisms for a 
public overview.
If this institutional structure is also to serve as a 
governing body, it must also contain:
■ An agreed-upon charter describing its powers and 
responsibilities, and its decision making process.
The powers include setting the quantity and quality of 
water entering, remaining and leaving water bodies, 
and deciding on the permitted uses and distribution of 
these waters;
■ Planning and decision making bodies;
■ Enforcement mechanisms;
■ Dispute resolution mechanisms;
t ■ A source of income to carry out its activities
On December 5, 2005, the Municipality of Jerusalem, 
facing threats of legal action, submitted a proposal to 
stop the flow of sewage water from East Jerusalem villages 
into the Dead Sea. Currently, about one-third of all East 
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Jerusalem wastewater flows into "Nahal Kidron" (the Kidron 
river or Wadi Nar) and from there, untreated, to the Dead 
Sea. This unabated flow has been uninterrupted for the 
past fifteen years. Israel's•Dead Sea Drainage Board and 
the Palestinian Authority jointly share the water basin in 
question. Neither party has wanted to take responsibility 
for the effluent and lack of Palestinian cooperation became 
an "excellent excuse" for the Jerusalem water company to do 
nothing over the years.168
168 Etgar Lefkovits, The Jerusalem Post,, December 6, 2005
A joint management plan for governing this common 
basin is in the nascent stages of development.
Transferability of European Institutional 
Experience to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict: The Elbe/Kidron Case Study
The question of transferability of other institutional 
experiences, to the conflict at hand has been examined above 
in the context of intranational v. international cases and 
•in the context of international law and its applicability 
to the Israeli-Palestinian water conflict. Within the 
context of smaller, subsidiary water basins the question of 
transferability of the European experience to the 
Palestinian-Israeli experience is one that bears analysis, 
particularly in light of the national stagnation on water
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related discussions that has settled in since recent 
elections. One intriguing project that is currently under 
study is a joint venture between Israel, Palestine and 
Germany. The Israeli Team is composed of the Faculty of 
Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Tel-Hai College 
of the University of Haifa, and the Department of Geography 
of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The Palestinian 
Team is represented by the Palestinian Water Authority in 
Ramallah and the Water and Environmental Development 
Organization (WEDO) in Bethlehem. The Germans, who are 
providing the bulk of the funding for the project, are 
represented by the Centre for Water in Urban Areas, The 
Centre for Environmental Research in Leipzig (UFZ), the 
University of Trier Faculty of Law, the Environmental 
Policy Research Centre in Berlin, the Institute for 
Hydrology, Water Management and Environmental Engineering 
at the University of Bochum. The German Team Coordinator 
for the project and author of the report is Simone 
Klawitter of the Center for Water in Urban Areas in the 
Department of Environmental Economics and Policy in 
Berlin.169 (It should be noted that the frequent incidence
18 6
169 For the full report see, From Conflict to Collective Action: Institutional Change and 
Management Options to Govern Trans-Boundary Water Courses” http: //www. fsp- 
wib.tu-berlin.de and http://umweltoekonomie.tu-berlin.de 
of German supported projects for water resource development 
in the Middle East is not coincidental. A number of German 
academic and scientific institutions are contributing 
toward this effort and, by contrast, the noted absence of 
American institutions in these endeavors is partially due 
to the American academic institutions acquiescence to the 
United States Department of State warnings on travel to the 
region.)
The project is to study the effectiveness of existing 
trans-boundary water management institutions in the Elbe 
River Basin, the Kidron Valley where no trans-boundary 
water management institutions exist, and evaluate the 
alternative institutional arrangements based on a cost­
benefit and multi-criteria analysis of separate and’ 
collective water and wastewater management options. 
Ultimately, this study is designed to serve as a Master 
Plan for the Kidron Valley. It is assumed that an 
integrated water resources management plan for the river 
basin will be the eventual recommended mechanism of the 
study. The study is divided into four areas of key 
research:
1. An ex-post analysis of the evolution of institutions 
for trans-boundary water management in Europe, using 
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the Elbe/Rhine river basin as a case study
2. The identification of alternative management options 
and determination of the benefits of collective 
action over the present governance regime in the 
Israeli-Palestinian context, using the Kidron Valley 
as a case study
3. An ex-ante analysis of alternative institutional 
arrangement for the Kidron Valley (separate, 
coordinated, joint, franchising) taking the European 
experience into account
4. The analysis of the transferability of institutional 
design for IWRM among different climatic regions, 
and at different scales of river basin management. 
As a practical contribution towards IWRM, the 
research project will advise the ongoing effort to 
develop a Master Plan for the Kidron/Wadi Nar 
Basin.170
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From conflict to collective action: 
The transferability of 
institutional designs for IWRM
Figure 22. Transferability of European Institutional 
Experience to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Source: http://umweltoekonomie.tu-berlin.de
Friends of the Earth; Middle East
“Friends of the Earth; Middle East (FoEME) is an NGO 
whose organization and objectives have been detailed above. 
Their activities, however, are relevant to this section, 
which advocates alternative methods of joint water 
management. In particular, FoEME proposes community control 
over water basins hydrologically.connected to the Mountain 
Aquifer and to pursue funding independent of Palestinian 
national policies and practices.
As aforementioned, the Mountain Aquifer is under a 
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severe threat of pollution from the waste of three million 
people residing on its sensitive recharge area. Currently 
over one million tons of solid waste, and over 60 million 
cubic meters of wastewater are polluting the aquifer every 
year. In a report series published over the last two 
years, Eco Peace/Friends of the Earth Middle East, a joint 
Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian NGO, has identified 
infrastructure projects in the West Bank that are expected 
to alleviate the pollution threat. "In response to the 
recent Quartet (United States, United Nations, European 
Union and Russia) statement on donors' assistance to the 
Palestinian Authority (refusal to provide donations to the 
Hamas led government until their charter is amended and 
recognize the State of Israel), we have called upon the 
Quartet, USAID, German Aid, European Commission and the 
World Bank to continue donor funding for sewage and solid 
waste projects" says Zach Tagar of FoEME and co-author of 
the reports.171 "Without these projects, pollutants such as 
nitrate, chlorides, cadmium, lead, mercury and arsenic will 
continue to pollute both peoples scarce water resources."172 
For the implementation of pollution prevention projects, 




Palestinian municipalities or directly to private 
contractors. In all of these projects, donor country 
agencies oversee project implementation on the ground.
Gidon Bromberg is the Israeli Director of FoEME and 
declares that local municipalities have proven in several 
cases highly effective in implementing wastewater and solid 
waste projects. Recognizing the needs for their residents, 
they have devoted significant resources and motivation to 
the implementation of local projects under difficult 
conflict circumstances. Nader Khatib is the Palestinian 
Director of FoEME who adds that, "in some cases cooperation 
between Palestinian and Israeli municipalities proved 
successful where national authorities were unable to 
implement important projects. Further, the political 
leadership of major Palestinian municipalities has remained 
Fateh"173 174FoEME calls upon the international donor 
community to consider alternative avenues of development 
cooperation, for the benefit of both people, and for the
173 ibid
174 ibid




The Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) is the 
institution in Palestine that is responsible for the water 
and wastewater sectors. The Ministry for Environment 
Affairs is responsible for water-related pollution control 
issues and coordinates with the PWA in issuing regulations 
and guidelines. The institutional structure of the public 
water sector including the technical and managerial staff 
is still weak. The current situation reflects the 
misconceptions about the inadequate wastewater 
infrastructures in Palestine. The political and economical 
situations as well as the weak inter-institutional 
coordination exacerbate this fact. The academic 
institutions play a key role in feeding the Palestinian 
institutions with .sufficient technical staff. However, 
personal relationships sometimes rule the appointment when 
there are open job vacancies. It is not sufficient to have 
environmental law and guidelines without having an 
effective enforcement tools and alternatives.175
from a water shortage, which has been conceptualized as a
First and Second Order Scarcity. Palestinians suffer 
175 Rashed Al-Sa'ed, 2
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'first order scarcity condition'.176 However, Palestinians 
also suffer from a "shortfall in the social resources 
necessary to manage this natural resource on a national 
level. This lack of social resources necessary to manage 
the natural resource is termed a 'second order scarcity 
condition'.177 While the first order scarcity condition is 
largely in the hands of the Israelis, the resolution of the 
second order scarcity condition is largely in the hands of 
the Palestinians. The Palestinian Authority had the 
opportunity to resolve this problem, yet it failed to do 
so, and this failure must not be repeated.178 The second 
order scarcity condition refers to the domestic, social, 
political and traditional constraints that manifest 
themselves, in this context, as weak water institutions. 
The issue has policy and temporal implications. If 
Palestinians can resolve the second order scarcity 
condition prior to future negotiations with Israel, then 
Israel will be unable to use the lack of Palestinian 
management efficiency and responsibility as a pretext for 
176 A first order scarcity condition means a lack of the natural 
resource, in this case water as defined by Ohlsson, L., see Yousef 
Nasser, "Palestinian Water Needs and Rights in the context of Past and 
future Development", Water in Palestine: Problems, Politics and 
Prospects, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International 




not handing over Palestinian water rights.179 A frequent 
entreaty by the Israelis when attempting to negotiate with 
Palestinians is that there simply is no partner in 
Palestine with whom to negotiate.
179 Ibid
180 Marwan Haddad, "Future Water Institutions in Palestine", Water in 
Palestine: Problems, Politics and Prospects, Palestinian Academic 
Society for the Study of International Affairs, Fadia Daibes, Editor, 
Jerusalem, 2003.
181 Ibid. Data available at www.semide-ps.org, accessed on February 15, 
2005.
In order to make Palestine a viable partner in a joint 
water management program institutionalizing water resource 
management within Palestine is a requisite. Equally 
requisite is basic change in the relationship between 
Israel and Palestine. "The main reality is the Israeli 
military occupation of the Palestinian land and resources 
and the recognition of the fact that for as long as the 
current conflict continues, many institutional reforms will 
be meaningless."180
The structure of the Palestine Water Authority (PWA) 
has been presented earlier but it is helpful to draw a 
table reviewing the institutional framework. Table 13 
illustrates the current institutions of the Palestinian 
wWater Sector and their primary functions.181
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Source: Marwan Haddad, "Future Water Institutions 
in Palestine", Water in Palestine: Problems, 
Politics and Prospects, ed. Fadia Daibes, 
Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2003
Inefficiencies in the PWA. The inefficiencies in
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Palestinian water institutions are due to over-employment 
in the water sector, poor training, lack of public 
administration guidelines and performance measures. Lack 
of coordination and cooperation between related 
institutions such as the PWA and the Palestinian 
Environmental Protection Agency (PEPA), Palestinian 
Ministry of Agriculture, Palestinian Ministry of Local 
Affairs, the Palestinian Ministry of Planning exacerbates 
the inefficiency of water services, supply and demand 
management, water, quality monitoring, technical and 





Financial Constraints. Financial constraints on
Palestinian Water Institutions are a major concern. Proper 
planning cannot be accomplished without proper funding and 
there is virtually no investment on the part of the Israeli 
Civil Authority into water infrastructures in the 
Palestinian sector. In addition, there are many public 
groups that refuse to pay taxes in the Palestinian 
Authority and this phenomenon is particularly widespread 
among refugee camps and villages.183 184
Water infrastructure is a disjointed conglomerate of 
wells, pipes, springs, reservoirs, and pumping stations 
with no pretense of a united system.
Proposed Reforms. In light of the challenged state of 
Palestinian Water Institutions, what then become the 
requirements that need to be fulfilled in order for the 
anticipated reforms to prove successful and result in
18 4positive changes?
■ The reforms should be structural in nature;
■ The reforms should be enforced by the law;
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■ Institutions should have the power and authority 
necessary to carry out reforms and follow up 
activities and tasks;
■ Institutions should adopt, allow and integrate plans 
and policies relating to regional cooperation;
■ The reforms should call for and make the most of the 
expected international support for the Palestinian 
people and the new State of Palestine.
The future water-related institutional reforms also 
necessitate the following:
■ That there be continuous technical level development;
■ That costs, tariffs, and fees be set so as to ensure 
cost recovery and sustainable development;
■ That there should be continuous technical and human 
capacity building;
■ That the environment should always be taken into 
consideration;
■ That the public be involved in ongoing and future 
water activities and projects.
■ Reform Proposal
■ The overall structure suggested in this proposal 
posits a combination of centralized and decentralized 
water management systems, which will be the most cost-
197
effective of all options.
Not unlike the structure of a typical American water 
utility, the proposal calls for:
Policy and programming, planning and design, engineering, 
operations and maintenance, resource development and asset 
management, including procurement, staffing, and inventory 
taking should be compartmentalized as departments within 
the PWA, with each department having a clear mandate, and 
Well drilling, the installation of strategic mains, 
reservoir building, fees and bills collection, and 
automatic control and/or monitoring of the water system 
should be transferred to the private sector.185
185 Ibid
186 Ibid
This proposal suggests that the table for Water- 
Related Institutional Structure in Palestine be modified to 
reflect a top-down and down-to-top management approach 
whereby a strong NWC would be in charge of strategic 
decision-making, an effective water system-managing PWA, 
fully operational regional and local water institutions, 
and a cooperative, supportive private sector all cooperating 
together with a clear legal/administrative mandate. Table 
14 illustrates the proposed Institutional Structure.186
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Source: Marwan Haddad, "Future Water Institutions 
in Palestine", Water in Palestine: Problems, 
Politics and Prospects, ed. Fadia Daibes 
Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2003
Among the most substantive changes suggested above is that 
the PWA changes its main function from a regulatory role to 
one involving full management of water resources. In order 
to facilitate that role, the proposal recommends that the 
PWA adopt organizational changes such as:
■ Restructuring to include six main units: Technical; 
Administrative; Data Bank; Research and Development;
Local, Regional, UN and International Cooperation; and 
Public Coordination
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■ Create three regional water utilities: West Bank 
Water; Gaza Strip Water; Jordan River Water.
■ Department structure for policy and programming, 
planning and design, engineering, operations and 
maintenance, resource development and asset 
management, including procurement, staffing, and 
inventory taking.
■ Expenditure and performance monitoring and control.
■ Setting the tariff policy.
■ Finally, this proposal suggests that once functional 
Palestinian institutional structures are in place 
regional cooperation on the order of the previously 
proposed "Regional Institutional Proposal" would be 
appropriate for Palestine water management.
Water Demand Management
Governing institutions for water management in' the 
Middle East must provide for forward thinking water 
conservation. While the initial concern of any water 
authority will be the fair and equitable allocation of 
domestic freshwater to all the residents of the region, 
long range planning will be consumed with water 
conservation or, as it has become popularized, 'water 
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demand management' (WDM). Water scarcity and socio­
economic conditions follow a correlative path and 
conventional supply management will not be a sustainable 
strategy. "Efficient use of water means that the 
contribution of water to human welfare is the optimum that 
may be achieved."187
187 Saul Arlosoroff, "Water Demand management-A Strategy to Deal with 
Water Scarcity, Israel: A Case Study, ", presented at Water for Life in 
the Middle East Conference, Antalya, Turkey, 2004, available at 
http://www.ipcri.org/watconf/elmadhoun.pdf, accessed January 2, 2005.
Water Demand Management is widely accepted among 
professional water resource researchers. The International 
Development Research Center (see a fuller explanation of 
their activities above) published a survey of institutions 
and centers throughout the Middle East in 2004, which 
identified a preliminary inventory of all institutions 
involved in WDM issues in each country of the region. The 
list includes a brief description of activities as well as 
names and coordinates of contact persons. A questionnaire 
was sent to these institutions to seek further information 
on their WDM activities. Twenty-two institutions 
responded, and an analysis of the completed questionnaires 
showed that about 77% of the respondents indicated that WDM 
was one of their primary areas of research as compared to 
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30%for supply management issues and 23% for environmental 
and other water issues188.
133 http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-31797-201-l-DO_TOPIC.html
189 David B. Brooks and Sarah Wolfe, "Water Demand Management as 
Governance: Lessons from the Middle East and South Africa, presented at 
Water for Life in the Middle East Conference, Antalya, Turkey, 2004, 
available at http://www.ipcri.org/watconf/elmadhoun.pdf, accessed 
January 2, 2005
Water scarcity is a reality in the Middle East but is 
not always associated with pro-active water policies or 
institutional structures. The correct price of water will 
reflect the cost of water to society and that cost only 
manifests itself under conditions of scarcity. Technical 
advances in water efficiency and water markets and water 
pricing are the cornerstones of water demand management.
"Despite scarcity, demand management has historically 
received far less attention that supply management. This 
situation has to change, and not just by introducing new 
techniques, but also by treating water demand management as 
a major component of governance. This region has both the 
opportunity to become a world leader in demonstrating how 
water demand management can bring about major improvements 
in quality of life and in standard of living for its 
citizens. "189
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Water Demand Management as Governance
WDM as a concept of governance is composed of five
190components:
1. Reducing the quantity or quality of water required to
accomplish a specific task
2. Adjusting the nature of the task so it can be 
accomplished with less water or lower quality water
3. Reducing losses in movement from source through use to 
disposal
4. Shifting time of use to off-peak periods
5. Increasing the ability of the system to operate during 
droughts
In addition, the following policy steps are suggested
191as central to water demand management:
■ Maintaining the public ownership and control of
water.
■ Metering water at every point of connection
■ Increasing re-use of sewage effluent
■ Increasing progressive, agronomic techniques
190 David R. Brooks, "An Operational Definition of Water Demand 
Management", Third World Centre for Water Management, International 
Journal of Water Resources Development, September 2005
191 Saul Arlosoroff, "Water Demand Management-A Strategy to Deal with 
Water Scarcity, Israel-A Case Study", Israeli-Palestinian International 
Conference on Water for Life, Antalya, Turkey, October 10-14, 2004.
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■ Incorporating an economic water policy to allow 
water 'trading'
■ Retrofitting older plumbing systems and utilizing 
more efficient urban water systems
■ Reducing 'virtual water' loss when water-laden 
agricultural crops are exported.
Water Demand Management and Equity
Water Demand Management is as much about equity as
about efficiency. It is assumed that in developing 
countries, such as Palestine, water that is 'saved' by one 
sector would likely be used by a sector that, heretofore, 
did not enjoy basic human water requirements such as small 
farmers and women. Many functions of WDM are 
decentralized, fulfilled by local subsidiaries and put into 
practice at the point of each water well and water tap.
Wider participation among stakeholders is presumed 
resulting in reduced environmental externalities. Programs
»
to reduce (or not allocate funds for improving) water 
guality (where possible) and water quantities (where 
possible) must still be tailored to meet the needs and 
reflect the social milieu of the societies they are 
serving. For example, double-flush toilets may work to 
save water in Israel but when asked if that might be a 
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viable tool for demand management in the West Bank, Fadia 
Daibes remarked, "First give the Palestinians in the West 
Bank toilets and then we can talk about how we flush 
them."192 
Bedouin
192 Interview with Fadia Daibes, December 28 2005 in Jerusalem.
193 http://www.nif.org/content.cfm?cat_id=1464&currbody=l
The most disenfranchised group in the region are the 
Bedouin. Although the 120,000 Bedouin living in the Negev 
comprise 25% of the total population in that region, they 
have suffered government neglect since the founding of the 
State of Israel. Approximately 40% of Bedouin have been 
relocated into seven government-planned townships, while 
the majority choose to maintain a rural lifestyle in 43 
officially unrecognized villages. The Israeli government 
does not recognize the villages and, as a result, does not 
provide for infrastructure necessary for the most basic 
services including electricity and running water.193 Any 
comprehensive water management proposal must include a 
satisfactory water demand management structure that takes 




A key component to efficient water demand management 
is the adoption of a new economic outlook on water value 
and the institutionalization of water markets.
Water markets assume that water is a commodity and, as 
such, has an economic value determined by the degree of its 
scarcity. Rather than dividing water in traditional 
manners and treating water as an object of rights and 
ownership, the water market philosophy posits that the 
ownership of water is the ownership of the monetary value 
that the water represents and that who owns the water and 
who uses the water are not one in the same and, in fact, 
are analytically independent. Moreover, from this 
perspective one considers water value rather than water
• • 194quantities.
Water Allocation System
The Water Allocation System (WAS) Model (Fisher 2005) 
sets as the upper bound of Middle Eastern water the 
replacement cost given by desalinated water at any given 
location. All conflicts over water can quantify the 
resolution costs by calculating the replacement cost 
according to market prices of the most expensive available *
194 Franklin M. Fisher and Annette Huber-Lee, Liquid Assets: An Economic 
Approach for Water Management and Conflict Resolution in the Middle 
East and Beyond, RFF Press Book, Washington, D.C., 2005
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water; desalinized water. This permits parties to estimate 
the benefits of cooperation and to compare the alternative 
costs of conflict. Replacing all the disputed water in the 
Mountain Aquifer, for example, with desalinated water at a 
cost of $0.70 amounts to a bit more than $100 million, 
substantially less than one fighter jet aircraft.195
195 Ibid
196 ibid
WAS takes into account demand considerations and the 
benefits to be derived from water use rather than fixing 
water quantities to be delivered. In this respect this 
model dovetails with the Water Demand Management goals. 
WAS also permits the user to impose social values that 
differ from private ones and to impose policies that the 
optimization must respect.196 The objective is to maximize 
the net benefit one can derive from any particular 
allocation of water at any particular location subject to 
constraints. The system of prices involved in solving the 
maximization benefit problem is called the 'shadow value', 
which, formulaically, is the rate at which the quantity 
being maximized (the net benefits of water) would increase 
if the associated constraint were relaxed by one unit. The 
shadow value of water at any one location, therefore, 
corresponds to the constraint that the quantity of water 
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consumed in that location cannot exceed the quantity 
produced there plus the quantity imported less the quantity 
exported. Parties can use the shadow costs to determine 
the true value of their own water .resources and the 
benefits, if any, of increasing their infrastructure and 
use this information to gauge the value and consequences of 
different water agreements. Water rights, when using this 
model, become largely symbolic.
The added benefit of analyzing water values in this 
manner is a paradigm shift in water planning. Rather than 
dealing with water rights and allocations, it allows 
parties to consider water permits, or, short-term licenses 
to use other parties' water based on standard, voluntary, 
optimization models. Nation-states would find this model 
very palatable as it precludes relinquishment of 
sovereignty. Conversely, any supra-national, joint 
management program, which assumes sovereignty on water 
issues, can also utilize water permits and transfers to 
optimize its own cost benefit analysis.
This model also encourages cooperation on a larger 
scale between transboundary countries in the Middle East. 
For example, if Israel knew that it would be possible to 
purchase water permits from a wastewater treatment plant in
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Gaza for the purpose of irrigating agricultural lands in 
the water-scarce Negev, a cooperative venture to construct 
such a facility would be economically viable and profitable 
for both parties.
Utility of Water Demand Management
"If water demand management is to aid in the 
resolution of water disputes between Israel and Palestine, 
and become a base for sustainable development, we must 
identify culture-and region-specific ways of promoting 
attitudes, incentives and policies to establish WDM as both 
means and ends for improving social, economic and 
environmental conditions."197 This is one of the challenges 
for effective and efficient water resource institutions. 
The economic tools for institutional policies such as the 
WAS model and detailed cost-benefit analyses will be 
utilized within the institutional regime for the purpose of 
saving water rather than cutting the budgets of normative 
government-funded water demand management programs.
197 David B. Brooks and Sara Wolfe, "Water Demand Management as 
Governance: Lessons from the Middle East and South Africa", (paper 
presented at the 2nd Israeli-Palestinian International Conference on 
Water for Life in the Middle East, Antalya, Turkey, 10-14 October 2004) 
' 20'9
The Conference on Water Demand Management was held in 
Jordan in 2004 and attended by 742 people from 38
• 1 Q Qcountries.
Water Demand Management is a tool for governance and 
an intricate part of any joint water resource management 
institution.





The water system of Israel, in particular its 
irrigation sector, is frequently cited as a model for other 
countries to emulate, struggling to cope with water 
scarcity and inefficiency. Israel's agricultural community 
has responded to the severe water restrictions admirably 
from a technological viewpoint. The adage that 'Necessity 
is the Mother of Invention' rang true from the 1960's 
through the 1980's when Israel led the world in advanced 
technology achievement for irrigation purposes. Israel 
invented the concepts of drip irrigation, sub-surface 
irrigation, fertigation, computerized central control 
systems, evapotranspiration scheduling and all the other 
components that comprise state-of-the-art water management.
Nonetheless, while this technology was implemented and 
crop production expanded, Israel's water resources were not 
protected. The decision-making process within Israel's 
government was not far-reaching and creative. Today, both 
major aquifers are over drawn and, in the case of the 
Coastal Aquifer, dangerously low in quantity and quality.
The population increases have outstripped any 
management plan. The political weakness of the
211
Palestinians, to this point, has made Israeli policy makers 
unresponsive. Israel has not provided all the stakeholders 
equal opportunity to influence water allocations and has 
disproportionately permitted agricultural interests to 
determine policy. Agriculture in Israel still consumes 67% 
of all freshwater and virtually all reclaimed water but the 
agricultural contribution to GDP has dwindled to a mere 
2.4%.
Major and systematic institutional reform is required 
to re-shape water policy in the region. The Mountain 
Aquifer, Coastal Aquifer and Jordan River Basin are the 
only three sources of freshwater in the region and 
Palestinians and Israelis share all of those resources. 
For reasons of equity, sustainability and security, joint 
management of these resources is necessary. Of the four 
accepted modes of groundwater management: separate, 
cooperative, joint management or outside agency management, 
emphasis has been placed on variations of joint management. 
However, joint water management, regardless of the degree 
of sovereignty relinquished by the parties, pre-supposes 
stable internal institutional structures. The lack of such 
national structures has made alternative methods more 
popular and attractive, in particular, development of local 
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water basin authority governance mechanisms.
The crisis in the region is such that if water 
resources remain stagnant, demand is not curtailed and 
population continues to grow as expected, by 2020 the 
region will require some 5000 MCM of water in an area, 
barring drought that will only have the capacity of 2000 
MCM. An integrated approach that combines development of 
new water sources, demand management, increased efficiency, 
environmental stewardship and wastewater treatment is 
required. However, as long as there is political 
instability and weak institutions a bi-national plan is 
unlikely to be adopted. Moreover, even with political 
'stability' if the asymmetrical relationship continues to 
characterize the status between Israel and Palestine, 
institutional disparity will persist.
In response to these challenges, policies and 
institutions must evolve to better manage the water 
resources in the region. As a prerequisite to fundamental,I
large-scale institutional reform Palestine must become a 
sovereign state. Its financial institutions, water 
development and allocation institutions, social, political 
and legal institutions must be functional and equitable 
before any joint management system can begin to 
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collectively agonize over trans-boundary water management.
Water Demand Management is an integral part of any
Joint Water Resource Program and must not only be 
incorporated into policy but must also serve as a 
governance tool. Water management must also meet the 
demands of all sectors of society and all economic classes 
of the population. Water management interfaces with all 
aspects of society such that an overall increase in quality 
of life will have to be attained before realistic water 
demand management can take hold. In other words, toilets 
and home plumbing will have to be installed before the 
population can discuss demand management on a micro scale.
The driving forces for significant institutional 
change in the Middle East are the promotion of equitable 
water resources, reduction of pollution, maintenance and 
long-term care of groundwater sources, confidence building 
and trust among parties. Cost-benefit ratios must also be 
included as a driving force.
Public and private investment is an important aspect 
of all joint management plans and toward that end both 
Palestine and Israel must be attractive and stable to 
attract investment.
Nowadays, with the growing pressure on water resources 
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in many developing countries, it is time that demand 
management strategies be considered more seriously. Demand 
management, including water allocation and pricing should 
be one of the first issues addressed. One of demand 
management's key problems is high transaction costs, which 
include those for research and information, bargaining and 
decision making and monitoring, enforcement and collection.
If the costs of developing new supplies are rapidly 
increasing and the transaction cost of reallocation of 
water or demand management is high, what can be done to 
hold down the costs of providing water? The key is to 
develop institutional structures that lower the transaction 
costs of demand management strategies. Here, 
decentralization could play a very effective role. 
Countries have achieved better quality services at lower 
costs by decentralizing the responsibility for delivering 
water service to local governments and transferring some 
functions to the private sector, autonomous entities, and 
community organizations.
Decentralization, especially in retail distribution of 
water, makes it easier to ensure financial autonomy and to 
involve the private sector and water users in water 
management. Smaller locally managed institutions, whether 
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public or private, have more effective authority to charge 
and collect fees and more freedom to manage without 
political interference.199
199 Alaerts, G.J., Blair, T.L. and Hartvelt F.J.A. (Eds.) (1991). A 
Strategy for Water Sector Capacity Building. Proceedings of UNDP 
Symposium, Delft, 3-5 June 1991, New York, UNDP, 191 pp. Available at 
http://www.oieau.fr/ciedd/contributions/at2/contribution/ciheam.htm, 
Accessed on March 1, 2006
In the Middle East, a complex program combining the 
benefits of centralization and decentralization is likely 





The challenges of establishing institutional 
structures for sustainable and equitable water management 
in the Middle East, as the discussion clearly shows, are 
formidable.
To ensure sustainable and equitable water management 
in the future, I propose the development of a joint water 
management authority that is structured to balance the geo­
hydrological reality of the region with cultural, economic 
and political proclivities of the parties. Such a proposal 
must take into account temporal and spatial aspects of the 
region. As Itay Fischhendler has noted:
"All stakeholders should delegate to one body to set 
concurrently the policies of allocation, pricing and water 
quality. Having one body to address all aspects of water 
will allow tradeoffs to be weighed concerning the quantity, 
quality and pricing of water. It will also help to 
overcome the adverse implications of the administrative 




The following discussion addresses the rationale for 
the proposed Authority, institutional arrangements and the 
challenges and benefits to be derived from this joint water 
management system.
Joint Management under Conditions 
of Asymmetry
The model required for sustainable and equitable water 
management in the contemporary Eastern Mediterranean calls 
for joint water management under conditions of asymmetrical 
institutional structures of the transboundary co-riparians.
Under the best of circumstances and most cooperative 
conditions, measurements to restrict or curtail water 
demands are unpopular and "can only be adopted and 
implemented successfully if the persons involved at the 
different levels-politicians, administrative officials, 
technical water resources management staff, water users and 
other stakeholders-have compatible and coherent attitudes 
on the issues, priorities, constraints and preferred 
actions in ground water resources management. The 
situation becomes even more complicated if the aquifers 
concerned are shared by different nationalities, as in the 
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case of the mountain aquifer shared by the Israelis and 
Palestinians. "201
201 Jac A.M. van der Gun, "From Monitoring and Modeling to Decision 
Support Frameworks for .the Joint Management of Shared Aquifers", 
Management of Shared Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian 
Case with an International Perspective, Eran Feitelson and Marwan 
Haddad, editors.
202 Eyal Benvenisti, "The Legal Framework of Joint Management 
Institutions for Transboundary Water Resources", Management of Shared 
Groundwater Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an 
International Perspective, Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, editors, 
p. 407
Sovereignty
The recommendation to form a single, sovereign water 
authority can only be attractive and appropriate when the 
trans-boundary riparians have reached an extraordinary 
level of confidence in each other and have developed 
internal institutions strong and stable enough to support 
relinquishment of sovereignty without protest. The 
decision of each entity to enter into a joint management 
regime must be carefully weighed. "States will agree to 
confer sovereign authority on the shared institution only 
if they retain important tools-such as veto power, control 
of budget, representatives in the institution's bureaucracy 
and judicial review-to ensure reasonable control over the 
decision-making process, the decisions adopted, their 
implementation or modification."202 In other words, the 
structure of a truly joint management system must be 
carefully crafted to serve each entity and be composed and 
219
supported equally by both entities. Any joint management 
structure must be designed for long-term success. Initial 
steps will be awkward and the eventual institutions must 
vigilantly neutralize predilections of narrow interest 
groups designed to discourage continuation of such 
institutions. In order to protect the institution, 
particularly in its early stages, the rules "precluding 
unilateral exit from treaty obligations"203 must be strict. 
The Challenge of Israeli Acquiescence
Israel is currently contemplating privatization 
options for water resource management. A public joint
Institutional water resource structures in Israel are 
highly regulated and centralized. Policies adopted by a 
joint management plan would enjoy supremacy over normative 
national policies. The process of making Israel a full, 
unequivocal partner in a centralized, jointly managed and 
governed water authority, is daunting, complex and 
challenging. A joint management plan would.be supported by 
legal, administrative and enforcement functions, which 
would supplant, supersede or creatively co-exist with 
current departments and policies within Israel and 
Palestine.
Public Ownership
203 Ibid, p. 410
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water resource management policy would be easier to 
institutionalize within national frameworks wherein "each 
participating state...establish (s) a flexible system of 
revocable permits for individual uses of the resource, 
instead of a system based on private ownership."204 This is 
important for three reasons: Joint management regimes must 
be flexible in order to be sustainable, the permit system 
requires institutional framework that assigns, amends and 
revokes permits and, as such, reduces the likelihood of 
allocation appropriation by powerful interest groups, and a 
successful permit system that allocates water equitably 
would engender respect for the institution.
A successful, Middle Eastern joint management system 
needs to be publicly owned for two additional, specific 
reasons. First, management of water resources is a tool, 
which can be utilized as the means to further mutual 
cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians. Second, it 
would be important for a joint water resource management 
regime to become an integral part of the community at every 
level and, as a non-profit organization, its bylaws would 
provide for returning a percentage of income back to the 
community for good works and investment in infrastructure 
204 Ibid, p. 409
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as part of a strategic plan. Any income above and beyond 
all its costs would be returned to the community.
The Future of the Joint Water Commission
Water resource management strategies are dependent on 
time and space. The political process needed to establish 
a joint regime is similarly dependent on optimal timing. 
As has been mentioned above, in spite of the two Intifadas 
and other setbacks in the relations between Palestine and 
Israel, the Joint Water Committee has continued to 
regularly meet. The residents of the Middle East are 
cognizant of the centrality of water resource management to 
the struggles of daily sustenance and long-term growth and 
development. Water mains and infrastructure have never 
been targets of terrorism. Today, the JWC has ceased to 
serve any corporeal functions. The JWC's only concern was 
the management of water in the West Bank. In the suggested 
structure for a new joint management regime, the JWC would 
surcease. Nonetheless, the foundation that the JWC laid 
would be used to support the structure of a new joint 
management institution and the appreciation for the need 
for water resource management by Israelis and Palestinians 
would serve to strengthen that foundation. A joint 
statement by Israel and Palestine announcing the 
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dissolution of the JWC in favor of the creation of a truly 
joint management institution would be the first step toward 
establishing a renewed sense of confidence. The initial 
proclamation should be accompanied with concrete steps to 
immediately increase domestic water allocations to the 
Palestinians equivalent to the WHO standards of 100 
liters/day per capita.
Subsidiaries
The politics of the region have altered the focus of 
water resource management in several localities in the West 
Bank. Subsidiary or local water basins, which in the 
current structure are already responsible for wastewater 
treatment, are beginning to formulate governing 
institutional structures to serve trans-boundary catchment 
basins.. Local water basin authorities are calling for 
institutional reform with the assistance of non-government 
organizations. The link between a centralized, powerful 
supra-national water authority and subsidiaries is central 
to the success of the joint water management institution. 
This link would be erected with confidence building steps 
between the entities, as manifested by local subsidiary 
institutions. Satisfying local externalities can only be 
accomplished by local residents. The two aforementioned
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cases of Emek Hefer/Tulkarem and the Kidron Valley basin, 
in particular, exemplify the importance of locally managed 
frameworks that effectuate cooperative management of highly 
polluted basins. The component of the joint management 
institution to incorporate these subsidiary actors as a 
vital tool for establishing a new sense of normalization in 
the region cannot be over-emphasized. There are precedents 
for similar subsidiary successes in Europe. For example, 
during the tempestuous 1991-1992 conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia, many dams were destroyed and it was not 
practical or possible to conduct negotiations on water 
resource management among national entities. "A low-level 
agreement was reached in 1992 between Serbs controlling the 
upstream Trebisnica River in Bosnia-Hercegovina and the 
Croat managers of the Dobrovnik hydropower plant. The 
agreement permitted the continuous flow of the river to the 
Dobrovnik plant in exchange for the Croat's guarantee to 
allow the continuation of supply of the river's water to 
the Bay of Kotor area in Montenegro".205 Smaller, local 
subsidiaries are more intimately familiar with local 
externalities and, therefore, able to more efficiently and 
effectively, and at lower cost, focus on the pressing water 
resource issues providing an institutional model for joint 
205 Ibid, p. 415.
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management on an intimate scale. These local subsidiaries 
would also promote public participation and encourage 
programs of equity. Nonetheless, a supra-national water 
authority is requisite to provide coordination, data 
acquisition, funding and other over-arching functions.
Eastern Mediterranean Water Authority
Structure
My proposal calls for the formation of the Eastern 
Mediterranean Water Authority (EMWA). The overarching 
structure of EMWA would be a supra-national, non-profit, 
centralized, governing unit, which would standardize rates, 
monitor water meters for every user and issue permits for 
water extractions. This would be an agency established by 
enabling legislation of both entities, Israel and 
Palestine. It would be granted political power to 
implement and enforce its allocation decisions. This 
agency would be endowed with the power not only to issue 
permits and establish criteria, but also to resolve 
conflicting claims, bring suit against violators, condemn 
property and purchase and import water from outside each 
entity or outside the watershed.
EMWA would, like the Regional Water Board suggested 
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above by Professors Marwan Haddad and Eran Feitelson, 
consist of several entities: a democratically-elected Board 
of Directors, a Water Utility and Local Authorities. In 
addition, it would include a Scientific Committee whose 
first task would be a complete water analysis and inventory 
of the Mountain Aquifer. The Scientific Committee would also 
bear responsibility for developing a transparent and 
efficient database and monitoring system for groundwater 
analysis. The Board of Directors, like the Board of 
Directors of IPCRI, would consist of an equal number of 
Palestinians and Israelis.
The Water Utility
The Water Utility would be structured in order to 
provide income to EMWA and to ensure that water tariffs are 
managed consistently and equitably throughout the region. 
The Utility would be co-managed equally by Palestinians and 
Israelis. The success of EMWA would turn on the 
effectiveness and efficiency exhibited by the Water 
Utility. It would not be enough for the Utility to become 
an 'operations and administration' body. The Utility would 
be required to develop a professional and dynamic strategic 
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management framework. Its most significant 
responsibilities would be:206
206 Gary Westerhoff, et al, The Evolving Water Utility: Pathways to 
Higher Performance, Denver, CO: American Water Works Association, 2003
■ Protecting public health and safety by providing
clean, safe and reliable supplies of water
■ Planning, installing and maintaining infrastructure
■ Responding to customers on a personal but
technologically advanced level emphasizing the
Utility's purpose as a provider of customer service
■ Complying with regulations and transparently sharing 
water quality reports
■ Assuring efficiency and cost-effectiveness. The 
publicly owned Water Utility must be efficient enough 
to stave off attempts by the private sector to 
purchase it
■ Safeguarding the environment
Because of inevitably applied political pressure on 
the Utility to advance the interests of particular 
constituents, it would fall to the General Manager and 
Board of Directors of the Utility to exhibit leadership in 
dealing with outside agencies and to internally manage the 
Utility fairly.
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Labor issues for the Utility are extremely important. 
The Utility would have to develop a strategic partnership 
with Israel's General Federation of Labor, the Histradrut, 
and cultivate a working relationship with Mekorot and the 
Palestinian Water Authority (PWA). EMWA would enjoy 
supremacy over Mekorot and PWA but the manner in which 
working arrangements are negotiated and carried out would 
determine the level of harmony of joint water management in 
the region.
The Utility's human resource strategies and policies 
must encourage excellence and innovation must be supported 
by a positive labor-management relationship.207 There is 
paucity, particular among Palestinians, of trained water 
and wastewater operators, managers and administrators. The 
Palestinian Authority has not fostered training and while 
there are indications that technical support in the new 
regime would be more highly regarded such training would 
fall under the purview of an Education sub-committee of the 
Scientific Committee of EMWA. These future managers must 
not only be cognizant of the hydrologic cycle but also 
expert on matters of microeconomics, legal structures and 
capacity building. Non-government organizations already 
operating in those fields should facilitate such training.
207 Ibid
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There are academic institutions throughout Israel and 
Palestine that engage in such programs and, in particular, 
the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies in the south 
of Israel already has a program where Palestinians, 
Jordanians and Israelis study together.208 
Sequential/Flexible Approach
208 http://www.arava.org/new/
209 Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, "A Sequential Flexible Approach to 
the Management of Shared Aquifers", Management of Shared Groundwater 
Resources: The Israeli-Palestinian Case with an International
Perspective" ed. Eran Feitelson and Marwan Haddad, Ottawa, Canada: IDRC 
and Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005.
It is vital that such an organization succeeds and it 
is proper that it take small incremental steps, a 
'seguential and flexible approach'. 209 EMWA should 
initially take control and govern the aforementioned Kidron 
Valley project. Its goal should be to establish 
sustainable and equitable basin management in the region on 
a local basis throughout the West Bank. The structure and 
methodology of governing basins would be determined by the 
Board of Directors together with local residents in the 
forms of focus groups, town and regional council meetings, 
economic analyses, and thorough analysis and evaluation of 
all stakeholder needs and demands. Transfers of water and 
development of water sources would be determined on a cost­
benefit analysis taking into account current and future 
needs and water quality.
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Benefits of EMWA
Efficiencies in Centralization. Advantages of such a 
supra-national water authority are multifarious. Chief 
among the benefits to a single authoritative water agency 
to manage the entire shared watershed is the coordination 
of all water-related activities under one agency. 
Diffusion and fragmentation of water administrative 
functions have a long history. In the Mediterranean 
region, from Roman times, control of water supply was never 
centralized under one agency. No self-respecting Ministry 
would agree to relinquish all authority over water, and so 
it continues today. In Israel, irrigation is under the 
aegis of the Ministry of Agriculture, the domestic supply 
and Water Commission are located in the Department of 
Infrastructure, sanitation is overseen by the Ministry of 
Health, hydro-electric power under the aegis of the 
Ministry of Energy, water quality and wastewater treatment 
managed by the Ministry of Health and by local agencies and 
environmental policy under the Ministry of the Environment. 
Competition among these departments exists and planning for 
different uses for the same source of water is counter­
productive. Such fragmentation precludes effective public 
involvement in water management. Political will in Israel 
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and political impotency in Palestine make joint water 
management challenging, particularly when cooperation among 
the governments has all but vanished.
Security. Essential to the success of any joint 
management plan or institution is that it not only 
satisfies everyone's needs in the region but that it 
enhances national security for both political entities. 
While on the surface it may be more evident that Palestine 
stands to benefit most since water would be more equitably 
allocated within a joint management structure than under 
the current regime. Israel has much to gain as well. 
Available wastewater would increase under joint management 
regimes, with adequate international funding, at a greater 
rate than projected population growth. That is to say, 
much of Palestine is without wastewater systems for its 
current population and development of this inexpensive 
water source for irrigation purposes can be significantly 
increased. In addition, as the population grows, 
wastewater (which represents 80-90% of all water used) 
plants will multiply providing a regular, reliable source 
of water for irrigation. Israel also has much to gain by 
an increase in quality of life in the region. As a rule, 
quality of life increases correlate with benefits 
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throughout socio-economic milieus. If Palestine becomes a 
more stable, environmentally healthy and economically 
flourishing country it will to the benefit of all entities 
in the region. Just as the Palestinian Authority and State 
of Israel agreed to look the other way and allow the town 
of Tulkarem and Regional Council of Emek Hefer to reach a 
trans-boundary management solution to a serious water 
quality problem, so shall the Palestinian Authority and 
State of Israel agree to allow EMWA to engage in water 
trading. This would allow EMWA to construct a water 
treatment facility in Gaza (desperately needed) and sell 
the water to southern Israeli communities who, in turn, 
would support a desalination plant off the coast of Gaza in 
the Mediterranean, for example. Security is most enhanced 
when resource interdependence is recognized and the 
institutions to manage those resource are equitably 
institutionalized.
Sustainable Management
The criteria for effective groundwater management are 
sustainability of water resources, transferability, 
efficiency and equity.
Sustainability. EMWA provides the best opportunity to 
satisfy the essential criterion of sustainability. Since 
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the watershed of the Eastern Mediterranean is shared, only 
a joint management institution comprised of both national 
entities and cognizant of the hydrogeology, and water 
requirements of the region can guarantee sustainability of 
the regions' groundwater. Only a joint management regime 
would have the necessary access, mandate and authority to 
conduct monitoring of groundwater sources.
Transferability. The expected exponential population 
growth coupled with the imminent expansion of water 
treatment plants and the planned development of 
desalination plants make water transfers inevitable. Such 
transfers can only be facilitated and coordinated by a 
joint management institution, such as EMWA, which has the 
built-in flexibility to engage local subsidiary agencies.
Efficiency. Efficient management of water resources 
can only be accomplished by cost-benefit analysis that 
takes into account all market segments and all population
«
^sectors. Efficient use of water, in particular, careful 
crop selection, water demand management, and recycled water 
is an underdeveloped area that require creative thinking on 
a regional level. It makes a difference to the resident of 
Tel Aviv that the farmer in Jenin is using treated 
wastewater for irrigation.
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Equity. The first test of equity is the guarantee of 
minimum quantity and quality standards for domestic 
purposes regardless of location, ethnic or national origin 
and socio-economic status. Only a joint management plan, 
with a complex structure that provides for centralized 
standards while permitting locally administered conjunctive 
use can guarantee optimal allocations of healthy quantities 
and qualities of domestic water.
The Role of NGO's
The Eastern Mediterranean is a semi-arid environment 
with a rapidly increasing population, diminishing quality 
of water, deteriorating political atmosphere, and waning 
and withering hopes for cooperation. The "Quartet"210 
cannot impose any water management plan for the region and 
international agreements and treaties cannot take root in 
soil that has not been prepared, fertilized and, of course, 
irrigated.
210 United States, United Nations, Russia and the European Union. The 
joint statement by the Quartet on the situation in the Middle East is 
accessible at http://www.un.org/News/dh/mideast/joint-statement.htm
If, then, the prerequisite for any joint water 
management plan in the region requires confidence and trust 
between the stakeholders and national entities, it is 
reasonable to construct the institutional foundation for 
such a program among parties in the region who are 
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cooperative, knowledgeable, highly respected and genuinely 
invested in sustaining the water resources in the region 
and managing them equitably on behalf of all water sectors; 
present and future, individual and collective. It is also 
necessary that such parties not be representative of any 
particular, narrow interest group and that they be 
residents of the region.
Non-government organizations and local universities 
would play key roles in gathering, collating and 
disseminating scientific data but EMWA must consciously 
guarantee the transparency of such data and ensure that 
national entities share all available data. In order to 
accomplish these indispensable functions it would be 
necessary for all water resource management researchers, 
NGO's, members of all EMWA committees and appointed 
associates be given unfettered mobility throughout 
Palestine and Israel.
EMWA Headquarters
The importance of symbolism in the Middle East is not 
lost on anyone. The headquarters of EMWA should be located 
on the banks of the Alexander River; half in Palestine and 
half in Israel.
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Dynamic Nature of EMWA
The structure of a joint management institution for 
the Middle East, such as EMWA, is a dynamic process. NGO's 
and academic institutions would be invited not only to 
engage in the determination of the institution's make-up 
but also to sit on its Board of Directors and serve as 
committee chairpersons. While EMWA would provide regional 
coordination, standards, policies and procedures, including 
enforcement and adjudication, initial steps to engrain EMWA 
into the fabric of the region would be accomplished at the 
local, subsidiary level.
There are many legal, economic, political and 
hydrological questions that need to be addressed if such a 
supra-national institution is to be accepted. It is my 
operative suggestion that a conference be held in the 
region with all interested parties, including emissaries 
from Europe and Australia who, in particular, have 
developed innovative, progressive water utility 
institutions, for the purpose of considering a joint 
management institution for water resources. The political 
entities in the Middle East have choices. As mentioned, if 
current trends lead the region to "Separation Management" 
of the water resources, the future is bleak indeed for 
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future generations. On the other hand, cooperation and 
equitable joint management of the scarce, natural resources 
of the Middle East can not only provide sustenance for its 
inhabitants but also a model for trans-boundary 




The water crisis in the Middle East is magnifying with 
every passing day. Populations increase rapidly, depletion 
of the Coastal. Aquifer continues unabated and few 
wastewater treatment plants are in the planning or 
construction mode.
Direct discussions, on national levels, between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority -are all but non-existent. 
Proposals for management by separation are being planned 
with abandon.
In spite of the current situation, local communities, 
who realize that their sustenance depends on joint 
management of water resources are reaching out to the 
'other side' and forming governance agreements. Water in 
the Eastern Mediterranean has always been a touchstone for 
all facets of society and the residents of the region are 
cognizant of the tentative and delicate nature of that 
resource.
The Eastern Mediterranean political entities urgently 
need to re-engender a sense of confidence and trust in the 
region before 'separation' becomes the new normative 
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reality. It is naive to think that a supra-national water 
authority can immediately take root in such an environment. 
It is clear, however, that under the right circumstances 
and in a nourishing atmosphere such a joint management 
regime would be the proper means to equitably manage the 
water resources and ensure sustainability. The cost­
benefit analysis of such a proposal must be thorough but 
should take into consideration the 'associative' benefits 
of such an institution as well. The region's potential 
improvements in economic development require regular, 
reliable, equitable and sustainable water management as 
does the potential for overall improvements in quality of 
life. There is a bastion of local, academic and non­
governmental organizations that are committed to working 
toward cooperative ventures for water resource management 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and are prepared to discuss, 
research and agonize over the institutional structure such 
a regime should take.
I believe that a supra-national, publicly owned, non­
profit, water authority should be a topic of intense 
scrutiny with the clear understanding that such an 
authority, for the time being, cut its eye-teeth on local, 
subsidiary water issues.
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In fewer than 15 years the joint population of 
Palestine and Israel will increase by one-third; from 9 
million people to over 12 million people and water demand 
(at current rates) will increase by one-third from 2000 
MCM, which is the maximum potential of fresh water sources 
in the area, to 3000 MCM. Palestinian water demands will 
only increase, per capita, over the next fifteen years and, 
within Israel, desalination cannot adequately replenish all 
the water required for its growing population.
The process of establishing an institution such as 
EMWA is every bit as important as the final product itself. 
Determining the appropriate structure for water resource 
management in the Middle East requires input from every 
sector of society. The hope is that Palestinians and 
Israelis can develop confidence-building steps to kick­
start this process and thereby engage the legal, business, 
and community leadership of both entities toward this and 
future common goals. The success of this process, 
particularly in institutional groundwater management, also 
holds promise for the resolution of other transboundary 
water conflicts around the world and, as such, should be 
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